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FROM THE EDITORS
The recent emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a maritime 
power with global reach is less a natural evolution than a willed project. Because 
much about top-level Chinese decision making is opaque, American and other 
Western observers have a tendency to resort to mirror imaging to try to un-
derstand it. And yet in some ways the Chinese can be surprisingly open about 
their intentions. This is particularly true of the maritime realm. As Liza Tobin 
demonstrates in “Underway: Beijing’s Strategy to Build China into a Maritime 
Great Power,” a wealth of official documents exists that can be used to trace the 
increasing focus and emphasis over the last several decades on the maritime 
dimension of Chinese national strategy. Perhaps her most fundamental point is 
that the (now-doctrinal) notion of China as a “maritime great power” is about 
much more than naval power; it also has important economic and psychological 
aspects. The United States clearly has not faced up to the full implications of this 
comprehensive challenge—including China’s stated ambition to be the great-
est global maritime power by 2049. Liza Tobin is a China analyst at U.S. Pacific 
Command.
There has been considerable discussion of late regarding whether a U.S.-China 
war is inevitable in the coming years. Some commentators have argued that the 
United States has a viable option for countering Chinese aggrandizement with 
little use of actual force: a distant blockade of oil shipments to China. Gabriel 
Collins, in “A Maritime Oil Blockade against China: Tactically Tempting but 
Strategically Flawed,” argues that China has an array of measures it plausibly 
could take to defeat such a blockade, and that they could have very undesirable 
second-order effects. Gabriel Collins is a fellow at the Baker Institute Center for 
Energy Studies at Rice University.
A final China-related piece explores the rationales underlying the PRC’s ve-
hement objections to the deployment in South Korea of an American ballistic-
missile-defense system intended to counter a potential missile strike on that 
country by the North Koreans. In “‘Rockets’ Red Glare’: Why Does China Op-
pose THAAD in South Korea, and What Does It Mean for U.S. Policy?,” Robert 
C. Watts IV calls attention to the outsize role that the Terminal High-Altitude 
Area Defense system has assumed in the diplomacy of the Korean Peninsula. He 
is properly skeptical of Chinese claims that the system threatens to ignite a new 
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   3 2/23/18   10:51 AM
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arms race on the peninsula and that it destabilizes the U.S.-PRC nuclear balance, 
and suggests that Chinese opposition has more to do with concern over the 
system’s potential to solidify the trilateral South Korean–U.S.–Japanese alliance. 
Commander Watts is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy.
In “Mission Command in a Future Naval Combat Environment,” Robert C. 
Rubel addresses an issue that has taken on new salience as the U.S. Navy redis-
covers the challenge of high-end war fighting at sea. The emerging concept of 
“distributed lethality” raises fundamental questions concerning the conduct of 
future naval warfare as a networked enterprise, especially given the increasing 
electronic threat to communications at sea. The author argues that these ques-
tions need to be approached in terms of the three fundamental modes of naval 
combat: structured battle, melee, and sniping. Robert C. Rubel is the former dean 
of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.
Recently, the College has increased its focus on Russia through the creation 
of a Russia Maritime Studies Institute, paralleling its established China Maritime 
Studies Institute. “‘Sea of Peace’ or Sea of War: Russian Maritime Hybrid Warfare 
in the Baltic Sea,” by Martin Murphy and Gary Schaub Jr., more than makes the 
case for intensified interest in the Russian challenge to the West—indeed, to 
the entire liberal international order. They argue that the United States and its 
NATO allies, while increasingly concerned about deterring or defeating Russian 
so-called hybrid warfare on the land frontier of the Baltic States, have not paid 
sufficient attention to potential threats from the sea, citing, for example, possible 
cyber attacks against ships and port facilities or the severing of critical undersea 
communication cables. Martin Murphy is a fellow at the Corbett Centre for 
Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College London; Gary Schaub Jr. is a senior 
researcher at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen.
Further reflection on the growing importance of the Baltic Sea region in 
the context of continuing Russian threats and provocations is provided in Don 
Thieme’s commentary piece, “The Baltic, Poland, and President Trump’s Warsaw 
Declaration.” Thieme, a retired U.S. Marine officer and former naval and Marine 
attaché with service in London and Warsaw, explicates the message of the presi-
dent’s underreported and underanalyzed speech of July 2017 in relation to the 
fraught German-Russian-Polish historical relationship.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309, 
332). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main 
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236).
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The Under Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Thomas Modly, was 
sworn in on January 5, 2018, at a ceremony at his alma mater, the 
United States Naval Academy. The following is an excerpt from his 
remarks.
DON’T EVER, EVER GIVE UP THE SHIP
Today’s swearing-in ceremony is not about me or the office; it’s really about the Department of the Navy and our nation’s Navy and Marine Corps. Those of 
us who are privileged to serve in senior positions in the department are merely 
temporary stewards of an incredibly proud tradition of service, courage, commit-
ment, and sacrifice. The Sailors and Marines who serve us today, and those who 
came before us, have kept this nation free and have secured liberty for millions 
of others beyond our shores. We in leadership have an obligation to defend the 
legacy of those who served and to protect those who serve us now. Most im-
portantly—as we grapple with how our Navy and Marine Corps must evolve to 
address an increasingly complex global security environment—we must commit 
ourselves to creating strategies and capabilities that protect and empower those 
who will serve us in the future. The challenges we face—as a nation, and as a 
community of peace-loving people who aspire to build a world in which liberty, 
prosperity, and peace reign supreme—are pushing us to think differently about 
defense. For those of us in the naval service, these complex challenges compel us 
to consider how we must prioritize our investments and our organizational focus 
to maintain the maritime superiority that has served us and our friends around 
the world so well.
When I look at the recently published National Security Strategy of the United 
States, it becomes clear that our world has become increasingly complex, and that 
this complexity will require us to think creatively about how best to protect the 
nation. The four pillars of this strategy are to (1) protect the American people, 
the homeland, and the American way of life, (2) promote American prosperity, 
(3) preserve peace through strength, and (4) advance American influence around 
the world. Whether taken individually or in their totality, all four pillars are criti-
cally dependent on the sustainment of dominant naval forces that protect vital 
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   5 2/23/18   10:51 AM
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sea-lanes for trade, build maritime bridges of understanding with our friends and 
allies, respond to natural disasters, protect our shores, and, when needed, domi-
nate and defeat those who wish to do us harm. We must never let this element of 
our national power diminish because we were unwilling to abandon conventional 
thinking in a time of rapid change.
The Academy is one of the best places I can imagine to inspire creative think-
ing in this regard. As my classmates know—because it was drilled into us during 
plebe summer—every inch of the Academy Yard has significance in some form 
or another. Whether it is a statue, building, quote, monument, walkway, or stair-
case, you can’t walk more than a few feet without being confronted with some 
long-standing tradition or piece of history that requires reflection, gratitude, or 
awe. I would like to focus on three of these iconic Academy touch points, because 
I believe they are particularly relevant to the challenges we face today as a Navy 
and Marine Corps team, and perhaps more broadly as a nation.
One of the first things a person sees while crossing the Yard is the multiple 
renditions of the Naval Academy crest, in both large and small forms—it is every-
where. Emblazoned on this crest is the motto of the Naval Academy: Ex scientia 
tridens. Roughly translated, those words mean “through knowledge, sea power.” 
As we think about the future of our Navy and Marine Corps, no words seem more 
relevant than these. While we surely must invest in more ships, aircraft, subma-
rines, and armored vehicles and in new weapons systems, nothing will be more 
important than the investment we make in knowledge—and in creating a force 
made up of people who thirst for it. Rapid technological advances are driving the 
raw technical requirements for this mandate, but knowledge is not defined purely 
by technical competence. For knowledge to truly produce sea power, we must 
create a culture in the Navy and Marine Corps that is committed to learning as a 
lifelong process—and a lifelong passion. Such a culture is not defined merely by 
certificates or degrees accumulated at regular career intervals, but rather is one 
that encourages innovation and risk taking and produces Sailors and Marines 
who are prepared to excel in circumstances that are characterized by uncertainty 
and by adversaries who are agile and unpredictable. Most importantly, the thirst 
for knowledge we must foster has to be focused on how to fight—and how to 
win. We ask great sacrifices from our Sailors and Marines when we enlist them 
to enter a profession of arms. We ask them to defend us, our liberty, our ideals, 
and our Constitution, and we ask them to pledge their lives and honor to this 
mission. Therefore, we must make sure that no adversary is smarter or better 
prepared, or, simply put, more knowledgeable than they are with respect to what 
it takes to fight and win.
Without this commitment to learning and knowledge and an understanding 
that they translate into a more effective fighting force, we invite aggression and 
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risk catastrophes that are potentially devastating to our security as a nation and 
to everything we hold dear. This institution, as well as the Naval War College and 
the Naval Postgraduate School, must be at the center of this effort. When you 
look at the faculties and student bodies of these institutions, we should recognize 
that we have literally thousands of years of accumulated knowledge and experi-
ence directly applicable to the big questions we must answer as a naval service as 
we look forward into this new century. We must be aggressive in leveraging and 
sharing this knowledge and institutionalizing how we access it to advance sea 
power for the nation.
Ex scientia tridens should be our battle cry as we think about and execute the 
strategies for the Navy and Marine Corps of the twenty-first century. It is only 
through the elevation of knowledge as a core characteristic of the naval service 
that we will maintain our strategic and competitive advantages. It is only through 
knowledge that our sea power can be sustained.
The second most prominent feature in the Yard is the Naval Academy chapel, 
with the crypt of John Paul Jones, the father of the U.S. Navy. Of Jones’s many 
memorable quotations, one in particular is the second point of inspiration and 
focus I would like to mention today. Jones famously said, “Men mean more than 
guns in the rating of a ship.” Since John Paul Jones came of age during an era 
when only men served on naval ships of war, we are obligated to modify that 
great quote, adapting it appropriately to modern times. It loses nothing in the 
translation when we say, “People mean more than weapons in the rating of a 
service.” Jones’s quote recognizes a profound point of truth that is perhaps even 
more relevant today than it was over two hundred years ago.
Our maritime advantage is, and will continue to be, almost entirely dependent 
on the quality of our people. They are our most precious and limited resource, 
and so our efforts and focus must be on them if we are to retain our superiority 
on the seas. As I enter into this office, I have grave concerns that sixteen years 
of wartime operations, compounded by unpredictable, nonsensical, and disrup-
tive budget cycles, have taken their toll on the quality of this, our most precious 
resource. As I prepared to take on this assignment, I spoke with many experts 
and observers of our Navy and Marine Corps who fear that we are approaching 
the point of creating a “hollow force”: a force that is tired, underequipped, and 
not sufficiently trained, but that is being asked to do more and more with fewer 
platforms, less rest, and no relief in the operational tempo. Eventually, conditions 
like these will break our people; and as they go, so will go the rating of our “ship.” 
We cannot allow this to happen, and Secretary Spencer and I are committed to 
reversing the trajectory of the last several years in this regard. The Secretary’s 
Strategic Readiness Review, which he commissioned to examine the recent 
shipboard tragedies of USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald, have lessons for us that 
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extend beyond the surface Navy. We will address these issues head-on and will 
attack their root causes with ferocity, because we have an obligation to our people 
to ensure that we respect them by protecting them, while we ask them to pledge 
their lives to protect us.
There is no greater mission for us in the leadership of the Department of 
the Navy than to ensure that our Sailors and Marines can operate safely, but we 
also must think about how changing global circumstances will demand more of 
them and how we must facilitate changes in our professional culture so it is best 
suited to address and defeat those who may challenge us on and from the seas.
As I mentioned in my Senate confirmation testimony a few months ago, we must 
advance agility when we think about our people. We need to recruit and train 
those who are innovative, creative, and courageous, people who are comfortable 
with uncertainty and who can collaborate and trust their teams and leaders under 
stressful conditions.
We also must tap into the vast knowledge and spirit of the private sector as 
partners with our men and women in uniform, as well as our civilian workforce.
This emphasis will challenge the status quo. Necessarily, it must do so. Such 
challenges are not pain-free, and they will require the Navy and Marine Corps 
to think differently about themselves, but this can and should happen often with 
any organization that wants to survive in a world that is changing as rapidly, and 
as disruptively, as ours is. We must not resist this—we must embrace it.
To put it in context, examples of unconventional thinking changing the nature 
of our Navy and Marine Corps are not without precedent. One hundred and 
twenty years ago we had nearly 150 years of a professional naval service in the 
United States, but not a single naval aviator; seventy years ago we didn’t have a 
single nuclear submariner; thirty-five years ago, not a single cybersecurity spe-
cialist or drone pilot. All these disciplines, and the creative thinking that inspired 
them, have been integrated into what many considered to be a proud, yet change-
resistant culture that was steeped in tradition. Today, we can hardly imagine our 
Navy and Marine Corps forces without a large number of people with any one of 
these skills. These types of changes embodied new ways of thinking about naval 
force and how to deploy it. We must embrace this kind of innovation, but with 
urgency and at a faster pace, because the conditions require it.
What we cannot lose, however, is the warrior spirit and ethos that have car-
ried our Sailors and Marines to victory over and over through the course of our 
history. These qualities must be refreshed and never allowed to atrophy. The 
prospect of a hollow force is the greatest threat to this ethos, and I will work tire-
lessly to ensure that we do not allow our budget and operational circumstances 
to decay the spirit of our forces any further. At the end of the day, the “rating of 
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our ship” is what will determine our collective fate as a maritime nation, and in 
this regard people will always mean more than guns.
Finally, the journey across the Yard ends here at Bancroft Hall—this massive 
building, the largest dormitory in the world. Memorial Hall is symbolic of the 
final point I would like to make today. It was here that everything I needed to 
know about the U.S. naval service came together into one, big, holistic picture.
Most everything I learned in my classrooms, Nimitz Hall, and the chapel, and on 
the parade fields and athletic fields and in the gyms, was reinforced in Bancroft 
Hall. Here I was surrounded by some of the finest young people this nation has 
to offer, who eventually became cherished friends. It was here that I learned 
about leadership, integrity, honor, military history, commitment, struggle, spirit, 
camaraderie, and—perhaps most important of all to me—creativity and the pow-
er of a sense of humor. All these things were on display on a daily basis—none to 
perfection, but always with an implicit understanding of the value in seeking it.
In this crucible I was exposed to people from every part of this country, of dif-
ferent races, ethnicities, and accents, and with different passions, strengths, and 
weaknesses—but all of them committed to the same ultimate goal, all pledging 
their lives to protect and defend the same document. It was, and is, a remarkable 
thing that happens here. It is a unique and precious reflection of the character of 
our country, and it is a microcosm of the qualities that define our United States 
Navy and Marine Corps.
As I stand here before you in Memorial Hall, you can see draped behind me 
one of its most famous artifacts: a replica of the flag that was raised high on the 
mast of Commodore Perry’s flagship, USS Niagara, during the battle of Lake 
Erie. What is inscribed on this flag is the final message I wish to impart to you 
today. Commodore Perry adorned this flag with the words of his dying comrade 
in arms, Captain James Lawrence, as Lawrence’s ship, USS Chesapeake, was be-
ing overrun by the British during the War of 1812. Captain Lawrence, mortally 
wounded from a gunshot, famously instructed his crew to sustain the battle with 
this final order: “Don’t give up the ship!” After Lawrence’s death, this phrase be-
came the rallying cry for Commodore Perry, in honor of his fallen friend. Over 
the years it also has become a part of the lexicon and ethos of our naval service.
In this broader service context, the “ship” that Captain Lawrence spoke of is re-
ally just a metaphor for something greater. When you read about the heroism 
displayed by our Sailors and Marines over the long course of U.S. history, you will 
see that this phrase precisely describes what they embodied in their character: 
they don’t give up the ship. They fight. They fight for the ship; they fight for each 
other; they fight for you.
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Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, some predictable and some not, the 
burdens of their commitment and of this ethos of self-sacrifice are not truly 
understood by wider swaths of the American public, many of whom have no 
relationship with a person who is serving currently in the military. I fear that the 
values and selflessness embodied by this simple command is underappreciated 
by many in this country—perhaps too many—considering that everyone here 
benefits from the bravery it demands.
We as a nation and as a Department of the Navy certainly are faced with a 
long list of geostrategic threats. Russian revanchism; Chinese territorial and 
economic aggression; Iranian murder, mayhem, and mischief across the greater 
Middle East and beyond; North Korean flagrant violations of international norms 
regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and general bellicosity; and the 
growing and morphing threat of Salafist-based global jihad are combining to 
overwhelm our ability to respond in traditional ways. Nonetheless, we face no 
greater threat than the erosion of the relationship between our naval service, its 
maritime mission, and our broader citizenry. To sustain our superiority on the 
seas we must all believe it is necessary to do so. It will require a renewed national 
mandate to invest in a linearly larger and geometrically more capable force. This 
cannot be done without the support of the American people, and through their 
elected representatives in Congress.
A popular question being asked today—and it has been asked of me countless 
times since I was nominated publicly for this position—is whether this future 
force should be 275 ships, 300 ships, 355 ships, or some other number. The right 
answer to this question, in my opinion, is 355 plus, because, while we certainly 
need more seagoing platforms, we also need to increase their lethality and their 
ability to operate in a networked fashion with both manned and unmanned assets 
that contain, restrain, confuse, overwhelm, and decisively defeat our enemies.
This is an ambitious objective—but that, ultimately, is a very good thing. We 
must set our sights high right now on building the Navy and Marine Corps of 
the future, because the only thing we can say with confidence about that future is 
that it will require much more than we reasonably can ask of the forces we have 
today. So we as leaders of the Department of the Navy must mobilize ourselves 
and our fellow Americans to fight for the Navy and Marine Corps we need and 
that our Sailors and Marines deserve.
Today we are at an inflection point not entirely different from the one the 
Department of the Navy and the nation faced in 1979 when I was sworn in as a 
midshipman. We were still recovering from a post-Vietnam hangover that alien-
ated the armed forces from the general population and created hollow-force is-
sues in all the services. Thanks to extraordinary political leadership and our own 
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national resolve, we rebuilt our military and our Navy to the point where our pri-
mary geostrategic foe—a militarily strong and capable Soviet Union—was forced 
into retreat. This palpable national resolve—and the sacrifices of many people 
who passed through these very halls—contributed to the demise of the Soviet 
system, removed the imminent threat of military force on Western Europe, and 
led to a chain of unstoppable events that freed millions behind the Iron Curtain 
from Communist tyranny. There is no doubt that we honored the words of James 
Lawrence with how we responded as a nation during that era. We did not give up 
the ship then, and we must not give up the ship now.
In closing, I would like to leave you with a message that is directed mostly to 
anyone in this hall who served a full career in the Navy or Marine Corps, but 
most especially to my classmates from the class of 1983. My own tenure as an 
active-duty officer in the Navy was short, but those of you here who dedicated 
a career to the naval service after leaving this Yard with me in May of 1983 have 
my greatest respect, admiration, and thanks for your dedicated service. President 
John F. Kennedy said it best: “I can imagine no more rewarding a career. And any 
[person] who may be asked in this century what he did to make his life worth 
while, I think [he or she] can respond with a good deal of pride and satisfaction: 
‘I served in the United States Navy.’”
To my classmates, I want you to know that it is my great honor to represent 
you as I have this very unique and humbling opportunity to serve in the Navy 
again. You have my commitment that, as long as I have the privilege to serve as 
our Navy’s Under Secretary, I will never, ever give up the ship.
Thank you for being here. God bless you. And may God bless the Sailors and 
Marines who go in harm’s way on the seas, in the air, and on the land to keep us 
safe and free.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
IN NATURE THERE ARE MANY COMPETING FORCES. Regarding 
leadership, I believe that the most powerful opposing forces 
that leaders must address revolve around the tendency for organizations (and 
individuals) to maintain the status quo and the contrasting need to adjust behav-
ior to address changes occurring in the environment in which they operate. It is 
easy to take comfort from continuity of activity—“a state of stability and the ab-
sence of disruption.” We know with certainty that the laws of physics and elegant 
mathematical formulas will remain constant and unalterable; human behavior, 
however, occupies the opposite end of the stability spectrum. The challenge for 
leaders at all levels is to maintain the continuity of actions that have proved suc-
cessful in the past, while making modifications as necessary to accommodate the 
changes that inevitably occur.
The Naval War College currently is undertaking a measured program of op-
erational and organizational changes that will keep the best aspects of what we 
have done successfully for over 130 years, while modifying activities as necessary 
to accommodate the ever-increasing level of change affecting the future world 
in which our students will live and work following their graduation. Previous 
President’s Forums over the past five issues of this publication have spelled out 
the nature of many of these changes. This column seeks to put these changes into 
the context of past practice and lessons learned over more than a dozen decades.
Since the College’s inception in 1884, its primary output has been alumni 
with an increased knowledge of the historical precedents of military actions 
and enhanced abilities to exercise critical-thinking skills in times of stress and 
conflict. These continuous threads remain fundamental to our efforts today, 
but our curric ula now include sessions focusing on the changing geographical, 
Thoughts on Continuity and Change
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technological, and political landscapes that exist in the first quarter of the 
twenty-first century. Students now grapple with issues related to such factors as 
operations and potential conflict in the cyber world, adoption of offensive and 
defensive unmanned and robotic systems, and the use of space-based sensors 
and communications systems. Cyber, robots, and space are terms that our founder 
Stephen B. Luce would have found incomprehensible. Yet he would be entirely 
comfortable knowing that Naval War College students routinely dedicate pre-
cious learning time to understanding the full range of conditions in which they 
ultimately may fight and prevail. Other examples of ongoing actions include the 
following: 
• As we teach our Joint Professional Military Education requirements, we have 
increased greatly our war-fighting focus while also increasing the maritime 
perspective. The requirement to teach sea control and the need for sea power 
never have been more important, and we have navalized our curriculum to 
achieve that end. In the training realm, we also have developed a number of 
war-fighting courses such as the Maritime Operational Planners Course, the 
Executive Level Operational Level of War Course, and the Maritime Staff 
Operators Course. We also are designing a new warfighter course for non-
commanders that we hope to implement in the near future.
• Your Naval War College has been educating international officers since the 
first foreign students were enrolled in 1894. Regularly scheduled internation-
al educational programs have been an integral part of this institution since 
the inception of the Naval Command College in 1956, followed by the Naval 
Staff College in 1972. Over the years, thousands of students have earned a 
Naval War College diploma in recognition of their successful studies. Today 
we maintain this continuity of effort, but now we allow select international 
students to earn a fully accredited master’s degree from the College. In this 
manner, they earn global recognition for their increased level of scholarship.
• It is widely recognized that any school is only as strong as its dedicated 
faculty enables it to be. In Newport, active-duty military officers and retired 
practitioners have been partnered in the classroom with highly qualified 
civilian educators for more than fifty years, ever since the appointment of Dr. 
Frederick Hartmann to the College’s first long-term contract in 1966. These 
professional educators—many with advanced degrees from the nation’s top 
academic institutions—bring extensive teaching and research experience 
to the diverse faculty. This year, to enable NWC better to recruit and retain 
faculty of the high caliber desired, we are taking steps to modify the Col-
lege’s policies and practices to resemble more closely the conditions educa-
tors find in more-traditional (i.e., Ivy League) graduate institutions. Faculty 
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committees are working to recommend changes to compensation levels, to 
improve and standardize promotion processes, and to create a form of future 
employment stability similar to tenure. Our goal is to ensure that upwardly 
mobile educators are not deterred from accepting employment at the Naval 
War College out of concern for the degree to which government employment 
rules differ from those at other top-tier graduate institutions.
In considering the issues of continuity and change, I am fond of the words of 
former Harvard University Fellow Pauline R. Kezer, who has written: “Continuity 
gives us roots; change gives us branches, letting us stretch and grow and reach 
new heights.”
The examples above are only a few of the areas in which we are instituting 
carefully considered changes to the status quo so as to serve our students better, 
and ultimately our military services and the nation. I seek the assistance of all Na-
val War College supporters and both past and present members of the extended 
Naval War College family in contributing ideas for change through participation 
on faculty committees, working within each organizational unit, and even by 
forwarding constructive e-mails. Finally, I ask the entire College community to 
recognize the benefits of the small but significant changes being made as we work 
together to “stretch and grow and reach new heights.”
JEFFREY A. HARLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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Beijing’s Strategy to Build China into a Maritime Great Power
Liza Tobin
UNDERWAY
Strategists and onlookers seeking to anticipate China’s next moves in the South China Sea (SCS) often have focused on aspects of the problem that are near 
term, security-centric, and geographically specific—such as whether and when 
China will seize or deploy military platforms on disputed features. These are im-
portant questions, but they are only pieces of a much bigger puzzle. Authoritative 
Chinese documents make clear that China’s activity in the SCS, East China Sea, 
and Indian Ocean and elsewhere in the maritime realm is part of a larger strategy 
to build China into a “maritime great power” (MGP)—an end state that Chinese 
leaders define in the broadest possible terms and view as an essential component 
of their overall strategy to achieve national rejuvenation.
This article provides an account of how Beijing itself depicts its maritime 
strategy in public, authoritative statements.1 The author acknowledges the robust 
body of research that exists on China’s maritime development, activities, and 
capabilities, particularly security-related aspects, and does not seek to duplicate 
it. 2  Rather, the focus here is on understanding these phenomena through the lens 
of Beijing’s own stated objectives and approach, which tend to be exceptionally 
wide-ranging in focus and not limited to the security realm. The intent here is to 
increase understanding of China’s strategic intentions and priorities in the mari-
time realm and to equip U.S. policy makers and national security professionals 
with a more precise and powerful lexicon for engaging their Chinese counter-
parts on maritime issues.
The article is organized as follows. First, it describes the end state that Beijing 
envisions achieving in the maritime realm and how this end state is linked di-
rectly to China’s higher-order national strategy. The article then traces the origins 
of China’s maritime strategy, demonstrating that China’s aspirations for maritime 
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power are not recent developments but are rooted in long-standing concern 
for China’s security and development interests. Next, the article examines the 
country’s maritime strategy in its current form, arguing that China’s approach is 
exceptionally broad and uses every available tool of statecraft to achieve its objec-
tives. The article then considers the strategy’s future prospects by examining how 
Beijing’s conception of its maritime rights and interests is expanding.
CHINA’S STRATEGIC END STATE: MARITIME GREAT POWER
The first step in grasping China’s maritime strategy is to understand how Beijing 
envisions its end state in the maritime domain. In Beijing’s own words, it is striv-
ing to build China into a maritime great power. People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
authoritative documents cite this key term—海洋强国—frequently, as an over-
arching mission statement for a host of maritime programs, ranging across deep-
sea exploration, littoral diplomacy, law-enforcement patrols, fishing industry 
development, public relations campaigns to promote China’s maritime territorial 
claims, naval development, and construction on SCS features. 3
While Chinese government documents from as early as 2003 list “building 
China into an MGP” (or simply “building MGP”) as a strategic imperative, the 
term surged in political significance on November 8, 2012. That day, General 
Secretary Hu Jintao called for “building China into an MGP” in his work report 
to the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, a gather-
ing of top party officials held every five years that issues authoritative guidance 
on all major policy priorities. 4  Hu’s statement at this venue indicated that the goal 
of MGP had been elevated as a national priority.
Hu’s speech listed four characteristics of MGP; together they frame Beijing’s 
overall strategic approach to the maritime realm:5
• The ability to exploit ocean resources
• A developed maritime economy
• Preservation of the marine environment
• Resolute protection of maritime rights and interests 
Authoritative commentary on Hu’s speech makes clear that Beijing views the 
mastery of all manner of ocean-related endeavors as a requirement for achiev-
ing China’s strategic ambitions. State Oceanic Administration (SOA) director 
Liu Cigui, in an article published shortly after Hu’s speech, defined an MGP as a 
country with a “powerful and comprehensive ability to develop, use, protect, and 
control the ocean.” He did not elaborate on what “control” (管控) meant, geo-
graphically or operationally. However, he did not use the term that Chinese strat-
egists use to express the Western military concept of sea control or sea command
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(制海权); rather, he used a more general term with managerial or administrative 
connotations.6 Liu did elaborate further on what MGP should look like: marine 
industries should constitute a relatively large proportion of China’s overall econ-
omy; large numbers of maritime professionals should be achieving scientific and 
technological breakthroughs; exploitation of marine resources should be done 
sustainably; and defense capabilities should be formidable enough to defend na-
tional sovereignty and maritime rights and interests and play an important role 
in safeguarding peace and promoting the development of international maritime 
affairs. 7  He was painting a comprehensive and ambitious picture.
General Secretary Xi Jinping subsequently amplified and clarified the connec-
tion between MGP and China’s overall strategic goals, making clear that mari-
time power is both a requirement for and an expression of China’s emergence 
as a well-rounded great power. Xi explicitly linked the maritime strategy to the 
achievement of China’s interim and long-term national strategic goals: “building 
a moderately prosperous society in all respects” (全面建成小康社会) by 2021 
(the centenary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party); and “the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese people” (中华民族伟大复兴), or national rejuvena-
tion, by 2049 (the centenary of the founding of the PRC).8 In July 2013, Xi led a 
politburo study session on maritime issues, during which he stressed that MGP 
was key to “sustained and healthy economic development” (经济持续健康发展) 
and “protection of national sovereignty, security, and development interests” (维
护国家主权、安全、发展利益). This set up his next statement: that MGP was 
a significant factor in achieving a moderately prosperous society and national 
rejuvenation.9
Liu, expounding further on MGP in 2014, clarified the benchmarks Xi had 
established: the interim goal was, by around 2020, to “lay a decent foundation for 
building maritime power.”10 After this, according to Liu, China would “ascend in 
the ranks of the world’s maritime powers and become [the] world’s main mari-
time power” by around 2049.11 It was an unusually explicit statement of China’s 
long-term aspirations, and one that Beijing may not care to articulate publicly on 
a frequent basis, perhaps aware that doing so would sound provocative.
THE STRATEGY’S LONG-STANDING ORIGINS
China’s modern quest for MGP stretches back decades. The following section is 
not a comprehensive history of China’s MGP aspirations; rather, it attempts to 
(1) shed light on the deep-seated strategic and psychological concerns that drive 
China’s maritime goals and behavior to this day; (2) show how the maritime 
strategy has gained coherence over time, but remains a work in progress; and (3) 
highlight examples of key doctrinal changes, laws, and other authoritative guid-
ance that laid the groundwork for Chinese behavior many years later.
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Victimized, Disadvantaged, and Late
China’s maritime strategy is rooted in historical baggage accumulated over 
centuries. According to one Chinese scholar, “China’s bitter modern historical 
experience began with the sea.”12  Chinese scholars assess that in the late twentieth 
century, China rejoined the international maritime realm victimized, disadvan-
taged, and late. First, Chinese strategists lament that China was subjected to ill- 
treatment by Western and Japanese aggressors approaching from the sea during 
China’s “century of humiliation” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. These writers describe this victimization as a major setback that must be 
overcome with accurate understanding, careful planning, and persistent effort.13
A second source of anguish is China’s “geographic disadvantage”; strategists point 
out that China is “besieged” by island chains in the western Pacific that could be 
used as springboards for foreign aggression, and nearby straits and waterways 
could turn into choke points for cutting off supplies.14  Third, scholars heap blame 
on Chinese rulers, noting with regret that China turned its back on the sea in the 
fifteenth century, and as a result arrived late to the race for rights and influence 
in the twentieth century, when other nations already had made great strides in 
exploiting the oceans for wealth, power, and prestige.15
This sense of victimhood, disadvantage, and lateness is still relevant in China. 
It played out in Beijing’s public messaging on SCS issues in the lead-up to and 
aftermath of the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in July 
2016 on the Philippines’ case against China’s nine-dash-line claims. Accord-
ing to Beijing, China was a victim of outside powers’ territorial invasion, but 
itself showed restraint when responding to provocations. Wu Shicun, a leading 
Chinese SCS commentator, asserted in June 2016 that “China’s sovereignty and 
sovereign rights over the SCS . . . [are] defined by the struggle against imperialist 
aggression.”16 In May of that year, China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom 
contended, “Whichever angle one chooses to look at the [SCS] issue, China has 
never been the troublemaker. Quite the opposite, China has been a victim.”17  Chi-
na’s insistence on its victimhood may sound discordant to outside observers of 
growing PRC maritime clout (a rapidly growing navy, coast guard, and maritime 
militia; a network of reclaimed features and military outposts in the SCS; and an 
outsize role in global shipbuilding, shipping, and fishing). But China’s confidence 
in its increasing capabilities is juxtaposed to genuine angst over lingering vulner-
abilities and past strategic blunders. The trend for China is toward strength—but 
feelings of exposure persist and are a powerful motivator for Beijing.
Returning to the Sea
For nearly six hundred years, Beijing embraced a defensive continental focus, 
viewing the ocean as a monolithic source of danger against which China must 
protect itself. Then, starting in the late 1970s, China emerged from decades of 
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relative international isolation, and as its engagement with the world grew its 
interest in the strategic role of the ocean expanded dramatically. Beijing gradu-
ally adopted a dualistic view of the ocean as a source of opportunity and danger.
Economics drove China to renew its strategic interest in the ocean in the 1980s. 
Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening policies set China on a course to integrate 
with the international economy, boost exports, and develop industrial and tech-
nological capacity along its coast. International legal developments unfolding 
concurrently also helped to 
spark China’s reawakening. 
Chinese strategists highlight 
the adoption of the United 
Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 
1982, which “established an 
all-new legal framework for 
the modern world ocean,” 
as particularly important.18
UNCLOS drove Beijing’s realization that other nations had surged ahead of China 
in exploiting the ocean’s potential. Catching up with—and eventually getting 
ahead of the curve on—international legal developments, so as to capture strate-
gic benefits from the sea, remains a focus for China’s maritime strategy to this day.
The codification of China’s maritime ambitions into laws and guiding docu-
ments gained momentum. In February 1992, China enacted its Law of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
of 1992, which defined the PRC’s territorial sea expansively, to include disputed 
areas covering Taiwan and all its islands, the Diaoyu Islands (Senkakus), the Para-
cels, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratlys.19 It also introduced a phrase to China’s 
lexicon that would become central to China’s maritime strategy: maritime rights 
and interests (海洋权益). 2 0 Other laws followed, such as the Law of the PRC on 
the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, in 1998. 2 1 These laws 
would become very significant; Beijing was laying down markers in domestic 
legislation that it would cite later to assert its claims to contested maritime areas.
For example, China cited the 1992 law as a rationale for delineating its claimed 
baselines around the Senkakus in 2012. 2 2  In 2016, it cited the 1992 and 1998 laws 
to support its SCS claims against Manila at the PCA. In particular, it cited article 
14 of the 1998 law: “The provisions of this Act shall not affect the historical rights 
of the People’s Republic of China.” 2 3
Another contributing factor to China’s maritime awakening in the mid-1980s 
and onward was that fears of ground invasion by the Soviets were receding. Liu 
Huaqing, during his tenure as commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
[A]ccording to Liu, China would “ascend in 
the ranks of the world’s maritime powers and 
become [the] world’s main maritime power” 
by around 2049. It was an unusually explicit 
statement of China’s long-term aspirations, 
and one that Beijing may not care to articu-
late publicly on a frequent basis, perhaps 
aware that doing so would sound provocative.
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Navy (PLAN) from 1982 to 1987, oversaw a shift in the navy’s strategic focus 
from coastal defense to near-seas defense (or offshore defense), expanding the 
PLAN’s mission to waters farther from China’s coast. 2 4  In 1992, Jiang Zemin’s 
work report to the party congress stated that the PLA must improve its ability to 
perform the sacred mission of “defending China’s sovereignty over its territory, 
airspace, and territorial waters and maritime rights and interests, and safeguard-
ing the unity and security of the motherland” (emphasis added). 2 5 In 1993, the 
Central Military Commission—China’s top military body, of which Liu was a 
vice-chairman—issued new Military Strategic Guidelines, a rare and seminal 
event for the PLA. The guidelines formally introduced the concept of near-seas 
defense into military doctrine. 2 6 Furthermore, according to U.S. scholars, the 
guidelines redirected the PLA’s main strategic direction—a doctrinal concept de-
termining the geographic direction that poses the highest risk to China—from a 
territorial focus (premised on a Soviet threat) to a maritime one. 2 7  This paradigm 
shift provided significant impetus and focus to naval modernization and laid the 
groundwork for the PLA’s increasingly distant missions (such as its antipiracy 
missions to the Gulf of Aden) years later.
In 1998, which the United Nations designated the International Year of the 
Ocean, China’s top government body, the State Council, issued the country’s first 
maritime white paper, an early step toward a maritime strategy. 2 8 The document 
outlined “a sustainable development strategy” and called for overall planning 
to develop and control marine resources and “safeguard the new international 
maritime order and the state’s maritime rights and interests.” This signaled Bei-
jing’s desire both to participate constructively in the international system and to 
ensure that China did not continue to miss out on benefits from the ocean. Later 
that year, China followed the white paper with the establishment of the Marine 
Surveillance Force, a paramilitary law-enforcement agency and precursor to the 
China Coast Guard (CCG), to “protect maritime resource rights and interests 
from encroachment.” 2 9 In 2001, China included maritime development goals for 
the first time in its Tenth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2001–2005), ensuring that rel-
evant government units at all levels would have maritime tasks to fulfill. 3 0
Refining a Maritime Vision
Hu Jintao’s tenure as general secretary (2002–12) was pivotal in the development 
of China’s maritime strategy in several areas. These included the ideological, 
military, and government-planning fronts.
With regard to ideology, Hu in 2003 held a politburo study session to exam-
ine factors that enabled the rise of global powers. Maritime power was one such 
factor. The session was followed by government-sponsored scholarly study and 
a television series that aired in 2006. 3 1 Beijing was seeking to popularize the idea 
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that maritime power was essential to the rise of historical great powers, and 
thereby to create a domestic base of support for its maritime power project—an 
effort that continues to the present.
Hu oversaw an expansion of the PLAN’s geographic and functional mis-
sions, paving the way for its eventual forays far from China’s periphery years 
later. In December 2004, having officially taken over military authority from 
his predecessor just a few months prior, Hu gave a speech stating that the PLA’s 
“historic missions” (历史使命) for the current period of the new century would 
include (1) guaranteeing the rule of the Party, (2) safeguarding China’s strategic 
period of opportunity for development, (3) safeguarding national interests, and 
(4) safeguarding world peace and promoting common development. 3 2  Many 
outside observers understood the latter two points as a broadening of the PLA’s 
mission. 3 3  Beijing reiterated these four missions in its 2006 defense white paper 
and provided additional detail on how it intended to develop PLAN operational 
capabilities to support the missions.
The white paper also emphasized that “conflicting claims over maritime rights 
and interests” were an important factor in China’s security environment—one 
that would prove a crucial sticking point years later when China sought to defend 
its “rights and interests” in the SCS. 3 4  A Chinese military expert commented that 
“safeguarding national unity and the state’s ocean rights and interests as well as 
protecting China’s maritime supply lines is becoming increasingly challenging, 
putting even greater demands on the development of the navy, and particularly 
operational capabilities at sea.” 3 5 Some of the strategic implications of Hu’s evolu-
tion in military doctrine became obvious in December 2008, when the PLAN 
deployed its inaugural antipiracy missions to the Indian Ocean to defend trade 
routes linking Asia to the Middle East, and again in July 2017 when China of-
ficially opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. 3 6
Government planners also devoted growing attention to maritime issues un-
der Hu. China’s Eleventh FYP (2006–10) gave more space to maritime issues than 
the previous plan. A section entitled “Protect and Develop Ocean Resources” 
began with a call to “strengthen awareness of the seas and oceans, protect mari-
time rights and interests, protect the maritime environment, develop maritime 
resources, implement integrated maritime management, and promote the de-
velopment of the maritime economy”; each of these themes endures to the pres-
ent. 3 7  In line with this growing attention to the sea, China in 2006 expanded its 
law-enforcement deployments in the Yellow Sea and SCS. 3 8 Then in 2008 a State 
Council–approved document on maritime development noted plans to construct 
marine-surveillance vessels capable of navigating coastal, medium-range, and 
distant waters to conduct law enforcement. 3 9 The Twelfth FYP (2011–15) called 
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for drawing up a “national maritime development strategy focused on building 
China into a maritime great power”—a preview of what was to come. 4 0
In 2012, Beijing established the Maritime Rights and Interests Leading Small 
Group—an informal, senior-level coordinating body with representation from 
multiple ministries and the military. The move most likely was intended to im-
prove coordination among the multiple, scattered bureaucratic entities involved 
with China’s maritime policy. Xi Jinping, then vice president, was appointed of-
fice director for the group. 4 1 This role would have put him in position to exert 
significant influence over the group’s agenda—just as the Party was preparing for 
its upcoming congress, at which Xi would take the helm.
A Watershed Moment
November 8, 2012, marked a high point in the emergence of China’s maritime 
strategy, as noted earlier. Hu’s call in his report to the Eighteenth Party Congress 
for China to “build a maritime great power” signaled that pursuit of MGP was 
enshrined as an integral component of China’s grand strategy, and that Beijing 
was committing itself to a long-term effort to achieve this end. Since then, Chi-
nese officials have cited Hu’s statement regularly as a rationale for their maritime 
plans and programs and to signal their alignment with leadership priorities. 4 2
The MGP strategy not only survived the political transition from Hu to Xi 
but gained increased emphasis and clarity. At his 2013 study session on maritime 
issues, discussed previously, Xi laid out “four transformations” (四个转变) to 
guide the country’s maritime work. Paraphrased, these were as follows: (1) trans-
forming the maritime economy toward quality and efficiency, (2) transforming 
marine-development methods toward sustainable use, (3) transforming marine 
science and technology so that innovation would play the leading role, and (4) 
transforming the protection of national maritime rights and interests so that 
planning would be unified. 4 3  The four transformations overlapped significantly 
with Hu’s four characteristics of MGP, but gave greater emphasis to enhancing 
and upgrading China’s approach to the ocean—in line with Beijing’s broader 
emphasis on transitioning its economic development model to be more “innova-
tive, coordinated, green, open, and shared,” in the words of China’s national Thir-
teenth FYP. That plan, ratified in March 2016, was the next major programmatic 
push for the maritime strategy.
THE STRATEGY’S COMPREHENSIVE SCOPE
For China, building MGP is a comprehensive, whole-nation pursuit touching 
on all ocean-related issues that Beijing considers necessary for China to achieve 
national rejuvenation. Security issues (including the roles of the PLAN, the CCG, 
the maritime militia, and military facilities on reclaimed SCS features) are only 
facets of the strategy, which also addresses economic, environmental, political, 
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diplomatic, cultural, legal, scientific, and other issues. The following summary 
uses the U.S. military’s definition of strategy—ends, ways, and means—to trans-
late and organize key aspects of China’s maritime strategy for audiences familiar 
with this construct. 4 4
• End: maritime great power (海洋强国)
• Ways:
• Expand the maritime economy (壮大海洋经济)
• Strengthen protection of marine resources and environments  
(加强海洋资源环境保护)
• Safeguard maritime rights and interests (维护海洋权益)
• Means:
• All relevant institutions of national power, including government, Party, 
military, civilian, and commercial entities
• Media, diplomatic, cultural, people-to-people, and academic outreach




The above elements of China’s strategy are derived primarily from the maritime-
focused chapter (chapter 41) in China’s national Thirteenth FYP (2016–20), 
which at the time of this writing was the most recent, top-level, authoritative 
articulation of Beijing’s maritime strategy available. 4 5 This article uses chapter 
41’s organizational scheme to lay out the ways, or major lines of effort, in China’s 
maritime strategy. To fill out the picture, and because national FYPs focus mainly 
on economic and social development rather than security issues, it also refer-
ences other documents, such as China’s 2015 defense white paper (Beijing’s most 
recent public articulation of its military strategy), China’s “Vision for Maritime 
Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative,” SOA statements, and official 
readouts of Xi’s 2013 study session on MGP. 4 6
It should be noted that, to date, China has not published a stand-alone, national-
level maritime strategy (国家海洋战略) that, in theory, would bring together the 
numerous strategic threads scattered in multiple Party, government, and military 
documents. However, momentum in Beijing appears to be building to do just 
that; in July 2016, China’s top Party, government, and military bodies jointly is-
sued guidance calling for a national maritime strategy, although they specified 
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no target date for completion. Importantly, such a document would require the 
PLA and other security entities to wrangle with civilian maritime entities over 
priorities—a major bureaucratic hurdle in China’s system. Indeed, the July 2016 
guidance noted that Beijing was seeking to achieve a more appropriate balance 
between two often-contradictory priorities in the maritime strategy: the develop-
ment of the maritime economy and the defense of maritime rights and interests.4 7
Chapter 41 of the Thirteenth FYP begins with the overall title “Expand the 
Blue Economic Space” (拓展蓝色经济空间), followed by a preamble and three 
subsections. This title points to Beijing’s central concern with maximizing 
China’s economic benefit from the sea. The preamble highlights the need for 
“coordinated land and maritime development,” lists the maritime strategy’s ma-
jor lines of effort, and links these ways back to the overall objective—“building 
China into a maritime great 
power.” The chapter then is 
divided into three sections, 
to which this article refers as 
“the ways.” The third way—
protection of maritime rights 
and interests—bears most directly on China’s use of coercion and hard power at 
sea, and thus will be discussed in the greatest detail, given the article’s intended 
audience within the national security field. However, this is not to suggest that 
this way is a higher priority for Beijing; in fact, for Beijing, order often indicates 
priority, suggesting that economic expansion, rather than the protection of rights 
and interests, is the fundamental concern of Beijing’s maritime strategy. Regard-
less, the three ways are mutually reinforcing and should be considered together 
to understand China’s vision of the sea properly and holistically.
Expand the Maritime Economy
Beijing sees the ocean as a new frontier for China’s long-term economic growth, 
and the title of the first section of the plan’s maritime chapter, “Expand the Mari-
time Economy,” is an exhortation to push further and deeper into this new frontier.
The imperatives here have significant overlap with other Chinese policy efforts, 
including transitioning China’s economy to a more sustainable growth model and 
one of Xi’s signature initiatives, the Silk Road Economic Belt and Twenty-First-
Century Maritime Silk Road (simplified to Belt and Road Initiative [BRI]).
Upgrading China’s Growth Model. Beijing portrays the ocean as a partial solution 
to one of China’s most nagging domestic challenges: slowing and imbalanced eco-
nomic growth. For more than a decade, Chinese leaders have recognized the need 
to rebalance the domestic economy away from an excessive reliance on pollution-
intensive, debt-fueled investment in infrastructure and industrial capacity.
Chinese scholars assess that in the late twenti-
eth century, China rejoined the international 
maritime realm victimized, disadvantaged, 
and late.
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However, the standard alternatives have proved insufficient: the rapid export 
growth China experienced at the beginning to middle of last decade has tapered 
off, and Chinese households’ consumption is not growing fast enough to pick 
up the slack from waning investment. Given these shortfalls, policy makers are 
trying to boost growth by raising productivity: pushing indigenous innovation, 
transitioning from low-end to high-end industry, and building a more robust 
services sector.
Beijing sees the ocean as an important domain in which all these upgrades can 
take place. The section on expanding the maritime economy thus has a heavy em-
phasis on innovation, science and technology, and industrial upgrades; attention 
to the first of Xi’s four transformations (improving marine resource development 
to improve economic quality and efficiency) is apparent. Specifically, this section 
calls for advancements in areas such as desalination, marine biomedicine, marine 
environmental technology, and deep-sea operations. It also calls for establishing 
maritime economic development experimentation zones in major cities along 
China’s coast.
Building the Belt and Road. With a flair for historical narrative, Xi has promoted 
BRI as a policy initiative that harks back to China’s golden era as “a resplendent 
maritime civilization.” 4 8 According to the narrative, China used the ancient Silk 
Road to facilitate trade and spread Chinese civilization throughout the world—
before China turned its back to the sea several hundred years ago. BRI is not a 
strategy per se, and it occupies its own chapter (separate from chapter 41) in the 
five-year plan, but it and the maritime strategy are intended to reinforce each 
other, and BRI’s intense focus on external outreach makes it a rich source of in-
sight into Chinese maritime concerns and ambitions. Chinese maritime officials 
note that advancing and defending the Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road 
is one of their key tasks during the Thirteenth FYP period. 4 9 BRI, according to 
China’s State Council, is a “systematic project . . . to integrate development strat-
egies” and “connect Asian, European, and African countries more closely and 
promote mutually beneficial cooperation to a new high in new forms.”50
China thus far has used the Silk Road primarily to promote maritime connec-
tivity between China and Europe via the SCS and the Indian Ocean, and between 
China and the South Pacific via a second route southeast, but its intended reach 
is expanding.51 Chapter 51 calls for “advancing the construction of strategic mari-
time hubs” along the road, and these presumably are intended to help safeguard 
China’s international maritime rights and interests. Beijing has expanded its 
aspirations beyond BRI’s original geographic focus to include virtually the entire 
world. Xi emphasized in May 2017 that “Latin America is the natural extension 
of the Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road.”52  Chinese officials also affirm 
that BRI is “open to all countries, and international and regional organizations.”53
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Like the maritime strategy, BRI is multidisciplinary, with implications for Chi-
na’s deepening penetration into all aspects of global affairs. BRI includes, but is 
not limited to, economics (promoting trade, development, and capital flows) and 
infrastructure (improving land, sea, and air connectivity). In addition, Beijing 
emphasizes that cooperative efforts in the diplomatic, cultural, and scientific and 
technological fields are all integral parts of the initiative. Beijing borrows from its 
own core diplomatic precepts when expressing its principles for BRI (e.g., “new-
type international relations” oriented toward win-win cooperation).54  Security 
and governance are areas of focus in both BRI and the maritime strategy. In June 
2017, Beijing published its “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and 
Road Initiative,” which listed “maritime security” (including search and rescue, 
navigational security, law enforcement, and disaster response) and “collaborative 
governance” (such as policy coordination and dialogue mechanisms) as priority 
areas for cooperation.55 The multidisciplinary aspirations of BRI suggest that Bei-
jing will measure the initiative’s long-term success not merely in economic return 
on investment but also in terms of how much leverage the initiative affords Bei-
jing over the evolution of global rules, norms, and standards and how BRI—hand 
in hand with the maritime strategy—advances China toward great-power status.
Strengthen Protection of Marine Resources and Environments
Beijing describes the ocean as “a basket of life, a treasure trove of resources” and 
recognizes that environmental degradation caused by excessive resource exploi-
tation could constrain China’s long-term development significantly.56 The first 
way addresses China’s approach to harnessing the ocean to drive sustainable and 
innovative economic growth; this next way addresses two conditions that will 
determine China’s ability to do so: the health of the maritime environment, and 
China’s access to maritime resources, including fish, oil and gas, and minerals.
The plan addresses these two conditions (resource exploitation and environ-
mental protection) in one section, or way—a change from how Hu categorized 
them in 2012, when he listed them separately as two of the four characteristics 
of MGP.57  The spirit of Xi’s second transformation (toward sustainable ocean 
development) is visible here.
Specific exhortations include “controlling the scale of land reclamation from 
the sea”—possibly a reference to SCS island-building projects—as well as con-
trolling pollution, strengthening China’s ability to exploit and develop marine 
resources, expanding expeditions to polar regions, researching climate change, 
protecting rare marine species, restoring wetlands, and improving disaster pre-
paredness and response. The SOA lists additional projects for the five-year pe-
riod, including promoting Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian, Xiamen, and other cities as 
international shipping centers with “intelligent ports” technology, and numerous 
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projects related to the exploration and use of tight oil, oil sands, deepwater oil, 
and shale oil.58
The fishing industry is an important focus in China’s maritime strategy and 
is addressed specifically in both the first and second ways (and is implicitly 
part of the third way, as an element of the “rights and interests” China needs to 
safeguard). Demand for fish—a treasured part of the Chinese diet—has risen 
dramatically as Chinese standards of living have increased, leading to overfish-
ing and declining stocks and driving China’s fishing industry farther and farther 
from China’s periphery in search of new sources of supply. According to an in-
depth assessment of China’s fishing industry, “Chinese fishermen, encouraged by 
government policy, now venture into disputed waters in the East and South Chi-
na Seas, as well as other countries’ exclusive economic zones and the high seas, 
to ply their trade.”59 This trend has contributed to tensions with other countries 
and clashes between fishing vessels. The first way called for “developing high-seas 
fishing”—providing political backing for the industry’s outward expansion—but 
the second way acknowledges the need for stricter conservation measures, calling 
for “strictly controlling the intensity of fishing and enforcing a fishing prohibition 
period.” The tension is apparent between China’s voracious appetite for fish and 
its recognition of the need to conserve fisheries and exercise tighter control over 
the industry’s activities.
The Thirteenth FYP’s heavy emphasis on maritime environmental protection 
is logical in light of the greater strategic priority Chinese leaders have afforded to 
environmental issues in recent years—notwithstanding China’s dismal record of 
environmental management during most of the reform period. The Eighteenth 
Party Congress in 2012 amended the Party’s constitution to add “ecological prog-
ress” as an important long-term task, a signal of the rising prioritization afforded 
to environmental issues in Beijing’s national strategy.60 New environmental-
protection policies have followed, although effective implementation often has 
lagged in the face of local resistance, distorted institutional incentives, and the 
sheer scale and complexity of the problem. Many environmental challenges are 
global in nature, adding further complications; China is highly vulnerable to 
ocean acidification, fisheries depletion, rising sea levels, and extreme weather 
patterns, with Chinese megacities, including Shanghai and Hong Kong, under 
particular threat from rising sea levels.61
Science and Technology. Chapter 41 places heavy emphasis on scientific and tech-
nological innovation, a natural outgrowth of Beijing’s intense focus on boosting 
indigenous innovation across the board in recent years. The third of Xi’s four 
transformations (toward innovation-led marine science and technology [S&T]) 
is reflected here. Chapter 41 stresses the importance of developing cutting-edge 
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and green maritime technologies and making new discoveries in marine science. 
In addition to economic and practical motivations for pursuing these advance-
ments, Beijing is keen for China to become an S&T great power as an important 
marker of great-power status.62  The ocean offers great potential in this regard; by 
one measure, 95 percent of the world’s oceans remain unexplored, and Beijing is 
determined that China achieve world-class breakthroughs on this frontier.63  Of 
course, many of the maritime technologies China is developing may have dual-
use applications that could enable military operations as well as civilian missions, 
although this is not addressed explicitly in this section.
For its period, the Thirteenth FYP highlights four major ocean-related S&T 
projects, which extend from those close to home to far-flung ventures exploring 
exotic frontiers. 
• Blue Bays Renovation: restoring China’s polluted gulf and bay areas by 
strengthening artificial coastlines, restoring natural coastlines, and building 
artificial wetlands
• Flood Dragon (Jiaolong) deepwater manned submersible: building platforms 
for deep-sea experimentation and exploration
• Snow Dragon (Xuelong) polar exploration: building a new Arctic observa-
tion station, an Antarctic scientific exploration station, and a new advanced 
icebreaker; raising Antarctic aviation capabilities; and building a polar land-
sea-air monitoring platform
• Global Ocean 3-D observation network: planning for a national ocean- 
observation station, to start building a system for global 3-D observation; 
and strengthening observation and research of the ocean ecology, ocean cur-
rents, and ocean climate
South China Sea. A number of the resource and environmental projects that Chi-
na set forth for the Thirteenth FYP period pertain to the SCS. China touts these 
projects to portray itself as playing a positive, stabilizing role.
According to the SOA, the projects include restoring “ecological islands and 
reefs,” construction of SCS ecological-protection zones, and “public benefit” 
demonstration projects on islands.64  The foreign ministry offered China’s light-
house on Subi Reef in the Spratlys, which went into operation in April 2016, as 
an example of China’s provision of “public goods and services for navigation in 
the SCS.”65
Safeguard Maritime Rights and Interests
In an address in November 2014 at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference
—a rarely convened forum; its meeting signals that Beijing is reevaluating its for-
eign policy approach—Xi highlighted the need to “resolutely safeguard territorial 
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sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, safeguard national unity, and prop-
erly handle disputes over islands.”66 The speech gave increased political signifi-
cance to the term maritime rights and interests. Reference to this term had been 
absent in official readouts of two previous benchmark foreign policy addresses 
—Xi’s speech on peripheral diplomacy in 2013 and President Hu’s address at the 
most recently preceding work conference in 2006.67  The term’s appearance in 
2014 suggested growing convergence between the maritime and foreign policy 
strategies. The Thirteenth FYP in 2016 added further political traction to the 
term and provided greater detail on how China would go about protecting its 
maritime rights and interests.
A number of general themes emerge from an assessment of this way. First, 
China is taking a very proactive approach to safeguarding its rights and inter-
ests, playing both offense 
and defense. Second, it has 
pinpointed both domestic 
and international obstacles 
to overcome. Third, it freely 
intermingles hard- and soft-
power tools in pursuit of its 
maritime objectives.
China’s  pr imar y hard-
power tool for the maritime 
realm—the PLA—is not mentioned explicitly in chapter 41, but the 2015 defense 
white paper states five times that the PLA must safeguard China’s maritime rights 
and interests, and there is significant thematic overlap between the white paper 
and the FYP’s discussion of safeguarding China’s maritime rights and interests.68 
Under the heading of “offense as defense,” China is actively strengthening its tools 
to protect maritime rights and interests. Each of the headers in quotation marks 
below is taken directly from the third section of chapter 41.
“Strengthen Maritime Law-Enforcement Capabilities.” Chinese sources make 
clear that Beijing’s concept of “maritime law-enforcement capabilities” refers to 
a multipronged approach in which civilian and paramilitary entities take center 
stage and the PLA Navy and Air Force are ready, over the horizon, if needed. 
In July 2016, Beijing published guidance that called for improving the capabil-
ity of its “party–government–military–law enforcement–civilian joint force” 
(党政军警民合力) to defend China’s maritime borders.69 The SOA provided 
more detail: “We should claim our nation’s legitimate rights and interests in our 
territorial waters through normal fishing production and through the routine 
patrol of fishery administration ships, marine surveillance ships, and other law 
[B]uilding MGP is a comprehensive, whole-
nation pursuit touching on all ocean-related 
issues that Beijing considers necessary for 
China to achieve national rejuvenation. Se-
curity issues . . . are only facets of the strategy, 
which also addresses economic, environmen-
tal, political, diplomatic, cultural, legal, scien-
tific, and other issues.
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enforcement ships, and should also safeguard our nation’s maritime rights and 
interests with the backup of our Navy and Air Force” (emphasis added).7 0 The 
diversity of China’s maritime law-enforcement tools—particularly its maritime 
militia, vessels of which can be indistinguishable to outside observers from or-
dinary fishing boats—often puts foreign navies in the quandary of not knowing 
whether the Chinese craft they encounter are state directed.
“Deepen Historical and Legal Research Related to the Sea.” Beijing extensively 
promotes its maritime claims to both domestic and international audiences, rec-
ognizing the need for stronger legal and public-opinion footholds for its argu-
ments. Some areas the SOA recommended for deeper research in May 2016 were 
“disputes over islands and reefs,” U.S. military activities near China’s periphery, 
and “false claims” (purportedly by the United States) regarding freedom of navi-
gation (FON) and sea-lane security.7 1
“Coordinate the Use of All Sorts of Methods to Protect and Expand National 
Maritime Rights and Interests.” “All sorts of methods” points to the wide vari-
ety of approaches—diplomatic, legal, economic, military, and others—that China 
uses to promote its maritime rights and interests. The SOA commentary from 
May 2016 provides several examples: building more islands and reefs, providing 
international goods, and strengthening maritime counterterrorism and counter-
proliferation cooperation.7 2
Beijing appears to recognize that it faces a delicate balancing act as it uses 
a variety of methods, both coercive and cooperative, to protect its rights and 
interests, and it probably recognizes the need to avoid advancing too far too 
fast on one front at the expense of others. This suggests that as China advances 
multiple parts of its maritime agenda, it may pause some efforts and then begin 
again, tacking between caution and risk taking, depending on its assessment of 
the environment and its progress on different lines of effort. Observers should 
not assume that these pauses indicate a decrease in Beijing’s resolve or a change 
in its strategic objectives.
“Respond Appropriately to Foreign Infringements.” In the same May 2016 com-
mentary, the SOA called for China to “increase counterresponses to other coun-
tries’ maritime infringements” and “seize the initiative in maritime disputes.” 
This suggests that in the future China might become increasingly assertive in 
pushing back against perceived “foreign infringements.”7 3
China issues warnings about its redlines, such as in March 2016 when Xi told 
President Obama that Beijing would “not accept any acts that infringe on China’s 
national sovereignty and security interests under the pretext of freedom of navi-
gation,” according to Xinhua. 7 4  Beijing’s signaling intensified as China prepared 
for the PCA decision on the nine-dash line in July 2016; authoritative media 
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asserted that U.S. aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and destroyers within the 
region “cemented China’s determination and capability to safeguard its own in-
terests and rights,” and that China was “well prepared for any risky actions the 
U.S. might take.” 7 5
“Protect Freedom of Navigation and Safe Maritime Passage in Waters under Chi-
nese Jurisdiction.” China is building a case for gradually displacing the United 
States in the role of protector of FON and safe maritime passage in waters China 
defines as its own and, perhaps, those farther afield. Here, China states its aim 
to take on more FON responsibilities, with the SOA adding that Beijing must 
“actively offer the public goods and services of FON protection and sea-lane 
security.”7 6
The implication appears to be that Beijing would be more trustworthy than 
Washington in this role; Beijing contends that U.S. military involvement, rather 
than Chinese actions, has destabilized the region and created risks where none 
existed. 7 7  Importantly, U.S. and Chinese commentators often differ in their 
understanding of FON, with Chinese commentators implying that the concept 
pertains only to the navigational rights of nonmilitary vessels and aircraft and 
criticizing the FON operations (FONOPs) conducted by the U.S. Navy as illegal. 7 8
International Cooperation
The next three items highlight the role Beijing sees international cooperation 
playing in its maritime strategy. For Beijing, maritime cooperation provides evi-
dence that China is becoming a major world power with a vital contribution to 
make toward peaceful international development, and is increasingly capable of 
taking a leadership role in global governance.
“Actively Participate in Building and Protecting the International and Regional 
Maritime Order.” “Actively participate” here alludes to China’s shift away from its 
formerly cautious, passive diplomatic approach to a “confident approach of active 
guidance . . . to promote a global community of shared destiny.”7 9 Beijing seeks a 
larger role in the international system, including the constituent parts that influ-
ence international maritime norms and legal regimes, in line with its growing 
comprehensive national power.
“Perfect Systems for Dialogue and Cooperation with Neighbors.” China prefers 
to manage maritime disputes with its neighbors through bilateral dialogue, rath-
er than in multilateral settings involving “non-regional countries”—primarily 
the United States.80 Beijing probably judges it will have more bargaining power 
in one-on-one negotiations with other claimant nations, whereas it would be 
more vulnerable to shaming, exclusion, or ganging up in multilateral forums.81
Sometimes, cooperation—such as that facilitated through BRI—can serve as an
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incentive for nations to accede to Beijing’s terms, through bilateral rather than 
multilateral dialogue.
“Promote Practical Cooperation.” China sees the maritime realm as providing 
abundant avenues for “practical cooperation.” Its “Vision for Maritime Coopera-
tion under the Belt and Road Initiative,” discussed above, is a window into the 
wide range of international maritime cooperation Beijing has in mind: green 
development (environmental and climate change–related efforts), ocean-based 
prosperity (resource use, tourism, shipping, Arctic affairs, etc.), maritime security 
(already discussed), innovative growth (scientific surveys, technology coopera-
tion, standards development, and transfers; educational and cultural exchanges), 
and collaborative governance.82
Domestic Synchronization
The next three items are interrelated and address domestic obstacles to China’s 
maritime strategy: flawed bureaucratic-coordination mechanisms; the need for 
unified, top-level guidance; and an incomplete legal regime. The imperative of 
Xi’s fourth transformation—toward a model for the protection of rights and in-
terests that is based on unified planning—comes through strongly.
“Keep Improving Maritime Coordination Mechanisms.” The first domestic ob-
stacle is poor intra- and interdepartmental coordination. According to the SOA, 
China’s multiple maritime-related agencies “each do things their own way.”83
During the last several years Beijing has focused on trimming bureaucratic 
overlap and sewing up gaps in its stovepiped, duplicative system for protecting 
China’s maritime rights. Although Beijing in 2013 merged four formerly separate 
maritime law-enforcement organs, forming the China Coast Guard and improv-
ing coordination, gaps and redundancies remain among the rights-protection 
forces.84
“Strengthen Top-Level Design of Maritime Strategy.” Beijing believes it needs a 
more centralized approach and coordinated planning for its maritime endeavors. 
This imperative probably explains Beijing’s call in July 2016—a few months after 
the March 2016 ratification of the Thirteenth FYP—for an overarching “national 
maritime strategy” to rationalize and unite its disparate efforts to build MGP.85
This logically follows from the previous imperative, since a unified strategy is a 
prerequisite for efficient and effective bureaucratic coordination.
“Formulate Basic Maritime Law.” Beijing sees shortcomings in its legal system 
that hinder the achievement of its maritime goals, and here Beijing appears poised 
to formulate new laws that will enhance its ability to claim disputed maritime fea-
tures and areas, as it has done in the past. In August 2016, China’s supreme court 
issued a judicial interpretation that established a legal basis for China to impose 
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criminal penalties on Chinese and foreign nationals who illegally enter, fish in, or 
kill endangered wildlife in China’s “jurisdictional seas” (which China defined in 
1992 to include contested waters in the SCS and around the Senkakus).86 Beijing’s 
efforts to “formulate basic maritime law” merit watching as indicators for how 
China will deal with external disputes and justify its activities in international 
waters in the future.
On the institutional front, Beijing is seeking to bolster its legal system’s ability 
to handle a greater number of international maritime legal disputes in its domes-
tic courts, thereby building a judicial system commensurate with its expanding 
maritime reach. Zhou Qiang, China’s top judge, in 2015 called for “building 
China into an international maritime judicial center with more influence over 
international law,” citing the need to provide legal protection for BRI.87
THE STRATEGY’S EXPANDING IMPLICATIONS
For Beijing, the concept of MGP, along with China’s strategy to achieve it, is 
evolving, as dictated by China’s expanding national interests. The implications 
of the maritime strategy, both for China and for the world, are expanding in 
turn. As a senior Chinese maritime official noted in 2012, “MGP’s meaning is 
not immutable; as the construction of MGP is put into practice, the meaning will 
be enriched and perfected.”88 Furthermore, according to PLA scholars, “China’s 
national interests have been gradually extending beyond the traditional con-
fines of territories, territorial waters, and airspace . . . into the maritime, outer 
space, and electromagnetic areas. . . . The expansion of national interests in the 
maritime arena will be an extremely important part of the rise of China’s national 
interests.”89
It is worth pausing to note here that Beijing’s maritime policy concepts—ocean 
boundaries, territory, rights, and so on—are different from Washington’s. China’s 
approach tends to be more flexible and user defined, to comport with its assess-
ment of its strategic requirements, rather than to conform to existing internation-
al legal standards and norms. This can be frustrating to outside observers seeking 
to pinpoint Chinese intentions and definitions. Qiushi, a key Communist Party 
political theory journal, in 2017 offered a definition of China’s “national maritime 
strategic interests” (国家海洋战略利益): they concern China’s core interests of 
national sovereignty, security, and development, and they manifest specifically 
in terms of economic, political, security, and cultural interests.90 This definition 
captures the breadth and flexibility of Beijing’s understanding.
The Thirteenth FYP’s maritime section touches on the expanding nature 
of China’s maritime rights and interests, directing officials to “plan holistically 
for using all sorts of methods to protect and expand national maritime rights 
and interests,” as discussed in the previous section. The directive contains both 
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defensive (“protect”) and offensive (“expand”) components. Government docu-
ments, official commentary, and PLA scholarship shed light on the meaning of 
this brief but important phrase.
On the Defensive: Global Interests under Threat
As China’s interests expand globally, Beijing recognizes that its threat horizons 
are expanding concurrently; its maritime strategy must face this reality head-on 
to “protect . . . national maritime rights and interests.” The 2015 defense white 
paper painted a dark picture of the threats to China’s overseas interests. “With 
the growth of China’s national interests, its national security is more vulnerable 
to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters 
and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and re-
sources, strategic sea lines of communication, as well as institutions, personnel, 
and assets abroad.”91
This list of threats is global, and most of the items relate to the maritime do-
main, directly or indirectly. Given this threat assessment, it is unsurprising that 
the white paper calls for broadening the PLAN’s mission geographically, from its 
predecessor’s focus on “offshore waters defense” to a combination of “offshore 
waters defense” and “open seas protection.”92  This is an explicit reference to a 
shift that was already well under way. The PLAN for years had been seeking to 
synchronize its modernization efforts with the needs of China’s export economy, 
such as the protection of sea lines of communication, as well as operational re-
quirements far from China’s periphery, such as antipiracy activities off the coast 
of Somalia.93  As was alluded to earlier, the PLAN is just one of multiple means 
Beijing uses to defend China’s maritime interests; others include the CCG and the 
maritime militia, diplomats, propaganda, and scholars and legal experts.
While the list of threats Beijing perceives is global, it is easy to deduce that the 
U.S. military occupies a primary position in Beijing’s assessment of threats to its 
maritime rights and interests. It appears that Beijing’s protection of its rights and 
interests requires a gradual attrition of the U.S. security role in the region. Beijing 
uses its extensive propaganda apparatus to cast the U.S. military as a troublemak-
er in the Asia-Pacific region, one with a “Cold War mindset.” PRC government 
and official media statements call U.S. aircraft carrier operations an attempt to 
“grasp hegemony,” U.S. sensitive reconnaissance operations a “severe threat to 
China’s national security,” and U.S. FONOPs a “total disregard for China’s call not 
to disturb peace in the SCS.”94
As China’s capabilities increase, Beijing appears increasingly willing to chal-
lenge Washington in defense of the country’s maritime rights and interests. This 
appeared to be the case in December 2016 when the PLAN seized a USN un-
manned underwater vehicle in the SCS.95 Notably, the incident occurred outside 
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the nine-dash line that China uses to mark its claims in the SCS, but Chinese offi-
cial statements stated that it occurred in “relevant waters of the SCS”—an ambig-
uous phrase in both English and Chinese.96 Beijing went a step further and used 
the opportunity to reiterate its opposition to “persistent close-up surveillance and 
military surveys by the United States within Chinese waters” (emphasis added).97
A Chinese government adviser on maritime issues warned, “China wants to send 
out a signal that if you spy on us underwater and threaten our national security, 
we have measures to deal with it. On the South China Sea issue, we took in hu-
miliations with a humble view in past years. I think this has finished.”98
On the Offensive: Expanding Rights and Interests
Beyond simply defending China’s maritime rights and interests as they expand, 
China’s maritime strategy seeks to expand those rights and interests actively.
This expansion is, first of all, geographic. Beijing is engaged in a comprehen-
sive effort to secure greater rights and interests in seas outside Chinese territorial 
waters. The head of the SOA stated this clearly in January 2016, noting that a key 
task for the year was to “holistically plan for protecting rights in near and distant 
seas and expanding the space for maritime strategic interests.”99 This was similar 
to, but more explicit than, language in the Thirteenth FYP (“plan holistically for 
using all sorts of methods to protect and expand national maritime rights and 
interests”). In a similar vein, the SOA’s official newspaper, in a commentary on 
the Thirteenth FYP in May 2016, called for “actively widening maritime strategic 
interests outside of seas under China’s jurisdiction” (emphasis added).100
While the Thirteenth FYP and surrounding commentary state Beijing’s intent 
to expand China’s maritime interests in the high or “distant” seas explicitly, the 
concept existed before 2016. In 2012, a senior official declared at China’s annual 
legislative session that China’s maritime strategy faced two geographically based 
challenges: first, defending and exploiting China’s “nearly 3 million square kilo-
meters of blue territory”; and second, “accelerating exploration and exploitation 
in 250 million square kilometers of the high seas, as well as expanding our na-
tion’s ocean rights and interests and increasingly using resources from the high 
seas.”101 The SOA, in a February 2014 work meeting focused on protection of 
maritime rights and interests, called for “expanding new frontiers of maritime 
strategic rights and interests.”102
What do Chinese leaders have in mind, specifically, when they call for ex-
panding maritime interests beyond China’s territorial waters? Authoritative 
documents and scholarly commentary indicate that these interests have a strong 
economic component. The opening section of China’s maritime-development 
FYP in 2013 framed China’s maritime strategic interests primarily in terms of 
China’s economic links to the rest of the world: “As a developing country that is a 
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major maritime nation, China has extensive marine strategic interests. With the 
development of economic globalization and the formation and deepening of an 
open economy, the ocean’s role as a link for international trade, cooperation, and 
exchange becomes more and more obvious by the day, and the strategic position 
the ocean plays in guaranteeing resources and expanding development space 
becomes more and more prominent.”103
PLA scholars writing in China’s foremost military journal in 2012 highlight 
economic and political aspects of China’s expanding global rights and interests; 
they frame national security interests as derivative of economic and political 
interests, which determine the requirements of naval modernization. These 
scholars enumerate specific examples of China’s global interests: Politically, 
they include China’s “new rights” in the global commons (international waters, 
seabeds, straits, waters under 
the control of coastal nations, 
and polar areas), the abil-
ity to control foreign vessels’ 
friendly and unfriendly pas-
sage by using domestic legis-
lation and law enforcement, 
and the right to explore and 
develop natural resources in 
international seas.104  On the economic front, they list interests that include ma-
rine industries (fishing, oil and gas extraction, shipping, and shipbuilding) and 
protection of China’s economic ventures overseas.105 Presumably, the latter now 
would include projects associated with BRI.
Several geographic areas beyond China’s near seas stand out as being of no-
table importance in China’s maritime strategy. The sea routes that make up the 
Maritime Silk Road (that between China and the South Pacific, and another con-
necting China to Europe via the Indian Ocean) are key. In addition, even before 
the rollout of BRI, military scholars highlighted the importance of the western 
and southern Pacific and the northern Indian Ocean as vital for ensuring China’s 
strategic access to trade, energy, and markets, and noted that in the future key ar-
eas might expand to include the eastern Pacific (to include the sea routes between 
China and Latin America, as discussed previously), the northwestern Indian 
Ocean, and parts of the Atlantic Ocean.106 On the last, some Chinese strategists 
argue (according to a U.S. scholar’s analysis of SOA documents) that China needs 
an Atlantic strategy because of that ocean’s strategic importance and because it is 
necessary for an MGP to have a global maritime strategy.107
Given the strategic importance of BRI for Beijing and the PLA’s mandate to 
defend China’s overseas interests, it will not be surprising if Beijing seeks military 
[A]s China advances multiple parts of its 
maritime agenda, it may pause some efforts 
and then begin again, tacking between cau-
tion and risk taking. . . . Observers should not 
assume that these pauses indicate a decrease 
in Beijing’s resolve or a change in its strategic 
objectives.
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bases along the Maritime Silk Road, in addition to the base it officially opened in 
Djibouti in July 2017. The Djibouti base lies in proximity to Chinese economic 
interests in Africa and at the strategically important intersection of the Gulf of 
Aden and the Red Sea, on the edge of the northwestern Indian Ocean. China’s 
2015 defense white paper hinted at a rationale for this move, stating that the PLA’s 
strategic tasks include safeguarding China’s overseas interests. Chinese maritime 
researchers in March 2016 called for the construction of “maritime strategic sup-
port points” to protect China’s interests overseas, noting the port of Gwadar in 
Pakistan and ports on the Indonesian island of Sumatra and in the Indonesian 
region of Kalimantan as potential locations.108
Chinese strategists and planners also focus extensive attention on the Arctic 
and Antarctic Oceans, both as frontiers for exploration and scientific break-
through and, in the case of the Arctic, as a strategic transit route. Beijing is 
focusing significant resources on building a better Chinese icebreaker and more-
advanced Antarctic aviation capabilities.109 Strategists see the Arctic Ocean’s 
Northeast Passage as growing in importance as a trade route to Europe, as melt-
ing polar ice makes it a shorter alternative to the Malacca–Suez route during 
summer months.110 In June 2016, Xinhua noted that the China COSCO Shipping 
Corporation—the world’s largest maritime carrier—planned to increase the 
number of commercial cargo voyages through the Northeast Passage; COSCO 
first used that route in 2013, according to Xinhua.111
In addition to expanding China’s maritime rights and interests in a geographic 
sense, Beijing also appears to be seeking to expand ideological acceptance of 
its rights and interests. Beijing is engaged in a broad campaign to raise “whole-
nation maritime consciousness” (全民海洋意识), seeking to develop popular 
support for its positions. Government guidance during the Thirteenth FYP on 
building “MGP soft power” (海洋软实力) called for media outreach, education, 
and academic research aimed at domestic and international audiences, with the 
goal of creating, by 2020, a “comprehensive, multilevel, multidomain system for 
whole-of-nation consciousness propaganda, education, and culture building.”112
China’s efforts to promote its views were particularly apparent in the lead-up to 
and aftermath of the PCA decision in July 2016 on the nine-dash line, in advance 
of which Chinese propaganda organs unleashed a global media blitz in an attempt 
to undermine the legitimacy of the Philippines’ case.113  The tribunal’s decision, 
strongly favorable to Manila, likely contributed to Beijing’s assessment that it 
needed to bolster efforts to create “a Chinese system of legal discourse in interna-
tional and maritime law” to deal with “increasingly fierce competition and conflict 
in the area of global maritime rights and interests” led by “anti-China forces.”114
However, the Philippines’ election of pro-China Rodrigo Duterte in May 2016 
led to a dramatic improvement in China-Philippines diplomatic relations. With 
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an accompanying easing of pressure from the United States—epitomized by Sec-
retary of State John Kerry’s statement in Laos in late July that it was time to “turn 
the page” on SCS tensions—the tide turned decisively in China’s favor.115 With 
external pressure relieved, the tone of China’s public rhetoric on the SCS became 
more positive, and PRC foreign minister Wang Yi praised “the magnificent turn 
of China-Philippines relations” as one of China’s important diplomatic achieve-
ments in 2016.116 Furthermore, Chinese officials began comparing the role the 
United States and other nonregional countries played in the SCS negatively with 
China’s, crediting China and other regional countries with cooling down the 
situation, while “countries outside the region” simply wanted to stir up trouble.117
Beijing’s quest to become an MGP is well under way and is unlikely to be de-
terred significantly. The vital connection that Beijing draws between its maritime 
strategy and the higher-order goal of national rejuvenation indicates that China 
almost certainly will continue to place high priority on achieving its maritime 
objectives.
That said, there are at least three key factors that could throw the maritime 
strategy off track or cause delays. The first factor is international resistance. The 
posture that the United States and other countries adopt in response to China’s 
maritime strategy is a major variable in the strategy’s speed and success. External 
acquiescence would allow Beijing to accelerate its strategy, whereas resistance 
would force it to delay parts thereof. The second factor is economic decline. A 
worse-than-expected Chinese slowdown, protracted over years, would weaken 
China’s economic magnetism overseas and compel Chinese leaders to scale back 
or delay elements of the strategy. China would have fewer economic carrots, 
such as port and basing agreements, to offer in exchange for MGP gains, as part-
ners would take a dimmer view of China’s ability to maintain its commitments.
The third factor is environmental degradation. China has defined “an exquisite 
maritime environment” as a requirement of MGP, but climate change, pollution, 
depleted fish stocks, and other environmental problems raise serious questions 
about the viability of this objective.
China’s maritime strategy is not entirely set in stone, however. Indeed, China’s 
stated intention to issue a unified national maritime strategy at some point in the 
future indicates that some aspects of China’s approach are still pending. Beijing’s 
Nineteenth Party Congress (set for October 2017, as of this writing) is the next 
major juncture for watching for signs of possible revisions or updates to the mari-
time strategy. The open-ended nature of the strategy offers a window—albeit one 
that is narrowing quickly—for the United States and others to anticipate China’s 
future trajectory, nudge it toward conformance with established international 
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rules and norms, and call Beijing out when its maritime behavior falls short of its 
own self-assessment as a responsible actor in the maritime realm.118
Issues that are still in flux at the time of this writing include China’s effort to uni-
fy its pantheon of maritime rights-protection forces into a “party–government–
military–law enforcement–civilian joint force”; how Beijing approaches this issue 
will affect the operating environment for foreign navies, coast guards, and com-
mercial vessels interacting with Chinese ships. Another important issue to watch 
is China’s evolving conception of its global maritime rights and interests. Changes 
in how Beijing defines and prioritizes these in authoritative documents can serve 
as early indicators of China’s intentions to expand and defend its commercial, 
military, diplomatic, political, and ideological footprints overseas.
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Tactically Tempting but Strategically Flawed
Gabriel Collins
As the noose tightens on a state’s economy, the victim may pursue a 
highly risky course of action—such as Germany’s decision to resume 
unrestricted submarine warfare or Japan’s decision to attack Pearl  
Harbor—that it otherwise may not have hazarded. . . . [H]istorical  
experience suggests that embargoes may include actions or reactions 
that are neither orderly nor predictable and that they are not simple, 
safe, and controllable substitutes for war.
ROBERT A. DOUGHTY AND HAROLD E. RAUGH JR.,  
“EMBARGOES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE”
Gabriel Collins is the Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & 
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A MARITIME OIL BLOCKADE AGAINST CHINA
On their own, energy embargoes are not a stand-in for strategy, nor are they an effective substitute for war.1 With a long-term trend of rising U.S.-China 
tensions and China’s growing dependence on imported crude oil to underpin its 
economic growth, distant energy blockades have received significant attention 
as potential tools for deterring, coercing, or terminating conflict with China.2
Significant discussion of the energy blockade issue over the past decade likely 
was stimulated by a 2008 analysis by Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray 
(“No Oil for the Lamps of China?”). 3  “No Oil” argued that, at a fundamental 
level, a maritime oil blockade would create significant political, economic, and 
diplomatic collateral consequences, and thus would be unfit as a stand-alone 
campaign strategy in a conflict with China.
Subsequent analyses typically either focused 
primarily on addressing predominantly tactical 
and operational issues or, in some cases, argued 
that the concerns raised in “No Oil” would be 
deemed secondary during a military conflict 
between China and the United States. 4  Yet the 
political, economic, and financial aspects of sus-
taining a unilateral—or perhaps bilateral, if not 
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alliance-based—oil blockade against China mean that even a militarily successful 
blockader could find its political, economic, and diplomatic position rendered 
untenable well before a blockade could exert its full effects.5 Neutral countries as 
well as U.S. allies would pressure Beijing and Washington strongly to end the con-
flict quickly, even in a distant-blockade scenario that focused on oil alone.6 The 
pressure likely would be exponentially stronger in scenarios in which Chinese 
maritime trade was interdicted more broadly, which likely would be the actual 
case. Under either scenario, as the blockade wore on the U.S. position outside the 
military domain would weaken progressively—most likely at a rate that exceeded 
the speed at which the blockade was pushing China toward termination of the 
conflict. This article aims to fill a critical gap by examining in greater detail the 
nonmilitary means that China likely would employ in response to a maritime oil 
blockade and these approaches’ strategic effects.
While the U.S. military almost certainly can execute the blockade mission 
against the People’s Republic of China (PRC), adverse political and economic 
dynamics likely would turn tactical success into a strategic outcome that, at best, 
would be muddled. Energy and resource blockades clearly would be a critical 
complement to a comprehensive, long-term war effort, and significant concep-
tual and planning work must be dedicated to the subject. But taking a tool that is 
fundamentally about slowly grinding an adversary down and trying to convert it 
into a substitute for head-on military conflict would be a risky strategy. It could 
make regional allies and China question U.S. resolve; it could allow service lead-
ers and civilian politicians to “punt” on important procurement commitments 
that are necessary to ensure credible combat capabilities in the face of China’s 
rising antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities; and it could lull the American 
public into thinking that there are relatively low-cost ways to resolve a military 
conflict with China victoriously—a combination that would be extremely un-
likely in practice.
Great-power wars typically are won on the political and economic fronts, 
where the country with the greatest reservoir of political will and the largest eco-
nomic and industrial heft prevails. 7  Yet the political will in the United States and 
other countries to accept the adverse impacts that globally disruptive physical 
trade warfare would generate should not be taken for granted. Disruptions would 
emanate both from the U.S.-led action and, very likely, from the Chinese retalia-
tory reactions. The political and social stamina necessary to endure an oil block-
ade’s global economic consequences, potentially for a multiyear period, likely 
would be among the most critical factors in determining whether a tactical mili-
tary success could be translated into a strategic victory that would help the United 
States maintain its preeminent position in maritime East Asia. In grappling with 
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this issue, this analysis draws on a broad range of data and historical examples to 
illustrate the profound strategic risks and adverse consequences for the United 
States that likely would follow from imposing a maritime oil blockade on China.
Some of the analysts who responded to Collins and Murray’s 2008 work ex-
pressed remarkably glib opinions on the economic consequences of a U.S.-China 
conflict involving maritime blockades of energy supplies, other key raw materi-
als, and export goods. One analyst essentially dismissed the grave economic 
consequences of attacking a critical node of the global economy and the attendant
—and unpredictable—diplomatic and political pressures this would create, not-
ing that destructive economic shock waves are “a given in any war between the 
United States and China.”8 Another posited that the world trade system could be 
rebuilt in a manner that excludes China, asserting that “[t]he U.S. geographic po-
sition and maritime nature of global trade [mean] the rest of the world economy 
could rebuild around the perimeter.”9
Such views risk creating a dangerous sense of strategic complacency. China’s 
economy is not the equivalent of a discrete brick that could be pulled out of the 
global trading architecture and simply replaced or rebuilt around quickly. Rather, 
the trade flows that are viewed as strategic vulnerabilities also reflect complicated 
international supply chains and manufacturing ecosystems that took decades to 
develop—and to which China is central and critical.
To put the matter into historical context, China today plays a significantly 
more important role in the global economy than Germany did on the eve of 
World War I. Imperial Germany accounted for slightly under 15 percent of 
global manufacturing production in 1913, while China now accounts for more 
than 25 percent of global manufacturing value added, within a much larger and 
more deeply interconnected global economy.10 Rewiring global industrial chains 
to offset meaningfully the loss of full Chinese participation would take years at 
best, and might not even be possible. A prolonged global economic output loss of 
a magnitude at least equal to that of the 2008–2009 Great Recession—if not the 
Great Depression itself—would become conceivable under such circumstances.
Arguably, strategic thought on the option of blockading oil shipments to Chi-
na has been distorted by prior U.S. economic-warfare campaigns against smaller 
countries. Such embargoes—particularly against Iran—damaged the target coun-
try sufficiently that Washington could declare “victory,” but avoided imposing 
systemic global costs high enough to alienate key U.S. allies and supporters. Eco-
nomic warfare against Iran is also a low-cost venture in the sense that—setting 
aside pinprick retaliation through its Middle Eastern proxies such as Hezbollah 
or Shia militias or isolated cyber attacks—Iran has relatively few attractive retalia-
tory options for inflicting serious strategic pressure on the United States. China, 
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in contrast, would have a range of credible military and nonmilitary options for 
retaliating against a U.S. energy blockade. 
Oil-based economic warfare against China would present challenges different 
from and much more complex than those pertaining to the economic and trade-
warfare campaigns the United States has waged over the past several decades.
First, the community of trading nations—many of which chafed under the U.S.
embargo against Iran—likely would be far less willing to tolerate actions against 
China that would harm their own economies deeply, with the pain of such harm 
increasing the longer the blockade continued. Reactions from countries fed up 
with U.S. action against China could unfold in numerous ways, including deny-
ing overflight rights and port and airfield access, severing trade relationships 
with U.S. companies, and refusing to cooperate with potential U.S. sanctions 
against China.
Second, China’s economic weight means that, unlike a country such as Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria, it cannot be cut off from the global 
economy with relatively little systemic consequence. An enduring lesson of past 
U.S. military actions abroad is that we are at our most powerful when we act with 
a critical mass of like-minded nations supporting us and facilitating the trans-
lation of national wealth into combat power. Unless China conducted a Pearl 
Harbor–style first strike, the United States likely would find it very difficult to 
line up sufficient international support for—or at least extended tolerance of—an 
economically destructive maritime oil blockade against China that likely would 
need to last for twelve months or longer to have full strategic effect. The global 
economic injury incurred simply would far outweigh the upside of supporting a 
prolonged campaign whose genesis most likely would come from a highly local 
miscalculation in a place such as the East or South China Sea, where the conflict 
is bilateral but the consequences would reverberate globally.
Third, China has multiple supply-side and demand-side options for buying 
itself strategic space and time to cope with a cutoff of seaborne oil and refined-
products imports. Its crude-oil inventories now likely exceed six hundred million 
barrels, equal to roughly a hundred days’ worth of seaborne crude-oil imports.11
Despite China’s growing absolute and relative dependency on imported crude 
oil, it also remains one of the world’s largest producers, pumping more than 3.5 
million barrels per day (bpd) from its own fields. With Kazakh and Russian as-
sistance, it also likely could surge secure overland crude-oil imports by several 
hundred thousand barrels per day on relatively short notice. These additional 
supplies from Kazakhstan and Russia would not be sufficient to offset fully a loss 
of maritime supplies, but could help stretch the life of existing crude stockpiles.
China also can ration demand and use domestically produced fuel substitutes 
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such as coal-based methanol to extend gasoline supplies and reduce crude-oil 
demand. This article will explore each of these potential responses in depth.
Fourth, past history in the Asia-Pacific region suggests that a successful U.S. 
embargo of oil shipments to a strong military power may escalate conflict in 
unpredictable ways. The U.S. decision to cut off oil shipments to Japan in the 
summer of 1941 helped trigger Japan’s invasion of the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, 
and arguably precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is dangerous to assume 
that economic pressure would be more likely to push China’s leadership toward 
capitulation than escalation. Nationalism is a potent force in today’s China, and 
if an outside power attempted to blockade China’s seaborne oil supplies, the Chi-
nese public would likely call for a strong military response and other escalatory 
measures. Furthermore, many of the potential flash points at which a military 
confrontation could be precipitated between the United States and China—
arising from various territorial and resource disputes in the East and South 
China Seas—involve matters that are disproportionally important to China and 
positions for which Beijing enjoys strong domestic support. Even objectively in-
flammatory measures, such as turning reefs into military outposts, are applauded 
widely by the Chinese body politic, and coercive measures by Washington in 
response to such actions would allow Beijing to portray itself as a victim of for-
eign aggression against China’s assertion of its perceived interests. Framing the 
narrative in this way could help maintain domestic political cohesion and brace 
Chinese society for a potentially prolonged and economically damaging conflict.
The disproportionate importance of fundamentally local conflicts also strong-
ly suggests that, rather than creating off-ramps for escalation control and conflict 
termination, an approach fundamentally based on a distant oil blockade instead 
might lead Chinese leaders to escalate and put the United States in a position 
from which it must either concede to China’s actions or amplify its military and 
political response into a higher-intensity conflict.
Fifth, the effects of suddenly removing more than five million barrels per day 
of demand from the global oil market and cutting off Chinese access to other sea-
borne resource imports likely would send commodity prices into a tailspin and 
cause severe economic disruptions to commodity exporters in the Middle East 
and other regions. Economic damage of sufficient scale could translate rapidly 
into social and political upheaval in an already-volatile region—where, it bears 
noting, it ultimately is U.S. military power that underpins the regional security 
architecture.
China’s global economic heft, other countries’ unhappiness with being sub-
jected to the collateral consequences of a U.S.-China conflict, and the risk of seri-
ous problems for key commodity exporters likely would put the United States in a 
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race against time to force Chinese capitulation before limited reserves of external 
political support were depleted.12  Assuming the United States sought substantive 
Chinese capitulation, such time pressure would undermine a central motivation 
for using a distant oil blockade: escalation control through the ability to impose 
economic pain in a calibrated manner.  
The often-underappreciated adverse consequences do not mean that a distant 
energy blockade lacks strategic viability. Rather, they suggest that policy makers 
considering maritime embargoes or so-called offshore control should recognize 
that, while the United States might have the tactical capability to seal off China’s 
maritime oil arteries, blockades alone are a limited means to a limited end. As 
has been argued previously, “effective blockades typically take years to achieve 
their goals and even then succeed only when they are a part of a comprehensive 
military action that usually includes invasion or massive aerial bombardment.”13
Blockade advocates must consider the strategy’s inherent limitations, as well as 
the full range of potential adverse consequences for American strategic objec-
tives. Otherwise, they risk setting the United States up for a Pyrrhic victory—or 
worse.
U.S. ABILITY TO INTERDICT CHINA’S SEABORNE OIL TRADE
China’s reliance on seaborne oil supplies has risen steadily over the past decade 
and could rise further as domestic production declines.14  The country’s oil-
demand growth rate has slowed dramatically, registering only a 2.5 percent 
increase in 2016. Nonetheless, demand growth now occurs atop a large base 
(nearly twelve million barrels per day), so even a 2 percent demand growth rate 
still would mean consumption of oil products expanding by 240 thousand barrels 
per day (kbd). Furthermore, the current oil price downturn has pressured China’s 
domestic oil output, which declined by 7 percent year over year in 2016 and is 
poised for further declines in 2017, barring a major recovery in oil prices.15
Moreover, the imported oil passes overwhelmingly through the Strait of Ma-
lacca and a handful of other passages that the U.S. Navy could seal off effectively 
(see figure 1).16 Under normal peacetime conditions, the Malacca Strait is the 
dominant waterway for transit of oil shipments; it carried an estimated 16.0 
million bpd of crude oil and petroleum products in 2016, the most recent year 
for which official Energy Information Administration data are available.17  The 
largest tankers use the deeper Lombok Strait, since their draft plus the under-
hull clearance required for safe passage exceeds the twenty-five-meter depth the 
Malacca offers.18
Additionally, a distant blockade would be imposed far from the Chinese 
coast, reducing the threat to U.S. forces from Chinese A2/AD systems. The most 
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important Asian inbound oil tanker routes are the Strait of Malacca and Lombok 
Strait for crudes originating in Africa and the Middle East, and the western Pa-
cific passage between the Philippines and Japan for cargoes coming from North 
and South America.
A distant blockade also would need to interdict the Myanmar–China oil pipe-
line, which eventually could move as much as 440 kbd of crude oil from Kyauk-
pyu in coastal Myanmar to Yunnan Province in southwest China.19 Preventing 
tankers from off-loading at the Kyaukpyu terminal would require few, if any, 
naval platforms to remain on-site. The area could be declared an exclusion zone 
FIGURE 1
KEY PASSAGES FOR SEABORNE CRUDE OIL HEADED TO CHINA
Source: Google Earth, author’s analysis.
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for the duration of a conflict, and if the Myanmar authorities failed to comply the 
facility could be disabled via air strikes, aerial mining, or other kinetic action. 2 0
In short, U.S. forces likely would be able to neutralize rapidly China’s overland 
routes for seaborne oil imports to avoid the Strait of Malacca and other choke 
points farther east and prevent them from diverting forces needed to seal other 
maritime ingress routes.
Differentiating among Targets in a Crowded Maritime Landscape
A large portion of China’s inbound oil trade would be readily targetable because it 
is carried on PRC-flagged vessels owned by PRC-domiciled shipping companies 
or their subsidiaries. 2 1 Vessels operated by or for China’s large, state-owned oil-
trading companies, such as UNIPEC—which has ranked consistently as one of 
the world’s largest supertanker charterers over the past several years—also would 
be readily identifiable. 2 2  Moreover, because a PRC entity would be the clear fi-
nancial beneficiary of trade conducted with such vessels regardless of the stated 
cargo destination, they almost certainly would be seized or turned away if they 
entered a blockade zone.
Yet even after sifting out the “obviously PRC” target set, naval planners would 
face the challenging question of how to permit oil to continue flowing to regional 
U.S. allies “behind the blockade” while also preventing leakage of oil to the PRC.
Oil cargoes can be traded while still at sea in a tanker, creating an opportunity for 
potential blockade-runners to obscure the cargo’s ultimate destination. 2 3  This is 
a strategically important consideration, because smart blockaders typically aim 
to minimize disruption to shipping between neutral countries so as to maximize 
political support for—or, at a minimum, tolerance of—the blockade.
A specially tailored version of the “navicert” system that Britain used dur-
ing World Wars I and II offers a possible solution. 2 4  In the system’s original 
form, a shipper applied to the British government for approval to ship goods 
to a particular country. Then, after investigating the cargo, its destination, in-
surers, and parties that stood to benefit financially from the shipment, British 
authorities granted an approved shipment a navicert, which functioned as a 
“commercial passport” that allowed the vessel to pass through the Royal Navy 
(RN) blockade. 2 5 A vessel without a navicert was treated as a blockade-runner 
and was subject to seizure. Today, a vessel also might be required to place a U.S.
government–controlled tracking beacon on board as a precondition for being 
granted a navicert in such a system. 2 6
In the case of a hypothetical distant oil blockade, secure digital navicerts could 
be issued for carriage of oil and refined products into Asian ports east and north 
of Singapore. To tighten the blockade, the United States could combine navicerts 
and “forcible rationing.” 2 7  In essence, forcible rationing entails allotting a fixed 
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quantity of crude oil (and possibly refined products) to neutral markets behind 
the blockade cordon. The quota would be based on the neutral countries’ actual 
demands, to create a situation in which a neutral country’s reexports to China 
would create shortages and hardship in that market, thus setting up a self-enforcing 
compliance mechanism that creates disincentives to transship crude oil or refined 
products or both onward to China in violation of a blockade. If consumers in a 
specific neutral market were found to be reducing their fuel use and shipping the 
remainder onward to China in response to high-price offers from Chinese trad-
ers desperate for fuel, quotas could be adjusted downward accordingly.
There are approximately thirty large (i.e., 100 kbd or larger distillation capac-
ity) oil refineries in East Asia outside of China that lie behind a likely distant-
blockade perimeter, most of which are in Japan and South Korea (see figure 2).
U.S. regulators could attach destination clauses to navicerts that prevented the 
resale of crude once tankers passed the distant-blockade force and could en-
force these by requiring certified shippers to report vessel locations in real time 
and surveilling activity at oil wharves at regional refineries and storage depots.
Given that Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan likely would have inter-
ests broadly aligned with those of the United States during a conflict with the 
PRC, the United States also could station expert observers at each large regional 
refinery to track distribution of crude oil and petroleum products to ensure that 
supplies were not diverted to China. 2 8 Refineries in Indonesia and Malaysia could 
prove more complex, perhaps requiring additional tracking and verification mea-
sures, such as aerial surveillance of ship traffic to and from the facilities.
These plants’ combined daily crude-processing capacity is approximately 6.8 
million bpd. Since most oil would be arriving over long-haul routes in large tank-
ers, this would keep inbound ship volumes manageable: three to four very large 
crude carriers per day, or approximately ten smaller Aframax vessels, if ship-
ments were moved that way. The certified-shipper system could be replicated for 
vessels carrying refined products such as diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel. 2 9
Handling Noncompliant Vessels
If a vessel were to violate the terms of the navicert, tamper with the permit or 
the tracking systems, or otherwise engage in behavior suggestive of an intent 
to violate the blockade, consequences could come in two fundamental forms.
First, military forces in the blockade cordon could employ disabling fire. As Sean 
Mirski points out, several high-profile sinkings or disablings likely would have a 
strong deterrent effect on future prospective blockade-runners. 3 0
The second, preferable method would occur at the “back end” of the navicert 
regime. Namely, geographic factors and draft restrictions constrain the passage of 
large tankers between China and large overseas oil suppliers, limiting them to no 
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more than six straits and passes between islands in the so-called first island chain 
(the Pacific Ocean between Japan and the Philippines). Generally, after such 
Facility Country Capacity (kbd)
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Mizushima) Japan  380
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Negishi) Japan  270
TonenGeneral (Kawasaki) Japan  258
Showa Yokkaichi (Yokkaichi) Japan  255
Kashima (Kashima) Japan  253
Cosmo (Chiba) Japan  220
Idemitsu (Chiba) Japan  200
Idemitsu (Aichi) Japan  175
Idemitsu (Hokkaido) Japan  160
TonenGeneral (Sakai) Japan  156
Kyokuto (Chiba) Japan  152
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Sendai) Japan  145
Fuji (Sodegaura) Japan  143
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Oita) Japan  136
Cosmo (Yokkaichi) Japan  132
TonenGeneral (Wakayama) Japan  132
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Marifu) Japan  127
Seibu (Yamaguchi) Japan  120
Taiyo (Shikoku) Japan  118
Osaka International Refining Company (Osaka) Japan  115
Cosmo (Sakai) Japan  100
Nansei (Nishihara) Japan  100
Toa (Keihin) Japan  70
 Japan subtotal 3,917
SK Energy (Ulsan) South Korea  817
GS Caltex (Yosu) South Korea  750
S-Oil (Onsan) South Korea  565
SK Energy (Inchon) South Korea  275
Hyundai (Daesan) South Korea  275
 South Korea subtotal 2,682
Petron (Bataan) Philippines  180
 Philippines subtotal  180
 Grand total 6,779
FIGURE 2
KEY NON-PRC EAST ASIAN OIL REFINERIES
Note: kbd = thousand barrels per day.
Sources: “Location of Refineries and Crude Distillation Capacity in Japan (as of June 2015),” PAJ, www.paj.gr.jp/; “About Bataan Refinery,” Petron, www
.petron.com/; “Overview of SK Energy’s Petroleum Business,” SK Energy, eng.skenergy.com/; “Refining Facilities,” GS Caltex, www.gscaltex
.com/; “Oil Refining Business,” S-Oil, www.s-oil.com/; “Overview,” Hyundai Oilbank, www.oilbank.co.kr/; “Overview,” SK Incheon Petroleum, eng
.skincheonpetrochem.com/.
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ships off-load crude oil in China they eventually have to pass back through the 
distant blockade stations if they are to obtain additional crude oil. Any outbound 
ship that (1) lacked a navicert, or (2) could not provide beacon tracking data that 
corroborated its compliance with the issued navicert, or (3) had attempted to 
off-load crude at sea to a China-bound vessel would be presumed to have run the 
blockade and could be seized or sunk. Conducting outbound screening activities 
would have the advantage of allowing naval forces to operate beyond the most 
dense—and thus most dangerous—coverage of China’s A2/AD systems.
CHINA’S NONMILITARY RESPONSES: BUYING TIME
One of this article’s primary contributions is its examination of China’s nonmili-
tary options for responding to a loss of seaborne oil supplies. China has various 
options for offsetting a loss of seaborne crude oil and refined-product supplies.
The potential responses span a range of time and cost dimensions.
China’s initial nonmilitary responses to a distant oil-and-refined-products 
blockade likely would emphasize two core elements: (1) minimizing domestic oil 
demand to extend the life of commercial and strategic crude-oil stocks, and (2) 
maximizing nonmaritime liquid-fuel supplies by working to augment overland 
imports of crude oil and refined products, as well as blending domestically pro-
duced “extenders” such as coal-derived methanol into the gasoline and diesel-fuel 
pools to reduce the demand for crude oil. The intent would be to maintain the 
ability to fuel the military and to support as much civilian economic activity as 
possible, with the ultimate goal of holding out long enough for the U.S. politi-
cal will to sustain the conflict to wane, potentially opening the door for a peace 
settlement more favorable to Chinese interests.
Demand-Side Options
Conservation through rationing would be among the lowest-cost and fastest 
responses to a seaborne energy embargo. The experience of the United States 
during World War II offers perhaps the most applicable case study for assessing 
potential parameters for rationing in China. The America of that era was—just 
as contemporary China is—a world-class industrial power that was heavily 
mechanized, and for which petroleum was an irreplaceable strategic economic 
input. 3 1 Between 1941 and 1944, the United States used a mix of voluntary and 
compulsory measures to decrease private and commercial highway gasoline 
consumption (i.e., transportation-driven gasoline demand) by 32 percent.3 2  As 
transportation expert Bradley Flamm points out, the U.S. achievement was espe-
cially noteworthy because it occurred “at a time when population, employment, 
and income growth would normally have led to large increases in auto ownership 
and gasoline consumption.” 3 3
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China remains in a period of similarly dynamic growth in personal car owner-
ship. Yet there are important differences that credibly suggest that China could 
reduce motor-fuel demand more rapidly than the United States did during World 
War II, and perhaps circumscribe demand even more severely if circumstances 
warranted. First, by 1940 the United States already had more than two hundred 
private cars per thousand persons—approximately twice the current ownership 
rate in China. 3 4  Second, many Chinese still use public transit as their primary 
mode of transportation to work and for daily activities, so a move to curtail auto 
use likely would spark less resistance than it did in the United States, where the 
government faced stiff pushback from many car owners who chafed at gasoline-
supply restrictions. Third, Chinese car owners in key markets, including Beijing, 
already regularly face serious restrictions on their driving—for instance, via 
administrative decrees that only cars with even- or odd-numbered license plates 
can be used on certain days. 3 5
So what would it mean in concrete terms if China responded to a seaborne oil 
and products embargo by imposing rationing that reduced gasoline demand by 
a third relative to preblockade levels? The International Energy Agency forecast 
that China’s gasoline demand in 2017 would be approximately 3 million bpd. 3 6
Thus, a 33 percent reduction in gasoline use—a million barrels per day—would 
decrease China’s total estimated oil products demand by more than 8 percent.
Oil demand likely would decline further as economic activity slowed because 
of the blockade and as civilian consumption of diesel and middle-distillate fuels 
(which are critical to air and naval operations) fell. “Involuntary” rationing likely 
would accelerate as export-oriented factories shut down and trucking activity fell. 
This article’s analysis suggests that the average heavy truck in China consumes 
approximately 144 barrels of diesel fuel per year. 3 7  Under such conditions, idling 
5 percent of the Chinese heavy-truck fleet—a plausible and conservative projec-
tion for the likely effects of an oil blockade—would remove a diesel-demand vol-
ume equivalent to the entire daily consumption of the Shanghai municipality—
approximately 112 kbd.
Rationing also would facilitate the redirection of fuels to the Chinese military 
and critical internal-transport activities. Even during the peak of U.S. military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and “normal” training activities and force 
movements, the Defense Department’s daily average fuel use was nearly four 
hundred thousand barrels per day—an amount equal to slightly more than 10 
percent of China’s domestic crude-oil output. 3 8 Even if some fuel use was not in-
cluded in this figure—for instance, that by transport aircraft and ships transiting 
multiple countries to support operations—it still strongly suggests that China’s 
domestic crude supplies alone would be more than sufficient to fuel the country’s 
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military operations for a very long period, particularly since the PLA does not 
face the “tyranny of distance” and the fuel-use intensity it causes to nearly the de-
gree that forward-based U.S. forces would. Furthermore, China’s rapidly growing 
domestic air-travel market likely would cease to operate during a conflict, ow-
ing both to reduced travel activity and to the need to reroute domestic kerosene 
consumption—now nearing seven hundred thousand barrels per day—to sup-
port military activities.
Finally, the domestic rail system, which moved 13 percent of the country’s 
freight volume in 2015 (as opposed to the 32 percent of freight volume that 
moved by highway), also likely would receive priority fuel allocations. Rail is 
a high-volume coal mover in China, and would become more important if a 
blockading power threatened the coastwise coal shipping that currently moves 
several hundred million tons of the fuel per year from northern to southern Chi-
nese ports. Railroads are highly fuel efficient. Indeed, based on the estimates in 
the previous paragraph and fuel-efficiency data from the Union Pacific (UP) and 
BNSF railroads, shutting down 5 percent of China’s heavy-truck fleet potentially 
would free up middle-distillate fuel sufficient to move roughly 1.5 trillion ton-
miles of goods. 3 9 This volume would be equivalent to 13 percent of all freight 
goods transported in China during 2015, according to data from the National 
Bureau of Statistics. 4 0
Supply-Side Options
Rationing and other conservation activities would set the stage for China’s core 
supply-side response to a disruption in the supply of oil and refined products 
caused by a blockade: tapping strategic and commercial stockpiles. As the coun-
try drew down crude-oil and petroleum-products inventories, it also would 
redouble efforts to procure additional supplies via pipeline, rail, and truck from 
Kazakhstan and Russia. 4 1 These two overland supplier countries are China’s “stra-
tegic depth,” from an oil-security perspective. They have significant supplies of 
crude and the ability to increase flows to China fairly rapidly, and likely would 
have abundant diplomatic and geostrategic reasons in the event of a maritime 
oil blockade to scale up overland oil supplies to China, quietly but significantly.
Once scale-up occurred and infrastructure kinks were ironed out, these increased 
supplies—one could call them the “Oil Silk Road”—likely could be sustained for 
years and could undermine a blockade meaningfully by extending the time an 
adversary would have to sustain it.
The Atasu–A-la Shan-k’ou (Alashankou) pipeline that brings Kazakh and 
some Russian crude into Xinjiang currently has a capacity of twenty million tons 
per year—approximately four hundred thousand barrels per day. 4 2  Since early 
2014, the line has operated below capacity, and as of October 2017 it delivered 
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only about fifty thousand barrels per day, suggesting that the line currently has 
approximately 350 kbd of “headroom” if supplies needed to be surged in the event 
of a seaborne energy embargo. 4 3
From Russia, the first Skovorodino–Daqing crude-oil pipeline entered service 
in 2010 and now can deliver a maximum supply of four hundred thousand bar-
rels per day. 4 4  Transneft and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
are now in the final stages of building a parallel pipeline from Skovorodino to 
Daqing that would expand the system capacity to six hundred thousand barrels 
per day; it is slated to enter service in 2018. 4 5 In April 2017, CNPC also put the 
440 kbd–capacity Myanmar–China oil pipeline into operation, but this system 
should not be considered a “secure” source of supply the way Kazakh and Russian 
pipelines are, because, as discussed above, it is highly vulnerable to naval inter-
diction, especially if a conflict escalated. 4 6
In the event of a blockade, Chinese traders also likely would move rapidly to 
secure supplies via rail. Prior to the construction of the Skovorodino–Daqing 
pipeline spur, Russian producers delivered as much as 228 kbd of crude by rail 
into China. 4 7  The ultimate surge capacity during a crisis would depend primar-
ily on three factors: (1) congestion on key Siberian rail routes between the west 
Siberian oil fields and the Chinese and Kazakh borders, (2) the availability of 
tank cars on each side of the border, and (3) the speed with which Russian and 
Chinese rail operators could calibrate their train cycle times to maximize rolling 
stock use. GlobalTrans, one of Russia’s primary freight-rail operators, reported at 
the end of 2016 that the country had a total of 260,000 operational tank cars. 4 8 To 
put that number in perspective, the United States had 371,000 operational tank 
cars at the end of 2014, at which point railroads were moving more than 950 kbd 
of crude within U.S. borders. 4 9
From mid-2012 to spring 2013, U.S. railroads more than doubled their crude-
oil haulage volume as coastal refiners demanded crudes from burgeoning shale 
plays.50 The scale-up rate and total haul volume were facilitated by the high ef-
ficiency of the U.S. freight rail network and the fact that even the distant Bakken 
oil fields in western North Dakota were never more than about 2,400 km from 
end-user markets. In contrast, a crude measurement on Google Earth suggests 
that the rail distance from Russia’s core oil fields in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous 
Okrug to the main ingress point for rail-borne crude at Manzhouli, Inner Mon-
golia, is nearly four thousand kilometers each way. Given these numbers, even a 
full mobilization of Russian crude by rail hauling apparatus likely would not be 
able to deliver more than perhaps four hundred thousand barrels per day sus-
tainably, with an additional one hundred thousand barrels per day coming from 
Kazakhstan (see figure 3). These volumes would be helpful—but they are not 
blockade breakers by any means.
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Expanding Pipeline Capacity from Russia. Transneft’s eastern Siberia–Pacific 
Ocean (ESPO) pipeline currently can transport fifty-eight million tons (roughly 1 
million bpd) of crude oil per year from Tayshet to Skovorodino, which is the start 
point of the southbound pipeline system into the Daqing area.51 The pipeline 
spur into China currently can transport approximately four hundred thousand 
barrels of crude per day and is expected to be capable of moving six hundred 
thousand barrels per day once a parallel pipeline whose construction was com-
pleted in November 2017 enters service in early 2018.52  
Those numbers suggest that if the first stage of the ESPO from Tayshet to 
Skovorodino were to run at full capacity under current parameters, there would 
be an additional four hundred thousand barrels of oil available per day once the 
pipelines into China were running at full utilization. Transneft plans to expand 
the ESPO’s capacity to eighty million tons per year (1.6 million bpd) by 2020.53
Taking this full-capacity number and subtracting the anticipated amount slated 
to head into China (six hundred thousand barrels per day) suggests that as much 
as one million barrels per day could be available if an exigent situation led Rus-
sian firms to breach contracts for seaborne supplies through the port of Kozmino 
and instead make oil available to supply China. The big question is how so much 
oil could be moved in a timely manner. As outlined above, rail and truck will play 
a key role initially. However, another option exists that has not received much, 
if any, consideration to date: building additional southbound pipeline capacity.
Atasu–A-la Shan-k’ou
Oil Pipeline (400 kbd).
Myanmar–China Oil Pipeline (400 kbd).
Access likely to be denied.
Tayshet–Skovorodino Oil Pipeline (1,600 
kbd by 2020).
Cross-border capacity of 400 kbd at the time 
of writing; 600 kbd projected by the rst 
quarter of 2018.
Wartime emergency could see additional 
surge capacity of 700 kbd for a total of 1,300 
kbd post-2018 within eight months after 
commencement of conict.
Note:
Insucient cross-border infrastructure and lack of domestic 
oil supplies would largely prevent strategically signicant 
transshipment from Vietnam, Laos, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan into China. Political
factors likely to hinder potential supplies via Indian or 
Mongolian borders.
FIGURE 3
CHINA’S OVERLAND OIL SUPPLY OPTIONS
Note: kbd = thousand barrels per day.
Source: Google Earth, author’s analysis.
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China was able to build the initial Russia–China pipeline at an average rate of 
approximately 1.6 km per day, and has built crude-oil pipelines in western China 
at rates approaching 2.25 km per day.54  The Jinzhou–Zhengzhou oil-products line 
was welded at an average rate of 3.6 km per day.55 In a time of national emergency, 
pipelines could be built much more quickly, as builders likely would marshal a 
much larger share of their equipment and manpower for a select few “national 
priority” projects than would be the case under normal conditions.
Perhaps the closest historical analogy comes from the American construction 
of the “Big Inch” oil pipeline during World War II. The Big Inch enabled the 
secure overland movement of crude oil from Texas oil fields to East Coast refin-
eries. Oil formerly had been moved from the Gulf of Mexico in coastwise tank-
ers, but German submarine attacks jeopardized this maritime supply line and 
forced the United States to find alternative routes. At 1,254 miles (two thousand 
kilometers) long, the Big Inch covered roughly twice the distance a line from the 
Russian border to Daqing would, and construction crews managed to complete 
it in just 350 days—an average construction rate of nearly six kilometers per 
day.56 Therefore, it is not inconceivable that a thousand-kilometer pipeline from 
Russia capable of moving several—perhaps as many as seven to eight—hundred 
thousand barrels of crude oil per day into the Daqing area could be built within 
six months.57
If rationing, demand substitution, and overland supply measures were com-
bined with a pipeline that could be brought on line within six months of the 
conflict’s commencement, the effects on China’s ability to withstand a maritime 
oil blockade could be profound. Because Transneft’s eastbound pipelines are now 
linked to fields in eastern Siberia and Russia’s core west Siberian producing areas, 
crude supplies could be sustained for a long period and the infrastructure would 
be located far inland, where it could be struck only at significant risk to the at-
tacker’s forces and with a high risk of escalation.
Use of “Fuel Extenders.” Chinese fuel providers could blend methanol produced 
from abundant domestic coal reserves into the country’s gasoline and diesel fuel 
supplies as a way to replace some degree of seaborne crude-oil imports lost to a 
blockade. The focus is on methanol as a fuel extender because, unlike ethanol 
produced from corn and staple grains, methanol production does not consume 
essential human food supplies.
The fuel extenders would provide China with multiple strategic advantages. 
Methanol can be produced from the country’s abundant domestic coal supplies.
Argus, a petroleum market data provider, estimates that by 2018 China will be 
able to produce approximately 120 million tons per year of methanol (equivalent 
to 2.6 million bpd), 80 percent of which is slated to come from coal feedstock 
and would be invulnerable to a maritime blockade, at least from a feedstock 
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perspective.58 However, China would need to be self-sufficient in the catalysts 
used to make methanol from coal; some of China’s largest coal-to-methanol 
plants currently source their catalysts from a key foreign-domiciled manufac-
turer that very likely would face significant pressure to curb Chinese customers’ 
access to catalysts during any conflict between China and the United States.59 It is 
currently unclear to what extent the Chinese coal-to-methanol industry depends 
on foreign-sourced catalysts.
Modern fuel-injected gasoline engines generally can tolerate a blend of 15 
percent methanol and 85 percent gasoline, also known as M15.60 At least sixteen 
Chinese provinces—including some of the country’s largest gasoline markets—
have promulgated local methanol-gasoline standards, and the country overall 
already blends approximately five hundred thousand barrels per day of methanol 
into its gasoline and motor-fuel pools, displacing the equivalent of 250 kbd of 
crude oil.61 At the end of 2015, China had an estimated 55 million tons per year 
(around 1,190 kbd) of domestic methanol-production capacity, according to 
market data provider Platts.62  China’s methanol-production capacity increased 
by 7.16 million tons per annum (tpa) in 2016, and is slated to rise by a further 7 
million tpa in 2017, bringing the total nameplate capacity to nearly 1,500 kbd.63
Argus estimates that, counting captive supply for methanol-to-olefins plants, 
China’s total methanol-production capacity could be as much as 120 million tpa 
by 2020—roughly 2.6 million bpd.64  It is thus highly plausible that by early 2019 
China could have 2 million bpd of domestic methanol-production capacity.
Much of China’s domestic methanol supply currently is used to produce 
olefins—a feedstock for petrochemical and polymer production. It is very likely 
that during a blockade contingency the Chinese government would prioritize 
liquid-fuel availability over the manufacturing of polymers and petrochemicals, a 
significant portion of which go to export markets. Of a domestic methanol supply 
exceeding 2.5 million bpd, a substantial portion of the stream likely would be di-
verted into the gasoline/motor-fuel supply, to reduce the call on crude oil. (Here 
it should be noted that a gallon of methanol yields approximately 49 percent as 
much energy as a gallon of gasoline.)65
If Chinese policy makers chose to replace 15 percent of the refined blendstocks 
from crude oil in the country’s total gasoline pool with coal-derived methanol, 
this would suggest a requirement for approximately six hundred thousand bar-
rels per day of methanol.66 The country’s estimated 2018 domestic coal-based 
methanol-production capacity of roughly two million barrels per day would be 
able to accommodate this number, and in doing so would displace the energy 
equivalent of nearly three hundred thousand barrels per day of crude oil–derived 
products demand.67
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Tests by researchers in Australia and Iran have shown that a lightly modified 
common diesel engine could run successfully on a blend of diesel fuel and metha-
nol. The team tried mixes incorporating 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent 
methanol by volume and found that a 10 percent methanol / 90 percent diesel 
blend generally performed best in terms of delivering a usable torque curve, ad-
equate power, and reasonably efficient fuel consumption.68 However, the blend 
ratio likely would be pushed higher to maximize the reduction in crude-oil usage; 
therefore, this analysis uses 15 percent as the methanol-blend figure. With 2.25 
barrels of methanol as the energy equivalent of one barrel of diesel fuel, 725 kbd 
of methanol theoretically could meet 15 percent of China’s diesel-fuel demand 
volume (3.3 million bpd × 5 percent demand reduction × 15 percent of supply × 
2.25 = 724 kbd of methanol) and displace 320 kbd of crude oil–derived products 
consumption. Large-scale adoption of fuel extenders likely would create addi-
tional engine performance and maintenance issues above what Chinese drivers 
experience today, but a blockade-driven crisis scenario likely would make vehicle 
users willing to accept and adapt to such disruptions.
COMBINED MEASURES WOULD HELP CHINA MAXIMIZE  
PRESSURE ON THE BLOCKADER
Each additional month that China successfully endured a seaborne energy 
blockade would mean increased pressure on a blockading power to terminate 
the conflict. This analysis contemplates a scenario of conflict post-2018. The base 
scenario’s assumptions are as follows:
1. On the first day, China holds combined commercial and strategic 
crude-oil stocks of seven hundred million barrels in storage tanks and 
underground caverns.69
2. The country’s refinery runs of crude oil are 12.5 million bpd.
3. Rationing rapidly reduces demand for oil products by 35 percent relative 
to preconflict levels.
4. China imports a baseline volume of six hundred thousand barrels per day 
of crude from Russia and four hundred thousand barrels per day from 
Kazakhstan by pipeline.
5. The 440 kbd Myanmar–China pipeline is interdicted and unable to supply 
crude.
6. Russia and Kazakhstan surge railborne crude supplies by a combined 
total of four hundred thousand barrels per day.
7. In addition to pipeline and rail supplies, Russia and Kazkahstan provide 
150 kbd of crude overland, by truck.
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8. Methanol blended into 
gasoline, vegetable oils 
blended into the diesel-
fuel supply, and other fuel 
extenders reduce crude-
oil demand by 615 kbd.
Under the baseline scenario, 
China’s crude-oil  stockpile 
would last for approximately ten 
months. If Chinese policy mak-
ers could reduce demand for oil 
products by 40 percent through 
rationing, import an additional 
one hundred thousand barrels 
per day of crude from Russia and Kazakhstan by rail and truck, and bring new 
pipelines capable of moving four hundred thousand barrels per day of Russian 
crude from Skovorodino within eight months of blockade imposition, the coun-
try’s stockpile “holdout time” would rise to seventeen months. For reference, 
it is unlikely that China’s direct military fuel needs would exceed five hundred 
thousand barrels per day even during an intense conflict.
Building a new pipeline from the Russian border capable of importing an 
additional six hundred thousand barrels per day of crude would increase the 
holdout time to twenty months in the 40 percent–rationing case. In a more 
extreme response scenario—maintaining all the above conditions but reducing 
crude-oil refinery runs by 45 percent from preconflict levels—the holdout time 
would be extended to more than four years. In the most optimistic response 
scenario—achieving 45 percent rationing reduction in oil-products demand and 
building additional pipeline capacity of eight hundred thousand barrels per day 
from eastern Siberia into northeast China—China would have nearly eight years 
before crude stockpiles ran out.
It is likely that even a conflict response that began with rationing less than 35 
percent relative to preconflict oil consumption soon would experience substan-
tial involuntary reductions as economic activity slowed. As China’s gross domes-
tic product and economic activity declined, the country likely would end up with 
ample domestic and overland liquid-fuel supplies to maintain basic activities, as 
discussed earlier. In addition, a multiyear-blockade scenario also likely would 
trigger even deeper structural adaptations. These likely would include greater 
use of public transport; greater use of railroads and internal waterways to move 
cargo instead of trucking it; cessation of most domestic passenger flights; and 
Beginning crude oil stocks, kbd 700,000
Baseline refinery runs, kbd  12,500
Refinery runs at 35% rationing, kbd  8,125
Refinery runs at 40% rationing, kbd  7,500
Refinery runs at 45% rationing, kbd  6,875
Methanol and fuel extenders, kbd  615
Domestic production, kbd  3,600
Pipeline supplies from Russia and Kazakhstan, kbd  1,000
Rail- and truck-borne supplies from Russia and 
Kazakhstan, kbd
 550




BASE ASSUMPTIONS FOR VARIOUS SCENARIOS
Note: kbd = thousand barrels per day.
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significant expansion of coal-
to-liquids production capacity, 
which currently is considered 
too environmentally damaging 
and economically uncompeti-
tive to justify funding. Here it 
bears noting that if all currently 
approved coal-to-liquids proj-
ects in China came on line, their 
total capacity would be 13.8 mil-
lion tons per year, equivalent to 
nearly three hundred thousand 
barrels per day of diesel fuel. 7 0
While these scenario esti-
mates are relatively simplistic, 
they suggest that rationing 
would be the highest-impact 
response strategy for Chinese 
policy makers facing a blockade 
of seaborne crude-oil imports. 
Building additional pipelines to 
move additional Russian oil into 
northeast China and blending 
methanol and other fuel extend-
ers into the gasoline and diesel 
pools would be the next most 
impactful responses.
The scenarios also highlight the reality that, within historically realistic re-
sponse parameters, China very feasibly could adapt to conflict conditions and 
withstand a blockade for a longer period than an outside power realistically could 
sustain the operation. At the most fundamental level, a blockader would find 
itself increasingly isolated on the world stage, which would complicate its ability 
politically, economically, and militarily to continue its campaign.
In addition, unlike imperial Japan in World War II, whose military was crip-
pled by a seaborne oil blockade because the country had no meaningful domestic 
oil production, China’s domestic production and overland imports supply many 
times the daily oil requirements of even the most intense conceivable conflict 
scenarios. 7 1 Therefore the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and Navy would 
not be constrained by fuel shortages, enabling them to project power against a 





No Emergency Pipeline from Russia
Initial crude-oil stockpile drawdown 
rate without seaborne imports and  
no rationing, kbd
–6,735  3
Draw rate with 35% demand  
rationing, kbd
–2,360 10
Draw rate with 40% demand  
rationing, kbd
 –1,735 13
Draw rate with 45% demand  
rationing, kbd
 –1,110 21
Emergency Pipeline from Russia  
Enters Service on Eighth Month of Blockade
Drawdown rate with no seaborne 
crude imports once supplementary  
emergency pipeline built  
(no rationing), kbd
–6,035  3
Draw rate with 35% demand  
rationing, kbd
–1,660 12
Draw rate with 40% demand 
rationing, kbd
 –1,035 21




CHINA’S CRUDE-OIL “HOLDOUT” TIMES UNDER 
VARIOUS SCENARIOS
Note: kbd = thousand barrels per day.
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chain in a manner that likely would force the United States ultimately either to 
escalate by engaging in direct military conflict closer to China or to forgo military 
action in China’s near neighborhood, effectively making China the new military 
hegemon in much of East and Southeast Asia.
CRITICAL STRATEGIC CHALLENGES TO A DISTANT  
OIL BLOCKADE
Risk of Systemic Global Disruptions
The commodity flow disruptions and price volatility that would accompany a 
distant blockade of China likely would be phenomenal. Sealing off the country’s 
maritime inbound oil arteries by itself rapidly would eliminate approximately 10 
percent of global oil demand, cratering prices in the process and setting the stage 
for multiple negative secondary effects in the Persian Gulf region and others de-
pendent on oil-export revenues. The effects would worsen as a blockade ground 
on, disrupting regional and global supply chains and almost certainly prompting 
demand rationing within China itself. A reduction in global crude-oil demand 
on the order of eight to ten million barrels per day within months of a blockade 
being imposed is not inconceivable. To put that figure in perspective, the global 
surplus during the deepest phase of the 2014–16 global oil price crash was only 
about two million barrels per day, and prices still fell below thirty dollars per 
barrel at one point—likely less than half the price that Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and other major exporters need to balance their budgets and maintain long-term 
financial and political stability. 7 2
To try to achieve a timely rebalancing of the global oil market under such con-
ditions, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would 
be forced to make dramatic cuts in production volumes. During the 2008–2009 
oil price collapse, OPEC moved decisively to reduce production, and by the end 
of 2008 had agreed to cuts that reduced total daily global oil supplies by nearly 5 
percent (more than four million barrels per day). 7 3  The results were substantial: 
oil prices that bottomed in February 2009 nearly doubled by the end of that year. 7 4
But a blockade scenario likely would entail production cuts of twice this size; in 
other words, equivalent to approximately a quarter of the cartel’s collective daily 
output. Cuts also would occur in an environment in which it would be uncertain 
when demand from OPEC Gulf producers’ cornerstone East Asian customers, 
foremost among them China, might recover.
China has been the key source of demand-side support for global oil prices 
over much of the past decade, accounting for roughly 43 percent of global in-
cremental oil-demand growth between 2009 and 2015. 7 5 On the secondary, but 
directly linked, level, commodity demand in China, which would suffer badly 
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under a blockade, has had a multiplier effect on global raw-material demand 
and prices. Consider the oil market, for instance. The five regional groupings 
that account for the majority of commodity exports to China (the Middle East 
and North Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, and 
sub-Saharan Africa) accounted for roughly 10.5 million barrels per day of oil-
products demand increase between 2000 and 2015—1.6 times the amount by 
which China’s own oil-products demand grew during that time. 7 6 Much of this 
came as rising commodity prices stimulated by China’s growth meant larger 
export revenues that catalyzed economic growth and greater local oil demand in 
key commodity-exporting countries.
The significant long-term reduction in revenue to major oil and commodity 
exporters as a result of decreasing oil-demand volumes and depressed prices 
could exert profound internal political effects and trigger new conflicts and in-
flame existing ones across the Middle East and parts of Africa. Sufficiently seri-
ous regional contingencies could divert U.S. military resources from the Asian 
theater, particularly if the United States found itself politically and diplomatically 
Commodity 2015 Share of Global Consumption
Estimated Annual Global Export 
Market Size (2015), Billion USD Three Largest Exporter Countries
Crude oil 13%  739 Saudi Arabia, Russia, Canada
Steel 43%  277 Australia, Brazil, South Africaa
Natural gas  6%  244 Russia, Qatar, Norway
Copper 49%  155 Chile, Zambia, Russia
Soybeanb 30%  78 Brazil, USA, Argentina
Aluminum 53%  50 Russia, Canada, UAE
Wheat 16%  42 Canada, USA, Australia
Corn 22%  30 USA, Brazil, Argentina
Zinc 47%  20 Australia, Peru, South Korea
Nickel 53%  18 Russia, Australia, Canada
Lead 35%  16 Australia, Mexico, Peru
Total value 1,669
FIGURE 6
CHINA’S SHARE OF GLOBAL DEMAND FOR SELECT STRATEGIC, HIGHLY TRADED  
COMMODITIES IN 2015
Notes: 
UAE = United Arab Emirates; USD = U.S. dollars.
Lead and zinc data include raw metal and ores and concentrates.
a. Iron ore raw material exporters. 
b. Soybeans and soybean meal. 
Sources: Bloomberg (steel price), industry associations, International Trade Administration (steel), Observatory of Economic Complexity (trade value), 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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isolated on the world stage. This could undermine the sustainability of a distant 
energy blockade against China.
Distant Blockade Signals U.S. Weakness?
Relying on blockade, especially a distant blockade, as a primary means of pros-
ecuting a conflict with China would risk signaling that the U.S. commitment to 
maintaining the Asian security architecture is, in fact, limited. Allies and the 
Chinese leadership alike likely would draw important conclusions from the 
message that U.S. actions transmitted. Regional partners might perceive a need 
to hedge their bets, while Beijing could conclude that if it held out long enough, 
Washington’s position and its resolve to prosecute the conflict would weaken, 
increasing the likelihood of a resolution that favored Chinese interests.
China Would Retain Its Military Hardware—and Still Pose a Challenge
One of the distant blockade’s chief points of attractiveness—its potential to re-
duce the belligerent parties’ direct kinetic actions against each other—is also a 
potential weakness because it leaves a defeated country with much of its antebel-
lum military capacity. As Evan Braden Montgomery of the Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) points out, a successful distant blockade that 
did not also include actions aimed at degrading China’s military would leave the 
United States struggling to “confront the challenge of reaching a sustainable ac-
cord with a defeated, potentially revanchist, and still militarily powerful China.” 7 7
In other words, victory today through a successful distant blockade might sow 
the seeds of a future conflict in which the blockaded party presumably would 
undertake great efforts to ensure it did not again suffer defeat by blockade.
Domestic Challenges from Powerful Commercial Interests
The broad deference the White House and powerful U.S. regulatory agencies 
such as the Departments of Justice and the Treasury showed to Wall Street dur-
ing and after the great financial crisis of 2008 raises unsettling questions for 
planners contemplating the domestic political dimensions of an energy blockade 
against China. Would these same offices and agencies—many of which would 
be involved intimately in implementing a blockade—truly be willing to injure 
influential private economic interests by effectively throttling the world’s second-
largest economy?
Multiple historical examples demonstrate that conflicting internal political 
priorities can impair a blockade’s strategic effectiveness severely. For instance, 
more than one year into its Beira patrol aimed at preventing oil shipments from 
reaching the rebellious colony of Rhodesia, Britain suffered major embarrass-
ment when a tanker entered the port of Beira even though an RN frigate had 
ordered it to stop and even had fired warning shots. 7 8 In the context of a distant 
oil blockade against China, any hesitance to use force against noncompliant 
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vessels likely would encourage open defiance rapidly and induce an onslaught of 
Chinese-flagged ships trying to run the cordon. Instead, well-publicized use of 
disabling fire against noncompliant vessels in the early stages of a blockade would 
offer the best deterrent and substantially increase the blockade’s effectiveness 
and strategic value. But planners should not assume that civilian elected officials 
would be willing to allow the U.S. Navy broad tactical latitude to sink or disable 
vessels attempting to defy a blockade, particularly if these officials’ willingness to 
go “all in” on an oil blockade was attenuated by their desire to protect the com-
mercial interests of their private patrons.
This is especially true in the case of a “partial war,” among the most likely 
scenarios for a Sino-American kinetic conflict. In such a confrontation between 
nuclear powers, the overriding objective is to control escalation carefully rather 
than to pursue total military dominance. 7 9 When civilian policy makers prioritize 
restraint over military effectiveness, it risks opening space for commercial inter-
ests to try to maintain to the maximum practicable extent their antebellum com-
mercial relationships. Internal political division invites attempts to circumvent 
an embargo. Nowhere would this be more apparent than in enforcement actions 
against confirmed—or, in particular, suspected—blockade-runners. Internal 
disunity likely would create conflicting or unclear rules of engagement and ham-
string on-scene commanders who must make important tactical decisions with 
substantial strategic consequences.
Perhaps the most prominent instance of domestic political discord undermin-
ing a blockade or economic-warfare campaign comes from Britain’s experience 
against Germany at the outset of World War I, between 1914 and 1916. Britain’s 
Admiralty enthusiastically promoted a full-bore assault on maritime trade bound 
for Germany, including that transiting through neutral ports, but it was stifled 
by a range of powerful diplomatic and commercial interests on the home front 
in Britain. As Nicholas A. Lambert noted in his groundbreaking historical ac-
count Planning Armageddon, the enduring lesson of Britain’s initial failure in 
its economic-warfare and blockade campaign against Germany was that, in the 
context of deeper global trade and financial linkages, “effective implementation 
of sea power was no longer simply a function of naval power but required the 
state to subordinate what might be termed the informal elements of maritime 
power (shipping, financial services, and communications). But in seeking con-
trol over the infrastructure of the global trading system, the British state created 
enormous resistance by effectively compelling its nationals to act against their 
profit-maximizing instincts.”80
Britain ultimately did blockade Germany successfully, but getting to the point 
of an effective cordon took the better part of two years. If the time required for 
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Britain to impose an effective blockade against Germany transpired in a U.S-
China conflict scenario, Washington’s battle already might be lost. Under such a 
scenario, China would have shown the ability to execute an aggressive action and 
consolidate its gains while the United States dithered, then responded only belat-
edly because the core issues at stake mattered much more to China.
When assessing a potential military approach, one must appreciate its strengths, 
weaknesses, and inherent limits. An oil blockade is not itself a strategy; rather, 
it is an action appropriately subsumed into a larger economic, diplomatic, and 
military campaign. It is also an action that in physical, trade-warfare terms would 
be akin to a nuclear strike on the global economy. An open military conflict 
between the United States and China would be a globally cataclysmic event on 
many levels. Furthermore, physically interdicting one of the largest channels in 
the global oil trade—and with it, major parts of the Chinese economy—very 
likely would open a Pandora’s box of unforeseen secondary and tertiary adverse 
consequences whose effects could be worse than even the most pessimistic analy-
ses might suggest.
For this reason, properly understanding the issue and constructing and main-
taining an effective and sustainable security architecture designed to prevent such 
a conflict from ever coming to pass should be core U.S. national security priori-
ties. In this respect, continued advocacy on behalf of a blockade-centric approach 
(i.e., offshore control) risks undermining U.S. strategic credibility in East Asia. 
Favoring a blockade-based deterrence policy goes in exactly the opposite direc-
tion by communicating that the U.S. political and military communities lack the 
will to engage in the intense conflict that may in fact be necessary to repel ter-
ritorial seizures and other actions aimed at undermining U.S. security guarantees 
and Washington’s standing in the eyes of its allies and others across Asia.
Treating a distant blockade as the centerpiece of Washington’s China-facing 
military stance also risks warping domestic procurement debates, with potential-
ly grave long-term strategic consequences. If a critical mass of Congress comes to 
believe that the Navy simply can close off China’s maritime oil arteries, members 
may become more reluctant to appropriate the hundreds of billions of dollars 
needed in coming decades to fund the personnel costs and hardware acquisitions 
needed to support and sustain a robust U.S. forward presence in Asia.
History strongly suggests that even if a potential foe appears vulnerable to 
over-the-horizon pressure on its seaborne commerce, a blockade never should 
be substituted for war or a campaign strategy. As U.S. policy makers contemplate 
options for potential conflict with China, they forget this lesson at their peril.
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“ROCKETS’ RED GLARE”
On July 7, 2016, the United States announced plans to deploy a terminal high-altitude area defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea to defend U.S. and 
allied forces better against North Korean ballistic missiles. China’s response to 
this announcement was strikingly strident. The following day a Chinese foreign 
ministry spokesperson expressed China’s “strong dissatisfaction with and firm 
opposition to the decision” and said that the deployment of THAAD will “gravely 
sabotage the strategic security interests of regional countries including China.”1
Several articles in the China Daily over the next few weeks described THAAD as 
a “clear, present, substantive threat to China’s security interests” and compared 
THAAD’s deployment to a stark example of strategic brinkmanship, stating that 
“the negative influence of the deployment of THAAD in the [Republic of Korea] 
is similar to that of the Cuban Missile Crisis.” 2
China’s opposition to THAAD has continued 
since the first components of the system arrived in 
South Korea and became operational in the spring 
of 2017. 3
Unlike the nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that 
the Soviet Union placed in Cuba in 1962, THAAD 
is a defensive weapon with limited capability and 
capacity, so it raises the question of why China 
so vocally opposes this regional ballistic-missile 
defense (BMD) system. Chinese media sources 
suggest three reasons for opposing THAAD in 
the Republic of Korea (ROK). First, they claim 
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that THAAD exceeds South Korea’s security needs and will spark an arms race 
on the Korean Peninsula. Second, they claim that THAAD’s radar will threaten 
China’s nuclear-deterrent forces, upsetting the strategic balance. Third, they fear 
that fielding an advanced BMD system in Korea will reinforce and reshape U.S.
alliances in Northeast Asia, both by tightening the alliance with South Korea and 
by fostering a trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan security relationship. In a July 9, 2016, 
editorial, the China Daily outlined Beijing’s argument against THAAD. “[I]t will 
not only escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but also break the strategic 
balance and widen the trust deficit among the regional powers. . . . Washington 
is trying to drive a wedge between Beijing and Seoul, and reinforce the US-Japan-
ROK military alliance.” 4
How should the United States evaluate these three concerns, and what are 
the implications for U.S. policy? This article will describe the decision to deploy 
THAAD, placing it within the context of U.S. and Chinese policy toward the Kore-
an Peninsula. Next, each of China’s three concerns about THAAD will be reviewed 
to analyze the theoretical underpinnings and assess the relative significance of 
each. The analysis will find that THAAD is not likely to spark an arms race on the 
Korean Peninsula, which suggests that China’s fear of a security dilemma there is 
insincere. China’s second concern—about strategic stability and the effectiveness 
of its nuclear deterrent—appears to be more sincere, but it overestimates THAAD’s 
limited contribution to the U.S. homeland-defense BMD system. Although the 
third concern has not been discussed in the Chinese media as thoroughly, it is 
likely that THAAD’s potential to strengthen America’s bilateral alliance with South 
Korea and to advance trilateral relations among the United States, South Korea, 
and Japan worries China most. In response, the United States should ignore warn-
ings of a Korean security dilemma, address strategic stability questions, and—
most importantly—harness concerns about strengthening alliance relationships 
so as to spur China’s cooperation in denuclearizing North Korea.
THE KOREAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, BMD, AND THE  
DECISION TO DEPLOY THAAD
The United States and China are the two most significant outside powers with 
an interest in the Korean Peninsula. Both countries have a shared interest in a 
nuclear-free North Korea, but from that starting point their policy goals diverge.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel R. Russel 
testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2014 that America desires 
“peaceful denuclearization” on the Korean Peninsula, and intends to “provide 
deterrence and defense against the threat posed by the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea’s (DPRK’s) continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile technology.”5 China, on the other hand, seeks denuclearization, but also 
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wants to maintain political stability in North Korea. When these two objectives 
conflict, China prefers policies that preserve the status quo over those that apply 
pressure to end North Korea’s nuclear program.6 Recognizing China’s potential 
to influence decision making in North Korea, President Trump has encouraged 
Chinese president Xi Jinping, privately and publicly, to use China’s influence over 
North Korea to curtail the latter’s nuclear weapons program. 7
As Assistant Secretary Russel pointed out in his testimony, ballistic missiles 
are closely related to the threat that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions pose. North 
Korea has a large arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles and desires to arm 
some of them with nuclear warheads. These weapons may appeal to North Korea 
because they are relatively inexpensive, can strike at long ranges, and are difficult 
to defend against. In response to the ballistic-missile threat on the Korean Pen-
insula and elsewhere around the world, the United States has developed regional 
BMD systems, including THAAD, to protect deployed U.S. forces and foreign 
partners, as well as homeland-defense BMD systems to defend the continental 
United States from attack by a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs).8
THAAD’s deployment to South Korea came after several years of negotiations 
between Washington and Seoul, during which China consistently opposed this 
weapon system. Spurred by advances in North Korean ballistic-missile technol-
ogy, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea first proposed the idea in June 2014, 
and by October 2014 negotiations were in progress.9 During these discussions, 
South Korea hedged its position about THAAD and asserted its independent 
decision-making process. In March 2015, the spokesperson for the South Korean 
president said that the United States “had not requested to deploy THAAD, the 
two countries were not consulting about THAAD, and . . . there was no deploy-
ment decision.”10 This position was referred to as the “three noes.”
That same month, however, the South Korean ministry of defense spokesper-
son stated that “it is possible that neighboring states could have their own posi-
tions on the possible deployment of the THAAD system by the U.S. Forces Korea 
but they should not attempt to exercise influence on our defense policy.”11 China 
is a neighboring state that had attempted to influence Korea’s decision making, 
and likely was the target of this remark. In July 2014, Chinese president Xi Jinping 
asked South Korean president Park Geun-hye to reject deploying THAAD, re-
portedly saying, “South Korea, as a sovereign country, should exercise its right to 
express its opposition and the THAAD issue won’t be a problem between South 
Korea and China.”12  China reiterated its opposition to THAAD at several op-
portunities, including during visits to South Korea by senior defense and foreign 
ministry officials in 2015.13
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In February 2016, South Korea abandoned its ambiguity about deploying 
THAAD and resumed discussions with the United States. This policy change 
was triggered by North Korea’s launch of a satellite into orbit. This rocket launch 
also may have tested ICBM-related technologies.14  China continued to voice its 
opposition to THAAD. For example, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said in 
a February 25, 2016, speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
in Washington, DC, that “China’s legitimate national security interests may be 
jeopardized or threatened [by THAAD]. . . . We believe China’s legitimate secu-
rity concerns must be taken into account, and a convincing explanation must be 
provided to China.”15
On July 7, 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that it had de-
cided to deploy THAAD to southeastern South Korea, “as a defensive measure 
to ensure the security of the ROK and its people, and to protect alliance military 
forces from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile 
threats.”16 China immediately denounced this decision. The following day China’s 
foreign ministry spokesperson said, “[I]n disregard of the clear oppositions from 
relevant countries including China, the US and ROK announced their decision to 
deploy the THAAD system in the ROK. China has expressed strong dissatisfac-
tion with and firm opposition to the decision. . . . China strongly urges the US 
and the ROK to halt the process of deploying the system.”17
President Xi personally expressed China’s opposition during meetings with 
U.S. president Obama and South Korean president Park during the September 
2016 Group of Twenty summit in Hangzhou, China.18 China complemented 
its vocal opposition with actions that were tied publicly to China’s position on 
THAAD and appeared intended to coerce South Korea or the United States into 
changing their deployment plans. For example, China opposed UN statements 
critical of North Korean missile tests if they did not include language critical of 
THAAD as well.19 China also held an unusually large naval exercise—involving 
over one hundred vessels—in waters adjacent to the Korean Peninsula in Sep-
tember 2016. 2 0 And the following month, China and Russia announced plans for 
combined missile-defense exercises. 2 1 Of most consequence, however, has been 
China’s use of economic statecraft to reduce trade between China and South Ko-
rea, such as reducing Chinese tourism to South Korea and cutting off many South 
Korean entertainers from the Chinese market. 2 2
The United States deployed THAAD to South Korea in the spring of 2017, 
amid domestic political upheaval there. 2 3  The United States had planned to 
deploy THAAD in late 2017, but accelerated this in part because of increased 
perceptions of North Korea’s threat, but also perhaps because of events in South 
Korea. President Park, who supported deploying THAAD, was unseated in 
March 2017 amid a corruption scandal. The front-runner to replace her, Moon 
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Jae-in, campaigned against THAAD’s deployment. Some assert that the early de-
ployment of THAAD was meant to present Park’s successor with a fait accompli, 
thus making it more difficult to reverse the deployment. 2 4
The deployment began on March 6, 2017, when a U.S. Air Force cargo plane 
delivered several missile launchers and other components to South Korea. 2 5
China’s foreign ministry quickly condemned the deployment. The next day its 
spokesperson said, “[W]e are resolutely against the deployment of THAAD. . . .
We once again strongly urge the relevant parties to stop the deployment process, 
instead of traveling further down the wrong path.” 2 6 Within two months, U.S. and 
South Korean forces declared the system operational. 2 7
THAAD remained controversial even after its deployment. Days before the 
South Korean presidential election, President Trump said that the cost-sharing 
arrangement on THAAD should be renegotiated so that Seoul would pay up to 
one billion dollars more for the system. 2 8 The original agreement called for the 
United States to pay the costs of procuring and deploying THAAD, while South 
Korea would provide land on which to base the system. After President Trump’s 
remarks, his national security advisor, Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, is 
reported to have assured his South Korean counterpart that Washington intended 
to honor the cost-sharing agreement, but later issued a caveat that cost sharing 
might be subject to future “renegotiation.” 2 9
Moon Jae-in was elected in March 2017, and that June he halted THAAD’s 
deployment to provide time for an environmental assessment of the deployment 
site. To expedite the deployment, the Park administration had divided the site 
into two smaller sites, which would have enabled an abbreviated assessment and 
facilitated a more rapid deployment. Moon’s decision halted the deployment 
of the remaining four missile launchers, but did not affect the status of the two 
launchers and the radar that had been deployed already and declared operation-
al. 3 0 The New York Times described the partial delay as “an apparent concession 
to China.” 3 1
When asked whether China viewed Moon’s decision as “a positive signal, 
as an affirmation of China’s opposition to THAAD,” China’s foreign ministry 
spokesperson, rather than agreeing or disagreeing, reiterated, “China’s position is 
clear-cut. We are firm in opposing the deployment of THAAD by the U.S. in the 
ROK.” 3 2  A commentator in the China Daily pointed out that “it is difficult to eval-
uate the delay in the installation of THAAD after the ROK President Moon Jae-in 
ordered an environmental evaluation, because he reiterated that the THAAD 
decision made by his predecessor Park Geun-hye will be carried through.” 3 3  It 
appeared to Chinese observers that Moon’s environmental review likely would 
slow but not reverse the deployment. This assessment soon appeared to be cor-
rect. Several weeks after Moon announced the environmental assessment, South 
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   83 2/23/18   10:51 AM
89
Naval War College: Spring 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
8 4 NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Korea’s foreign minister affirmed Seoul’s commitment to deploying THAAD 
and pointed out that the environmental study was intended to improve domestic 
political support for the deployment. 3 4
THREE EXPLANATIONS FOR CHINA’S OPPOSITION TO THAAD
China’s opposition to THAAD is clear, but it is less apparent exactly why China 
opposes this system so strongly. Robert Jervis, a scholar at Columbia Univer-
sity, has written that “the roots of many important disputes about policies lie 
in differing perceptions.” 3 5 To understand China’s opposition to THAAD, it is 
essential to understand China’s perception of THAAD and how it believes that 
THAAD changes the security environment on and around the Korean Penin-
sula. The following section will explain and evaluate China’s three arguments 
against THAAD: first, that THAAD will spark an arms race on the Korean Pen-
insula; second, that THAAD threatens China’s nuclear deterrent; and third, that 
THAAD could strengthen and change U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia.
THAAD Creates a Security Dilemma
China’s first argument against THAAD asserts that this weapon system is ill suit-
ed for the threats South Korea faces, but at the same time will be a destabilizing 
influence on the Korean Peninsula because it will encourage an arms race. China’s 
position resembles theoretical arguments Robert Jervis has made about the spi-
ral model of the security dilemma: that “policies aimed at security will threaten 
others.” 3 6 Jervis outlines how, in an anarchic state of nature, a country achieves 
security only through its strength, and fears aggression from other states, includ-
ing possible but unlikely threats. In this environment, strengthening one’s own 
security will make other countries feel threatened, causing them to strengthen 
themselves in turn. Even weapons intended to be defensive could at the same 
time threaten the security of other states. Jervis writes that “when states seek the 
ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little—too much because 
they gain the ability to carry out any aggression; too little because others, being 
menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state’s security.” 3 7
However, the Chinese position does not hold up to close scrutiny, partly because 
of its internal contradictions, but also because THAAD is a defensive system.
Chinese media reports argue that several aspects of THAAD make it unsuited 
for use on the Korean Peninsula. These articles contend that because THAAD is 
intended for use against “long-range” missiles it is unable to defend Seoul and 
other parts of South Korea from short-range North Korean threats, such as artil-
lery. A researcher at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military 
Science said that THAAD “mainly targets long-range missiles and has nothing 
to do with intercepting short-range ones launched by the DPRK.” 3 8 A China 
Daily article describes THAAD as defending against missiles “at a high altitude 
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of 40–150 km [kilometers],” but then counters that this high-altitude capability 
is meaningless because “hundreds of DPRK missiles targeting South Korea will 
fly at a much lower altitude of less than 20 km.” 3 9 Yet another article points out 
that THAAD would be useless against the artillery and short-range rockets that 
threaten Seoul. Because of these limitations, the Chinese author concludes that 
THAAD “is not a good option.” 4 0
Despite arguing that THAAD does not add much to the defense of South 
Korea, one Chinese scholar assessed that this weapon will “stoke an arms race on 
the Korean Peninsula.” 4 1 He Yafei, a former vice-minister of the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, writes that THAAD will “undermine the regional strategic 
balance in East Asia. . . . When the strategic balance of a region is broken, an 
arms race follows and regional disputes and conflicts intensify.” 4 2  More explicitly 
outlining the dynamics of an anticipated Korean Peninsula security dilemma, 
a researcher at the PLA’s National Defense University writes that THAAD “will 
inevitably make the much weaker DPRK feel a more immediate security threat 
and then motivate it to develop more conventional and even nuclear weapons to 
ensure its security. . . . The vicious circle resulting from escalated military moves 
and countermeasures will only result in escalated military tensions.” 4 3
The language Chinese observers use to suggest that THAAD could start an 
arms race echoes Robert Jervis’s spiral model of the security dilemma, but the 
Chinese position has several flaws. Logically, how could a weapon that does not 
add much capability to the defense of South Korea, as Chinese writers argue, 
change the security balance meaningfully and create a security dilemma? Fur-
thermore, North Korea already has the world’s fourth-largest army and spends 
over one-third of its gross domestic product on its military, so whether THAAD 
is deployed is irrelevant; North Korea likely is devoting as many resources as it 
can to building and sustaining its military already. 4 4  Yet while these two con-
tradictory arguments do not hold up in concert, they still are worth examining 
individually.
The first argument—that THAAD exceeds the defensive needs of South 
Korea—is flawed in several ways. From the U.S. and South Korean perspectives, 
THAAD adds to existing defenses, particularly as North Korea improves its mis-
sile technology. According to the director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA), THAAD can “deepen, extend, and complement” other BMD systems in 
general, while on the Korean Peninsula it “contributes to a layered missile defense 
system and enhances the U.S.-ROK Alliance’s defense against North Korean mis-
sile threats.” 4 5 While THAAD may not meet all of South Korea’s complex and 
challenging defensive needs, it complements other defenses and adds improved 
capabilities.
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Before THAAD’s deployment, U.S. and ROK forces had several BMD capabili-
ties. The Patriot missile system provides land-based endo-atmospheric point de-
fense against ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight, meaning it engages 
a threat inside the earth’s atmosphere as it descends toward a target. The Patriot’s 
operational range is estimated to be twenty to thirty-five kilometers (km) up to 
an altitude of 15–32 km. 4 6 The U.S. Navy also can provide endo-atmospheric 
terminal defenses with its SM-6 missiles, plus exo-atmospheric defenses against 
longer-range missiles in the midcourse phase of flight using SM-3 missiles. 4 7
Like the Patriot and SM-6, THAAD is a terminal defense system, but it has 
increased speed, altitude, and area-coverage capabilities. Its interceptor’s speed 
of Mach 8 far exceeds the Patriot’s Mach 3. 4 8 THAAD is able to engage targets 
both within and just beyond the atmosphere, suggesting an altitude capability 
exceeding a hundred kilometers, the highest extent of the earth’s atmosphere. 4 9
The U.S. MDA believes that this high-altitude capability is important because a 
“high-altitude intercept mitigates effects of enemy weapons of mass destruction 
before they reach the ground.”50 This capability may be particularly important 
against North Korean missiles that could be armed with nuclear warheads.
THAAD’s estimated operational range is two hundred kilometers, enabling it to 
defend a substantially larger area than the Patriot.51 When used in coordination 
with other BMD systems, as in South Korea, THAAD likely provides additional 
engagement opportunities. Deploying THAAD should bolster the resiliency and 
capacity of BMDs on the Korean Peninsula and increase the probability of inter-
cepting North Korean ballistic missiles successfully.
THAAD’s improved capabilities, in comparison with other U.S. and ROK 
BMD systems, also may be relevant owing to recent improvements in North Ko-
rean ballistic-missile technology. For example, Pyongyang has added a “lofted” 
trajectory to its Rodong medium-range ballistic missile. By lofting the missile—
launching it at a more elevated angle—the rocket’s reach is shorter but it gains a 
higher altitude and higher speed than a missile flying the same range along the 
most efficient trajectory. South Korea’s ministry of defense has argued that the 
speed and altitude of a lofted Rodong reduce its vulnerability to Patriot missiles, 
but it remains within THAAD’s engagement capabilities.52  The Rodong is of par-
ticular concern to the South Korean government because officials believe North 
Korea is able to arm it with a miniaturized nuclear weapon.53  It is difficult to as-
sess the technical merits of the ministry of defense’s analysis, but it is noteworthy 
that South Korean officials argue that THAAD addresses a specific defensive 
capability gap brought on by advancements in North Korean missile technology.
Chinese analysts correctly point out that THAAD does not add much capa-
bility to the defense of Seoul against short-range artillery and unguided rockets.
But there is more to defending South Korea than simply defending Seoul; North 
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Korea likely would not limit wartime attacks to the capital city. While the city may 
be not only the political but the economic heart of South Korea, targets distant 
from Seoul also would be important to U.S. and South Korean defensive efforts.
One example is Pusan, a busy containerport in southeastern Korea.54  Although it 
is over three hundred kilometers from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that sepa-
rates the two Koreas, Pusan is within the range of some North Korean ballistic 
missiles. The North Korean announcement of a July 2016 test launch implied that 
using ballistic missiles to attack a port, such as Pusan, is an aspect of Pyongyang’s 
war plans. “The drill was conducted . . . under the simulated conditions of mak-
ing pre-emptive strikes at ports and airfields in . . . South Korea.”55 Arguing that 
THAAD does not defend Seoul ignores other ways in which the system might 
contribute to South Korea’s defense.
The second part of China’s argument is that THAAD creates an arms race 
on the Korean Peninsula. To evaluate this concern, it is important to determine 
whether THAAD is a defensive system. Jervis proposes that if a defensive weapon 
can be distinguished from an offensive weapon, a state can increase its defensive 
armament without causing another state to feel threatened, or in other words, 
without sparking an arms race. However, it could be difficult to make this distinc-
tion, because “a weapon is either offensive or defensive according to which end of 
it you’re looking at.”56 Furthermore, weapons can be both defensive and offensive 
in character. Jervis suggests several criteria to assess whether a weapon is defen-
sive or offensive. A defensive weapon should focus on keeping an adversary from 
entering one’s territory, should not extend one’s reach into an opponent’s terri-
tory, and should be immobile. Mobile forces, even if defensive, are problematic 
because they can advance with and protect offensive forces. On the other hand, 
according to Jervis’s argument, weapons that can destroy enemy defenses or are 
more effective when used in a surprise attack are inherently offensive.57
On the basis of these criteria and THAAD’s characteristics, one can conclude 
that THAAD is not an offensive system, and is instead primarily defensive.
First, although the Russian deputy minister of defense argued in June 2017 that 
THAAD “is not only a ballistic missile defense system, but it has dual function: it 
can launch attack missiles a long distance,” there is no evidence that THAAD has 
an offensive capability.58 The missile carries no warhead and has not been tested 
against land targets.59 With no offensive capability, it could not be used to mount 
a surprise attack. In fact, there is little surprise about THAAD’s deployment—its 
location alongside a golf course is well known, and the U.S. Department of De-
fense publicized its March 2017 arrival in South Korea.60 Second, THAAD has 
several capability limitations. It is a mobile system, as its March 2017 delivery by 
strategic airlift demonstrated; yet once it is in place political considerations may 
make it unlikely the battery will be repositioned. Its 2017 deployment to South 
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Korea was halted to conduct an environmental-impact assessment of its new 
base, which may take up to a year to complete.61 Any future relocation probably 
would be similarly constrained, except perhaps in extremis. Other capability 
limitations include that it has no antiaircraft capability and is located about three 
hundred kilometers south of the DMZ. So THAAD can target only ballistic mis-
siles, and its interceptor’s range does not extend into North Korea. By Jervis’s 
definition, THAAD is not an offensive system, and actually exhibits many char-
acteristics that would define it as a defensive weapon.
Chinese observers argue that THAAD is ill suited for use in South Korea and 
creates a security dilemma on the peninsula, but THAAD appears to be a use-
ful, defensive weapon that should not cause an arms race when viewed through 
the theoretical lens of the different impacts of offensive and defensive weapons.
THAAD arguably is a defensive weapon that adds improved capabilities and an 
additional layer of defense for U.S. and South Korean forces. Contrary to the criti-
cism some Chinese analysts have voiced, these aspects of THAAD should reduce 
its risk of contributing to a security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula.
THAAD Upsets Strategic Stability
As Jervis writes, “[S]tates underestimate the degree to which they menace 
others.”62  Perhaps the United States underestimates the menace THAAD poses 
to China. China’s second argument against THAAD suggests that it is part of an 
American global missile-defense system that threatens China’s limited nuclear 
deterrent and leaves China vulnerable to coercion by the United States.63
This argument focuses on THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar, which has two opera-
tional modes. To provide fire-control data to a THAAD battery, it operates in a 
shorter-range “terminal” mode; to provide early-warning and cueing data to oth-
er regional or strategic BMD systems, it can operate in a longer-range “forward-
based” mode.64  Chinese observers contend that THAAD’s radar improves the 
U.S. homeland-defense BMD system by collecting data on Chinese missile tests 
in peacetime and providing targeting information on Chinese ICBM launches 
in wartime.65 Contrary to these fears, U.S. BMD policy and weapons are not di-
rected against China. Furthermore, the AN/TPY-2 radar is not likely to change 
appreciably the information available to the United States about China’s strategic 
capabilities.
Several articles in the Chinese media best encapsulate this argument against 
THAAD and demonstrate the mistrust that exists in China about THAAD’s pur-
pose in South Korea. Building on the argument that THAAD is not needed in 
South Korea, an August 2016 China Daily article asserts that there is a “hidden 
agenda behind THAAD, an installation that barely covers Seoul but extends its 
reach into China,” and concludes that “THAAD can be used to collect radar data 
of warheads and decoys of Chinese and Russian strategic missiles by monitoring 
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their tests, thus enabling the United States to neutralize their nuclear deterrence 
and put the national security of China and Russia at risk.”66 Similarly, the PLA 
Daily wrote in July 2016 that THAAD “far exceeds the defense needs of the 
United States and South Korea in the Korean Peninsula. . . . The United States 
apparently has an ulterior object in mind. . . . The real intention is to target China 
and Russia and further advance the construction of the US global missile defense 
system.”67
This fear and mistrust about THAAD are consistent with China’s broader 
concerns about how America’s BMD systems could affect China’s limited nuclear 
deterrent negatively. China’s strategic rocket force has only seventy-five to one 
hundred nuclear-armed ICBMs.68 By comparison, the U.S. nuclear force has over 
four hundred deployed ICBMs, up to 230 submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
deployed on submarines, and eighty nuclear-capable strategic bombers.69 Em-
ployment of China’s relatively small nuclear arsenal—sometimes referred to in 
Chinese writings as a “lean and effective” force—is believed to be governed by a 
“no first use” (NFU) policy. 7 0 Pan Zhenqiang, a professor at the PLA’s National 
Defense University, explained the principles behind this policy when he wrote, 
“NFU highlights China’s philosophical belief that nuclear weapons can only be 
used to serve one purpose, that of retaliation against nuclear attack.” 7 1 While 
there is a vigorous debate among analysts of China’s nuclear program regarding 
whether Beijing actually would adhere to its NFU policy, China’s nuclear force 
structure was developed within the constraints of this policy. As a result, China 
has only a small number of strategic nuclear weapons. 7 2
The Chinese strategic community believes that BMD poses “the most serious 
threat to China’s nuclear deterrent.” 7 3  While American BMD may be rudimentary 
at this point, some Chinese analysts fear that its potential to grow and improve 
over time is unlimited. This expectation fosters a fear that U.S. BMD will threaten 
China’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Sun Xiangli at the China Academy of En-
gineering Physics writes that “because China’s nuclear forces have maintained a 
limited scope for a long time, China is very sensitive to threats from strategic mis-
sile defenses. As long as strategic missile defenses develop without limit, China’s 
limited nuclear deterrent will inevitably be challenged.” 7 4  When combined with 
the risk of a U.S. first strike against China’s small nuclear force, effective BMD 
could secure the United States from nuclear retaliation, in the eyes of some Chi-
nese analysts. Assessing U.S. motives for developing BMD systems, two Chinese 
defense experts are reported to have said, “[T]he essence of developing missile 
defense is to search for a shield against nuclear weapons. Once it succeeds, it will 
trigger a deep and widespread military revolution and even change the nature 
of politics.” 7 5 According to this perspective, BMD could undermine strategic 
stability, meaning that it could weaken America’s perceived risk of suffering an 
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unacceptable level of damage in a nuclear exchange, thus creating opportunities 
for the United States to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to coerce China. 7 6
How does deploying THAAD to South Korea interact with China’s fear that 
U.S. BMD makes China’s nuclear deterrent less credible? Chinese concerns stem 
from THAAD’s associated radar. Some in China argue that the AN/TPY-2 radar 
is able both to collect data on Chinese missile tests and to provide early-warning 
or cueing information to strategic BMD systems. According to the PLA Daily,
“not only can [the radar] glean information from the region and accumulate data 
on target features in peacetime, but it can also serve as an early identification and 
tracking tool in wartime.” 7 7  Wu Riqiang, a professor at Renmin University in Bei-
jing and a former missile designer, said, “China is not concerned with THAAD 
interceptors. China is concerned with THAAD radar.” 7 8 He contends that a 
forward-deployed radar such as the AN/TPY-2 could provide early warning of 
an ICBM attack against the United States, thus increasing the homeland-defense 
system’s engagement opportunities. By tracking Chinese ICBMs early in their 
flight, the United States also might be able to observe the ICBM deploy decoys, 
thereby enabling defensive systems to distinguish better between decoys and 
warheads. 7 9 This argument suggests that the radar associated with this regional 
BMD system also could make the homeland-defense BMD system more effec-
tive by increasing the depth of fire and more efficient by reducing the number of 
engagements against decoys.
The idea that a BMD capability threatens a nation’s nuclear deterrent and 
degrades strategic stability is new neither to the world nor to China. Thomas 
C. Schelling, the late eminent scholar, wrote of the Cold War strategic balance 
that “ballistic missile defenses, if installed on a large scale by the U.S. or the 
Soviet Union, might preserve or destroy stability based on whether or not they 
increased or decreased the advantage to either side of striking first.”80 These con-
sequences are particularly meaningful for a small nuclear power such as China.
Effective BMD could make nuclear war more likely, because BMD potentially 
gives the “first striker” an advantage. The first striker may not be able to eliminate 
all its enemy’s nuclear forces, but its BMD would place at risk the smaller number 
of weapons launched in a retaliatory second strike.81 As a result, the 1972 Anti–
Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited the United States and the Soviet Union 
to protecting one location with a BMD system each, has been described as the 
“savior of small nuclear programs” like China’s, by ensuring that enemy targets 
remained vulnerable to retaliation by a smaller nuclear force.82
For at least the last decade, China’s opposition to American BMD systems 
has been consistent over different times and locations, so it is not unique to 
THAAD’s deployment in South Korea. Speaking at a conference on disarmament 
in Geneva in 2009, China’s then foreign minister Yang Jiechi said, “[T]he practice 
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of seeking absolute strategic advantage should be abandoned. Countries should 
[not] develop missile defense systems that undermine global strategic stability.”83
More recently, China has opposed the deployment of AN/TPY-2 radars, without 
THAAD batteries, at two locations in Japan. While the United States and Japan 
linked these deployments to North Korean nuclear and missile advancements, 
the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman criticized the decision in 2013, saying 
that it would “bring about a severe negative impact on global strategic stability.”84
China consistently has opposed U.S. BMD improvements and deployments in 
Northeast Asia.
China’s position on BMD resembles that represented in Russian and many 
Chinese reports about THAAD that include Russia as an affected party, but this 
view likely represents a convenient alignment rather than overlapping interests.
Russia has objected both to NATO’s Aegis Ashore system in Romania and Poland 
and to THAAD in South Korea. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov criticized 
the decision to deploy THAAD, saying that “this situation should not be used as 
a pretext for massive militarization of Northeast Asia and the deployment in the 
region of yet another positioning area for the US anti-missile defense shield.”85
Russia’s strategic nuclear force is much larger than China’s, and therefore less vul-
nerable to low-capacity BMD systems. Moscow’s opposition may be rooted less 
in concerns about assuring mutual vulnerability than in political considerations, 
such as how BMD reinforces U.S. relationships with Moscow’s former allies in 
eastern Europe.86
From a theoretical perspective, China’s concern about American regional and 
homeland BMD capabilities degrading its nuclear deterrent is understandable, 
but in the narrower practical context of THAAD in South Korea these concerns 
are misplaced. U.S. strategic BMD capabilities are not focused on China. It is 
possible that the AN/TPY-2 radar may improve U.S. understanding of Chinese 
strategic capabilities, but no matter whether it does, the United States already has 
an array of sensors that can provide the kind of intelligence and surveillance data 
about which China is concerned.
According to U.S. defense policy, American BMD capabilities are directed 
against “rogue states” such as North Korea and Iran that have or may be devel-
oping nuclear weapons and the ability to employ them via long-range ballistic 
missiles. Furthermore, U.S. policy explains that this technology is not intended 
for use against Russia or China. The 2010 U.S. Department of Defense Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review Report included the following:
Today, only Russia and China have the capability to conduct a large-scale ballistic 
missile attack on the territory of the United States, but this is very unlikely and not 
the focus of U.S. BMD. . . . 
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. . . As the United States has stated in the past, the homeland missile defense capabili-
ties are focused on regional actors such as Iran and North Korea. While the GMD 
[ground-based midcourse defense, which uses ground-based interceptor, or GBI, 
missiles] system would be employed to defend the United States against limited mis-
sile launches from any source, it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale 
Russian or Chinese missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic balance 
with those countries.87
America’s homeland-defense BMD system reflects this policy. It has forty-four 
GBIs, which constitute the only BMD weapon that can engage an ICBM.88 Presi-
dent Trump and members of Congress have advocated fielding twenty additional 
interceptors.89 Yet even such a larger future force would constitute a relatively 
small number of interceptors. Particularly in light of GBIs’ low success rate in 
testing, the homeland-defense BMD system has insufficient capacity to defend 
the United States against a large raid from either Russia or China.90
It may be difficult for the United States to address China’s concern about the AN/
TPY-2 radar. Chinese analysts mistrust assurances that the radar is intended only 
to target North Korea. The China Daily reported that South Korean president Park 
promised Chinese president Xi that the radar would operate in its shorter-range 
terminal mode rather than in forward-based mode. Wang Junsheng, a scholar at 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, wrote in response that “this is hogwash, 
for even if the first THAAD’s range were only 200 km, it can be easily upgraded.”91
Reporting indicates that the two modes use the same hardware but different soft-
ware, suggesting it may take no longer than eight hours to change modes.92
Regardless of the uncertainty about how the radar is used and whether it is 
as capable as the Chinese believe, THAAD on the Korean Peninsula does not 
change dramatically the methods available to the United States for peacetime in-
telligence collection or wartime early warning and cueing. For gathering techni-
cal information about missile tests around the world, the U.S. Air Force manages 
an intelligence-collection program that includes advanced radars and optical 
sensors at ground sites, on planes, and on ships.93  There are many other sensors 
available to the United States, including Space Tracking and Surveillance System 
satellites; other AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan; Aegis radars on BMD-capable ships 
at sea; and the Sea-Based X-band radar (known as SBX), which is a large, missile-
tracking radar mounted on a mobile oil rig–like hull.94  So, although it may not 
be a satisfying explanation to a Chinese audience that is wary of American BMD 
capabilities, introducing one THAAD radar into South Korea does not appear to 
add much to America’s existing BMD sensor coverage in Northeast Asia.
THAAD Strengthens Northeast Asian Alliances
China also has raised concerns about THAAD’s potential influence on Northeast 
Asian alliance relationships, specifically that the missile-defense system could 
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strengthen ties between the United States and South Korea and improve the 
trilateral relationship among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Writing 
in general terms, Thomas J. Christensen, a professor at Princeton University, 
has noted that there is a “stimulative effect of North Korean activities on U.S. 
alliances.”95 More specifically, Charles L. Glaser at George Washington Univer-
sity has written that China likely is less concerned about THAAD’s impact on 
its nuclear deterrent than about “the role that cooperation on the deployment of 
BMD systems plays in deepening U.S. military alliances with South Korea and 
Japan.”96 The China Daily also has highlighted the relationship between THAAD 
and U.S. alliances: “[T]he US is trying to tear China and ROK apart and reinforce 
the US-Japan-ROK military alliance.”97  So, how does China perceive THAAD’s 
effect on both these alliance systems?
As China has become more economically important to South Korea, ROK 
leaders have had to balance delicately their growing economic and political rela-
tionship with China with their enduring security alliance with the United States.98
Chinese analysts directly associate THAAD with the prospects for future Sino-
Korean economic and political relations. Wang Junsheng writes that “the deploy-
ment of THAAD in the ROK will almost certainly set a ticking time bomb in the 
two peoples’ minds, as well as bilateral economic ties.”99 A China Daily editorial 
indicates that “the THAAD move will deal a blow to China-ROK ties, which are 
enjoying their best ever period since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 
1992.”100 On the other hand, South Korea and the United States have very deep 
political and security ties, dating back to America’s participation in the 1950–53 
Korean War. America remains the guarantor of South Korean security, with 
28,500 troops stationed there. In peacetime, the two countries exercise together 
routinely; in wartime, America would exercise operational control of South Ko-
rean forces, and the United States provides extended nuclear deterrence.101
In recent years, South Korea has gone to great lengths to avoid choosing 
publicly between China and the United States, and this has been particularly ap-
parent in the BMD realm. In 2015, South Korea hesitated to endorse THAAD’s 
deployment. Government representatives then responded to questions about it 
with the “three noes” and began to develop an indigenous BMD system, called 
the Korea Air and Missile Defense, as an alternative to U.S. BMD systems.102  Even 
after the 2016 deployment decision, South Korea’s defense minister Han Min-koo 
announced that THAAD “will not be related to sharing information with the U.S. 
[regional missile defense] system” and reiterated that “[s]ince the Kim Dae-jung 
administration, our nation has maintained the policy of not participating in the 
[U.S.] missile defense system.”103  His comments appeared to signal that, although 
THAAD will be in South Korea, it will not serve as a precursor to greater Korean 
integration with U.S. BMD systems.
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By hosting THAAD, South Korea chose a U.S. security initiative in the face 
of China’s fierce objections. While South Korea has emphasized that THAAD’s 
deployment does not reflect on its relationship with China, Beijing disagrees.
Some in China have accused South Korea not only of tightening the relationship 
with the United States but simultaneously of rejecting China. An analyst at the 
PLA National Defense University wrote, “Washington wants to utilize THAAD to 
bind the ROK more tightly to the U.S. chariot.”104  Wang Junsheng described the 
deployment of THAAD as a “strategic competition issue between China and [the] 
U.S., which is a zero-sum game,” and assessed that China will treat South Korea 
as if it “gave up [its] balanced position between China and [the] U.S.”105 Similarly, 
the China Daily wrote that “the only side that profits from the situation is the 
United States. By successfully distancing China and the ROK from each other, the 
US has secured its alliance with the ROK and the ground for continued presence 
of US military bases there.”106
Despite South Korea’s sensitivity to China’s perceptions of THAAD’s deploy-
ment, Moon Jae-in’s administration has affirmed South Korea’s commitment to 
THAAD, while simultaneously slowing the deployment to conduct an environ-
mental assessment. In June 2017 remarks in Washington, DC, South Korean 
foreign minister Kang Kyung-wha described South Korea’s position on THAAD 
and highlighted the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance.
My government has no intention to basically reverse the commitments made in the 
spirit of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Going through the environmental-impact assess-
ment is an issue of domestic due process. It does not mean that we will cancel or 
reverse the decision to deploy THAAD. With democratic and procedural legitimacy 
obtained, we will strengthen public support for the deployment, which in turn will 
further strengthen the alliance into the future. The deployment of THAAD was an 
alliance decision, so will we, as alliance [sic], continue to collaborate on the basis of 
mutual trust.107
Although THAAD complicates South Korea’s relations with China, Seoul 
appears to view THAAD as a potentially positive element of the U.S.-ROK al-
liance. Deploying THAAD in South Korea also may increase the likelihood of 
further developing a formal or informal trilateral security relationship among 
the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Two American scholars described this 
“consequence of Chinese inaction,” regarding North Korea’s nuclear program as 
one part of a “nightmare for Chinese defense planners.”108 Throughout the Cold 
War and into the post–Cold War era, the United States has had strong bilateral 
alliances with South Korea and with Japan, but the relationship between Japan 
and South Korea has been the “important but precariously unpredictable leg” 
of the U.S.–Japan–South Korea triangle, according to Victor Cha, former direc-
tor of Asian affairs at the U.S. National Security Council.109 He described South 
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Korea–Japan relations as a “quasi alliance,” a circumstance in which two countries 
are not allied with each other but are allied with a common third party, in this 
case the United States.110
Both the potential and the limitations of this quasi alliance were evident in 
June 2017. Following a North Korean test of a ballistic missile that could reach 
Alaska, the United States flew two B-1 bombers over South Korea to reassure 
U.S. allies and deter North Korea. The bombers were escorted by both South 
Korean and Japanese fighter aircraft. According to a U.S. military official, this 
“demonstrate[d] solidarity between Japan, ROK and the US to defend against 
provocative and destabilizing actions in the Pacific theater.” Although this de-
scription suggests an effective trilateral defense relationship, press reports indi-
cated that, although the fighter escorts flew in coordination with each other, each 
was conducting “separate bilateral missions” (i.e., between the United States and 
South Korea and between the United States and Japan).111 Thus, even at a moment 
of heightened tensions, South Korea and Japan appear to have preferred bilateral 
operations with the United States.
American policy makers advocate improving trilateral ties beyond this quasi 
alliance. American leaders in both the State and Defense Departments have 
shared a consensus that improving trilateral relations among the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea is a policy priority. In 2014, representatives from both 
departments testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United 
States desired and would benefit from closer trilateral relations. Assistant Secre-
tary of State Daniel Russel testified that “strategic cooperation among the United 
States, Japan, and the ROK is essential to developing the security order in North-
east Asia, especially given the threats facing us and our allies from North Korea 
and other regional uncertainties.”112  David F. Helvey, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for East Asia, said that “the dynamic nature of the region, and the 
growing threat from North Korea, make trilateral cooperation among the United 
States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan more important than ever. Simply put, 
trilateral security cooperation is an essential element of deterrence against North 
Korean threats. The Department of Defense encourages a healthy and open 
United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan relationship.”113
Although U.S. policy makers desire improved trilateral relations, there are 
significant historical obstacles to achieving this goal. The legacies of history—
particularly Japan’s decades of conquest on the Korean Peninsula in the early 
twentieth century and a continuing territorial dispute—complicate efforts to 
achieve a more durable trilateral relationship. Korea was a Japanese colony from 
1910 to 1945, and Japan’s rule was particularly harsh during the Sino-Japanese 
War and World War II. Japanese soldiers forced tens of thousands of Korean 
women, euphemistically called “comfort women,” into sexual slavery. Differing 
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   95 2/23/18   10:51 AM
101
Naval War College: Spring 2018 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
9 6 NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
perceptions of whether Japan has apologized sincerely for these and other war-
time abuses impede improved South Korea–Japan relations.114  Similarly, the two 
countries disagree over who has sovereignty over an island group in the Sea of 
Japan, known as Dokdo to the South Koreans and Takeshima to the Japanese.
South Korean president Lee Myung-bak visited these islands in 2012, eliciting 
a strong response from Japan, which faces several other territorial disputes over 
islands, such as those involving the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with China and Tai-
wan and the Northern Territories / Southern Kurils with Russia.115
Such lingering tensions have made it more difficult to achieve trilateral co-
operation, and analysts disagree about the role the United States should play in 
resolving these tensions. The impact of history on South Korea–Japan relations 
was evident in 2012 when a proposed intelligence-sharing pact between the two 
countries collapsed shortly before the signing ceremony. The agreement failed 
because of South Korean domestic opposition rooted in lingering historical 
animosity.116 Some analysts believe that the United States should play a more 
active role in encouraging Japan and South Korea to resolve these historical and 
territorial disputes.117  Others argue that “Washington cannot broker a deal on the 
complex issue of historical memory.”118 THAAD is certainly not a mechanism to 
settle these differences, but BMD cooperation could foster a more productive 
working relationship between Tokyo and Seoul.
Whether in the context of bilateral U.S.-ROK relations or trilateral U.S.-Japan-
ROK relations, China appears to be concerned about several aspects of BMD that 
could overcome history and strengthen alliance relationships. The United States 
encourages many of its allies to participate in BMD efforts. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights the importance 
of multinational BMD: “Allied and partner acquisition of interoperable ballistic 
missile defense capabilities and participation in regional deterrence and defense 
architectures will counter the coercive and operational value of adversary ballistic 
missile systems.”119 Furthermore, technical aspects of BMD encourage deliberate 
planning, information sharing, and time-sensitive decision making, all of which 
lend themselves to closer integration of multinational capabilities. The threat 
missiles move so quickly over such a long distance that the windows of oppor-
tunity to detect and engage them are small in area and short in time. Data often 
are shared among several sensors to detect and track a target; if these sensors 
belong to different countries, reliable data-sharing processes should be put in 
place. Additionally, because the threat may be within a BMD system’s engage-
ment envelope only briefly, decisions must be made quickly, perhaps according to 
preplanned, automated doctrines, which could mean that engagement authority 
is delegated to firing units. Without coordinated planning, information sharing, 
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and decision making, there is a greater risk of missed engagement opportunities 
or redundant employment of limited interceptors.
While integrating with U.S. BMD systems, a country may discover that, 
given these unique characteristics, existing defense policies do not work well, 
which can lead to significant changes in doctrine and command and control 
(C2). Sugio Takahashi, a scholar at Japan’s National Institute for Defense Stud-
ies, has documented how BMD cooperation with the United States transformed 
Japan’s defense posture and relationship with its U.S. ally. As BMD cooperation 
increased, Japan amended its self-defense force law to allow its prime minister to 
predelegate engagement authority to the missile-defense task force. Additionally, 
the Japan Air Self-Defense Force relocated its Air Defense Force headquarters 
to the U.S. base in Yokota and built a Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination 
Center there, in part to facilitate the “seamless operational cooperation between 
the two countries’ BMD systems.”12 0 It is not unreasonable for Chinese analysts 
to be concerned that similar operational demands could lead South Korea to 
change its own military doctrine and C2 if it integrates more closely with U.S.
BMD systems.
Although Seoul has assured Beijing that THAAD deployment does not mean 
South Korea is joining an American BMD network, Chinese observers remain 
concerned it could lead to changes in South Korea’s defense posture and alliance 
relationships, like those they have observed with regard to Japan. Regarding 
THAAD, the PLA Daily wrote that “South Korea cannot help but open up its 
intelligence and information to the United States and Japan in the areas of air de-
fense, early warning, and airspace control if it imports THAAD.”12 1 China already 
may be seeing evidence to support this argument. Overcoming both historical 
animosities and South Korean public opinion, South Korea and Japan signed a 
revised information-sharing agreement, called the General Security of Military 
Information Agreement, in November 2016. Xinhua wrote that this agreement 
would “serve the U.S. pivot-to-Asia strategy by integrating military intelligence 
programs among the three countries,” hinting at China’s fear of a strengthened 
trilateral relationship.12 2
Summarizing America’s interest in enhanced trilateral cooperation, the com-
mander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., said, “If you look 
at Northeast Asia, we have treaties to defend Japan and treaties to defend South 
Korea. I think there’s value in a Northeast Asia trilateral [agreement], where we 
bring Japan, the United States, and South Korea together, [which] I’m working 
hard on.” Actions in the western Pacific suggest that these efforts to improve 
trilateral relations have the potential to succeed, specifically regarding BMD 
cooperation. For example, in June 2016 the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean 
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navies held a BMD-tracking exercise, with a total of five ships from the three 
countries.12 3  As China appears to fear, BMD could be a mechanism for improved 
trilateral cooperation. It would be reasonable for China to assume that THAAD 
might advance this trend.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Having considered several alternative explanations for China’s opposition to 
THAAD, we can ask: What is the relative importance of each explanation? And 
what are the ramifications for U.S. policy? First, China’s fears of a security di-
lemma on the Korean Peninsula are unfounded. Second, the United States should 
appreciate China’s concern about THAAD’s potential impact on its nuclear deter-
rent and take steps to reassure China about the limited objectives of America’s 
homeland-defense BMD program. Third, recognizing that China is particularly 
concerned about America’s Northeast Asian alliances, the United States should 
leverage THAAD and BMD cooperation with South Korea and Japan to strength-
en bilateral ties with South Korea and build up trilateral U.S.–Japan–South Korea 
relations. On the basis of this analysis, Beijing’s opposition to THAAD should not 
weigh on decision making in Washington about its employment in South Korea 
but instead should remind policy makers of the value and potential of U.S. alli-
ances in Northeast Asia.
First, China’s argument that THAAD exceeds the needs of defending the 
Korean Peninsula and could spark an arms race there is not supported well 
by facts and should not affect U.S. policy. As the North Korean missile threat 
becomes more advanced and as the pace of the country’s testing accelerates, it 
is reasonable for the United States and South Korea to bolster their defenses of 
critical forces, infrastructure, and populations. The United States may want to 
consider informing Chinese interlocutors about the tactical circumstances that 
require THAAD, but otherwise should not change its deployment posture be-
cause of this criticism.
Second, Washington should acknowledge but refute Beijing’s concern about 
BMD and THAAD’s impact on the viability of its strategic nuclear deterrent. Even 
if the United States desired to use BMD to defend against a Chinese strategic nu-
clear attack, adding an AN/TPY-2 radar to the Korean Peninsula likely does not 
change appreciably the threat information available to the U.S. homeland-defense 
BMD system. Chinese authors have criticized the United States for not making 
efforts to cooperate with China on BMD concerns; they suggest the United States 
should “restrain offensive capabilities and defensive capabilities, increase trans-
parency, and enhance bilateral dialogues” to convince China of the limited aims 
of American BMD capabilities.12 4  This proposal—that the United States should 
adopt unilateral arms limits—likely would not be acceptable to the United States; 
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however, more discussions of BMD capabilities and limitations may be useful as 
a confidence-building measure.
There are several approaches the United States could take to reassure China 
about THAAD’s limited impact on its nuclear deterrent. Some U.S. scholars have 
proposed reassuring China about THAAD and GBI’s focus on North Korea 
through steps such as a joint technical analysis of U.S. BMD programs, and invit-
ing Chinese observers to monitor tests of the homeland-defense BMD system.12 5
Their recommendation could be extended to include observing a THAAD test.
Steps to increase transparency would need to strike a fine balance of revealing 
enough to convince China that the AN/TPY-2 radar in South Korea does not 
threaten Beijing’s ICBMs while not revealing capabilities and limitations that 
China’s own conventional ballistic missiles then could exploit. In any case, China 
may not be interested in attempts at transparency; in 2016, the United States of-
fered to brief Chinese officials about the AN/TPY-2 radar, but China rebuffed 
these offers.12 6 Alternatively, the United States could emphasize to China that, by 
safeguarding South Korea and Japan from a North Korean nuclear attack, BMD 
acts as a brake on their nuclear programs.12 7  The development of nuclear weapons 
by South Korea and Japan might be a worse outcome for China’s security than a 
limited U.S. BMD program.
Rather than addressing China’s concern about BMD’s impact on China’s 
nuclear deterrent, others have advocated using BMD and THAAD to leverage 
this concern and encourage China to influence North Korea more effectively.
According to this perspective, if China supports meaningful sanctions against 
North Korea, the United States will not deploy any more strategic GBIs. If South 
Korea and the United States agreed that North Korea’s nuclear program no longer 
posed a threat, the United States would withdraw THAAD from South Korea, 
and perhaps begin to reduce the number of GBIs.12 8 However, although there 
is coercive logic to balancing the perceived threat of THAAD and GBI with the 
assurance of future BMD disarmament pending North Korean compliance, ap-
pearing to bend to Chinese pressure on BMD might complicate U.S. efforts to 
reassure regional allies about American security commitments.12 9 Instead of us-
ing THAAD as a bargaining chip with China, the United States should use it as a 
catalyst for improvements in the bilateral U.S.–South Korea alliance and trilateral 
U.S.–Japan–South Korea relations.
Third, the United States should recognize the importance China places on 
THAAD’s potential influence on American alliances in Northeast Asia, and lever-
age this concern to demonstrate the tangible impact of Beijing’s lack of success 
in persuading Pyongyang to restrain its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs.
As China seems to fear, THAAD specifically, and BMD more generally, may be 
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a mechanism to encourage more routine integration and cooperation among the 
United States, South Korea, and Japan, which may help to overcome historical 
grievances and build a more durable trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan relationship. U.S. 
diplomacy should emphasize to Beijing that China’s inability to influence North 
Korea’s nuclear program has contributed to the perceived need for more-robust 
BMD, which could lead, as an unintended consequence, to improved bilateral 
and trilateral alliance relationships.
THAAD has seized China’s attention and received its condemnation, and likely 
will continue to do so into the future. South Korea and the United States decided 
to deploy THAAD after years of attempts by China and other members of the 
Six-Party Talks to rein in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile ambitions.
Owing to its proximity to and political and economic relationships with North 
Korea, China has appeared to be the country with the most leverage on Pyong-
yang, but even its influence has failed to restrain Kim Jong Un. In the absence of 
efforts by China to end North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, the United States 
and its allies must use both military and diplomatic tools to defend themselves 
and shape the security environment. It is reasonable for the United States and 
South Korea to deploy THAAD—a defensive weapon—to defend their forces 
against new and challenging North Korean threats. It will not spark an arms race 
in what already is one of the world’s most militarized areas. It does not threaten 
China’s nuclear deterrent. It—perhaps—would improve bilateral and trilateral 
U.S. alliance relationships in Northeast Asia.
The United States has deployed THAAD to South Korea despite China’s 
objections. The Trump administration should take several interrelated steps to 
maximize THAAD’s value as a policy tool, not just as a defensive weapon system.
To address the first two Chinese criticisms about THAAD, Washington should 
emphasize the deployment’s defensive nature and allay Beijing’s concerns about 
BMD’s impact on its nuclear force. Recognizing the importance China attaches 
to THAAD’s potential influence on bilateral and trilateral alliance relationships, 
the United States also should emphasize that deploying THAAD was necessary, 
in part, because China has not used its influence successfully with North Korea 
to end the latter’s nuclear weapons program.
For this approach to be effective, however, the United States must do more 
than just employ THAAD in South Korea. The United States should emphasize 
THAAD’s potential effect on regional alliances to spur Chinese cooperation in 
ending North Korea’s nuclear threat. Alliances have been a source of American 
strength since the end of World War II and remain particularly relevant to the 
nuclear standoff with North Korea. America has five treaty allies in Asia alone, 
including South Korea and Japan, while China, for comparison, has only one 
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ally worldwide—North Korea. Improving U.S. alliance relationships with South 
Korea and Japan would send an unmistakable signal to Chinese leaders that their 
apparent inability to rein in North Korea has tangible outcomes that are contrary 
to China’s interests. THAAD has tremendous potential to reshape the dynamics 
of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia, but only as part of what should be a concerted 
diplomatic effort to strengthen alliance relationships. THAAD could contribute 
to closer defense cooperation in Northeast Asia, but deploying a U.S. BMD sys-
tem cannot spark this evolution by itself.
The United States should not take South Korea—its democratic ally and 
THAAD’s host—for granted. THAAD is a politically significant issue there, and 
was a factor in the election of Moon Jae-in, who campaigned as a THAAD skep-
tic. The United States should work closely with President Moon to convey the 
utility and value of THAAD to the South Korean people, while also respecting 
agreements made by previous administrations about THAAD’s funding. De-
mands that Seoul renegotiate financial details of THAAD’s already-controversial 
deployment might only inflame THAAD’s South Korean opponents and under-
cut assurances of America’s commitment to its ally.
During his campaign Moon criticized the accelerated deployment of THAAD, 
but suggested that “if South Korea can have more time to process this matter 
democratically, the U.S. will gain a higher level of trust from South Koreans and, 
therefore, the alliance between the two nations will become even stronger.”13 0 The 
United States should have the strategic patience and diplomatic savvy to earn 
this “higher level of trust” from South Korea. Furthermore, U.S.-ROK relations 
are not limited to the military alliance. Trade, for example, is another important 
aspect of bilateral ties that should be encouraged similarly, through consistent 
policies and trusting relationships. Renegotiating financial aspects of THAAD’s 
deployment or the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, as the Trump administra-
tion has proposed, may signal that America’s commitment to South Korea is 
conditional, which would not be likely to build trust in bilateral relations.
The United States should consider THAAD as more than an end unto itself, 
seeing it instead as part of a comprehensive strategy to cultivate and bolster al-
liance relationships in Northeast Asia. China’s objections to THAAD in South 
Korea indicate that Beijing considers alliances to be a source of U.S. strength 
in Northeast Asia and fears that THAAD could bolster these alliances. Thomas 
Christensen wrote of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis that a “robust U.S. security 
presence and commitment to East Asia, in the proper context, can incentivize 
China to behave more moderately toward its neighbors.”13 1 Similarly, THAAD 
might enable the United States to demonstrate its continued security commit-
ment to allies in East Asia and incentivize China to urge North Korea to curb its 
nuclear ambitions. Strengthening the bilateral U.S.-ROK alliance while bolstering 
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the trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan relationship could amplify this effect. If THAAD 
has this positive impact on U.S. alliances but Beijing remains unable to constrain 
Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, improved relationships with Seoul and Tokyo 
still would strengthen Washington’s position in future diplomatic efforts. To de-
rive these potential political benefits from THAAD’s deployment, however, U.S.
commitments to allies in Northeast Asia should be explicit and enduring, not 
ambiguous and transactional.
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MISSION COMMAND IN A FUTURE NAVAL 
COMBAT ENVIRONMENT
Mission command is a command-and-control (C2) concept that increasingly is being integrated into the doctrine of the U.S. armed forces. Joint Publi-
cation 3-0 defines it as follows: “If a commander loses reliable communications, 
mission command—a key component of the C2 [joint] function—enables military 
operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders” (em-
phasis original).1 Throughout its history, the Navy has practiced decentralized C2 
owing to the huge distances involved and the dif-
ficulty of communications. However, the modern 
networked and more intensely joint/multidomain 
environment imposes a new context within which 
C2 in a war-at-sea environment will be practiced.
To adapt its tradition of decentralized C2 to a new 
environment that features the potential for high-
end war at sea, naval officers must understand 
how the dynamics of naval combat affect the tran-
sition from a communications-rich environment 
to one that is either constrained or distorted—
specifically, the considerations required to exert 
effective mission command as operations devolve 
into forms characterized by lesser degrees of struc-
ture and control.
The Navy is currently in the process of re-
discovering its war-at-sea roots, owing to the 
emergence of potential opposition to its policy of 
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maintaining a free and open global commons, with such opposition supported 
by the naval building programs of both China and Russia. One of the key con-
cepts on which that rediscovery is riding is distributed lethality, the installation 
of offensive missiles on a wide variety of the Navy’s ships. The idea is to increase 
the number of potential shooters with which an enemy navy has to deal, instead 
of allowing it to focus narrowly on our aircraft carriers. The concept also im-
plies greater geographic dispersion of forces, including surface action groups 
(SAGs) and independently operating ships that are not attached to the carrier 
battle group. Such distribution and dispersal pose C2 challenges for the Navy; 
the intended solution is a wide-area battle-force network. However, opponents 
will challenge that network, and dispersed units may find themselves with either 
partial or no connectivity. A current answer to this problem is the concept of 
mission command.
Recognition that a return to war fighting at sea is necessary has been slow to 
come and incremental, with the discussion over the past few years focused on 
countering littoral antiaccess/area-denial systems. The development of air-sea 
battle, now transformed into the joint concept for access and maneuver in the 
global commons (known as JAM-GC), is a step forward in addressing the prob-
lem, but does not cover all the bases with regard to a fleet-versus-fleet engagement.
While the author acknowledges that a future sea battle will be multidimensional 
and multidomain, there are certain dynamics of fleet-versus-fleet combat, which 
will be discussed in this article, that commanders at all levels must understand.
War at sea always has been difficult to control, even with the advent of radio, 
radar, and computing. The historical trend is that advances in communications 
have been matched by increases in weapons ranges and distance between friendly 
units. The constant has been the difficulty an admiral has in maintaining control 
of the flow of a fight. This is one reason that Navy culture is characterized by 
decentralization and the philosophy of command by negation. Naval officers at 
all levels are inculcated with the ethos of thinking for themselves. This culture 
has served the Navy well throughout its history and may yet do so again, but an 
understanding of its place in the arena of modern naval combat is necessary for 
its intelligent application. To develop such understanding, it is useful to revisit 
the dynamics of combat at sea.
NAVAL COMBAT DYNAMICS: THREE TRADITIONAL MODES
Tactical combat at sea generally has occurred in three basic modes: structured 
battle, melee, and sniping. 2  These modes emerge from the relationship between 
a commander and his or her forces, and thus are manifested whether we are 
talking about oared galleys, nuclear submarines, or unmanned vehicles. It is also 
a comprehensively exhaustive list; any manner of fighting at sea (as opposed to 
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projecting power ashore) will be a variation of one of these modes. Understand-
ing this is an important first step in gaining a useful grasp of naval war fighting, 
and thus the necessary approach to mission command in the new context. De-
fining the intellectual boundaries of a problem serves as a clarifying lens and a 
counterweight to vague and sometimes oracular new concepts and the immoder-
ate claims made for new technologies.
We will define structured battle as a broad term that indicates coordinated ac-
tion among the units of a force, whether individual ships, task groups, or even a 
fleet. In past eras, the battle line was the principal tool admirals used to achieve 
coherence and coordination among their individual ships. This worked when 
guns were the main armament. Once aviation developed to the point of being 
able to sink ships, the aircraft carrier–centric circular formation and aggrega-
tions of it became the basis for coordination and control. However, a specific 
formation is not a prerequisite for engaging in a structured battle. Tight doctrine, 
detailed plans, and ship captains who are well schooled in the commander’s in-
tent are also ways to achieve structure and coordination. Among the objectives 
of a structured-battle approach are making the force as a whole maneuverable, 
massing fires, and obtaining mutual support. The distinguishing characteristic 
is coordination, regardless of how it is attained, whether by doctrine; operation 
order; a more distributed command authority; or swift, compact, and almost 
invisible tactical commands, using a modern signal book.
A melee is a form of battle in which each unit fights on its own without coordi-
nation with others. A common mode of fighting in the days of galleys up through 
nineteenth-century battles in the age of sail, a melee was characterized by loss of 
control by the admiral after initial contact and usually involved confusion, if not 
chaos. Nonetheless, under certain conditions, the melee at sea could be advanta-
geous, if not downright desirable. In the days of sail, if an enemy’s line broke and 
he started to flee, a general chase resulting in a melee was considered “permis-
sible, indeed obligatory.” 3  The idea was to take advantage of an enemy’s disarray 
and demoralization by engaging as many of his ships as possible so as to neutral-
ize his fleet. In World War II, a notorious incident occurred during the battle of 
Leyte Gulf. Japanese vice admiral Takeo Kurita failed to give general chase to 
fleeing American forces when he had the opportunity to inflict great damage. 4
In one sense, then, a naval melee can be the functional equivalent of kicking 
the enemy when he is down—a desirable operational situation that calls for ag-
gressiveness, even at the cost of control. The downside to a melee is that units 
tend to lose mutual support, so risk increases; but the potential payoff is inflicting 
greater loss on the enemy than could be achieved if structure and control were 
maintained. The distinguishing characteristic of a melee—at least in the sense in 
which the term is used in this discussion—is the absence of coordination among 
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units. While the breakdown in coordination among the elements of a force could 
occur in a defensive struggle—especially if the force is surprised, as was the Allied 
force in the first battle of Savo Island (August 1942)—more often it has occurred 
when an overall aggressive thrust of the force is called for.5
A key characteristic of melee warfare is that, unless planned beforehand, it 
springs on a commander unexpectedly. Therefore, the commander’s mind must 
be ready to make a difficult decision in a heartbeat. It is a risk-versus-payoff deci-
sion that involves an understanding of the current relationship between strategy 
and operations. Admiral Kurita stood to lose ships if he pressed his attack, but 
the payoff could have been major disruption of the Allied campaign. It does not 
appear that Admiral Kurita was prepared to make that decision in any kind of 
considered way. Personal inclinations may be a powerful influence—one might 
imagine how differently Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey would have acted had 
he been in Kurita’s shoes. A prepared mind is one that understands the character-
istics of a melee both as an unexpected danger and as an opportunity to exploit, 
and its potential place within the overall campaign structure. Such a mind would 
be ready to make the best decision for his or her force.6 A commander who seeks 
to issue enlightened mission orders ought to understand the potential situations 
that subordinate commanders might encounter and prepare them to mitigate, 
accept, or exploit a melee if the opportunity presents itself.
Sniping is ambush warfare. At sea it most often has taken the form of com-
merce raiding, but in World War II in the Pacific there were a number of cases 
in which submarines on both sides were able to pick off major combatants. 7  Like 
the melee, sniping involves units acting independently; but, unlike the melee, it 
is highly dispersed and episodic. Given its dispersed nature, the risk to individual 
units is a function of their stealth—submarines being the most effective—because 
sniping is undertaken in areas in which the enemy is sufficiently strong to make 
structured battle a losing proposition. In sniping, wide latitude is granted to the 
individual ship captain to select targets and the time and place to attack them.
ADAPTATION TO THE MODERN ENVIRONMENT
Although structured battle has been the default mode of sea fights at least 
since the development of the line-ahead battle formation, the other two modes 
have been used in various conditions. The question for today’s naval tacticians 
and campaign planners is what the equivalent conditions are in the modern 
operational environment, and how each mode plays out in the age of missiles, 
unmanned systems, and battle networks. Especially interesting is how modern 
weapons affect the decision on whether to allow some kind of melee to occur 
or to try to maintain a structured fight even if it means, as it did with Admi-
ral Kurita, passing up opportunities to inflict great destruction on the enemy.
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Obviously, the nature of the weapons being used exerts considerable influence.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing in an era in which the ram as the principal naval 
weapon was starting to be challenged by the long-range naval rifle, speculated 
on the relationship between melee and structured battle (the prevailing view 
then being that ram-induced melees were the proper form of battle). “Until that 
time [trial by battle] there is room for the opposite view—that a melee between 
numerically equal fleets, in which skill is reduced to a minimum, is not the best 
that can be done with the elaborate and mighty weapons of this age.”8
It should be noted that structured battle is the underlying assumption behind 
much of, if not all, the literature on network-centric warfare (NCW). A key tenet 
of NCW is self-synchronization, a condition in which individual units would be 
able to achieve coordination of their efforts without the need for rigid plans or in-
tervention from centralized authority.9 While NCW assumes sufficient network 
connectivity to enable self-synchronization, a similar effect can be achieved by 
units adhering rigidly to prebattle doctrine, plans, or both. Similarly, “control-
free” operations, as the NCW literature visualizes them, do not imply a melee.10
Current initiatives, such as network-optional warfare, are also ways of achieving 
coordination among forces without having network connectivity available con-
tinuously.11 The relative elasticity or intermittency of C2 measures does not have 
a bearing on whether a force is engaging in structured battle or melee, or sniping 
for that matter.
Nested Variation
The range of naval weapons, such as aircraft and missiles, and the dispersed 
nature of battles permit nesting of the fighting modes. A major operation involv-
ing subordinate task forces and groups is likely to be planned as a structured 
battle, but sniping operations could be built into it. Moreover, depending on the 
exigencies of battle, individual groups or units may end up operating in melee 
conditions.
At the October 1944 battle of Leyte Gulf, all three modes were on display. 
The day prior to the battle, American submarines Darter and Dace ambushed 
Admiral Kurita’s task force, sinking his flagship. Structured battle took place 
in the Surigao Strait when the battle line of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, 
USN, blasted two Japanese forces attempting a southern pincer maneuver. As 
mentioned earlier, a brief melee broke out between Admiral Kurita’s force, which 
issued through the San Bernardino Strait, and Rear Admiral Clifton A. Sprague’s 
escort carrier force, which it caught by surprise. Kurita at first ordered a general 
chase (an order that normally produces a melee), but then—possibly uncomfort-
able with the way his force was losing cohesion—he ordered his units to regroup, 
which let the American force gain some separation. Kurita subsequently ordered 
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a withdrawal. From the perspective of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander 
of the Pacific Ocean Areas, the overall operation to support General Douglas 
MacArthur’s landing on Leyte might have appeared to degenerate into a melee, 
once he learned that Halsey had taken his entire force north chasing after Vice 
Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, leaving the San Bernardino Strait uncovered. Any time 
a naval force is dispersed into individual units or independent groups, such as 
is called for in today’s emerging concept of distributed lethality, the nesting of 
modes could occur—planned, desired, or not.
The Effects of Reach: Weapons, Sensors, and Communications
In 1944, C2 of dispersed forces could be exerted only by precursor plans and 
orders or through radiotelegraphy. This necessarily left wide latitude for task-
force commanders and ship captains to operate as they saw fit. At the same time, 
weapons were targeted mostly visually, whether by aircrew, periscope, or ship’s 
lookouts. In today’s missile age, the situation has changed, with a number of dif-
ferent nonvisual sources of target location and identification available. These are 
integrated into a common operational picture (COP) that is shared among units 
and headquarters, and whose radius may extend a thousand miles or more. Rid-
ing on data links and secure, long-haul communications, the COP creates a whole 
new environment in which the three modes of sea fighting will occur.
Most readers of this article will be familiar with the campaign-phasing tem-
plate embedded in joint doctrine.12  Its phases range from Phase 0 (Shape) to 
Phase V (Enable Civil Authority). The following discussion will focus on Phases 
II (Seize the Initiative) and III (Dominate)—in other words, once the fighting 
breaks out. However, later on it will examine the role of the three modes during 
Phase I (Deter), moving to crisis and the brink of war.
In a very real sense, the differentiation among the three fighting modes in a 
modern operational environment will be a function of network conditions. The 
battle-force network, and perhaps fragments thereof, is a prerequisite for effec-
tive missile combat, in that it facilitates over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T) and 
the efficient use of missiles at the group and higher levels. Relayed positive target 
identification is necessary to comply with the law of armed conflict, and effi-
ciency is required because a force necessarily possesses fewer missiles than it does 
bullets for guns or bombs for aircraft.13  If missiles are expended inefficiently, a 
force may run out before the enemy is defeated, necessitating risky replenishment 
operations sooner or more often than otherwise necessary, or even retirement in 
the face of the enemy. Ways will be found to replenish missiles at sea; nonethe-
less, missiles are far less tolerant of inefficient use than other types of weapons.
Efficiency may be defined from different frames of reference: ship, group, force, 
or theater. In all cases, a functioning network is key to their efficient use. This 
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suggests that structured battle is the best mode to employ, with tight firing coor-
dination among as many units as possible.
However, it is likely that a capable enemy will attempt to disrupt our battle-
force network in some way, through either intrusion or denial, or we may cut 
communications voluntarily by imposing emissions-control conditions to deny 
targeting information to the enemy. We can define four dimensions of network 
status: full or constrained (available bandwidth); constant or intermittent con-
nectivity; one- or two-way communications; and confidence level, in terms 
of the validity of the data coming through. Of course, the network also might 
be completely dark. While these conditions may characterize the network as a 
whole, they more likely will exist either at the unit level or across some fraction 
of the force. Owing to the wide dispersal of autonomous or semiautonomous 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, it could be the case 
that a distant maritime operations center (MOC) has better situational awareness 
about local conditions than a unit or group commander, assuming the opposing 
forces are over the horizon from each other. Of course, the opposite also could 
be the case.
In either situation, when communications are disrupted it must be left to the 
local commander to decide what to do. It is in this situation that an understand-
ing of the three modes of sea fighting will be needed to concoct robust com-
mander’s intent before the battle and to inform constructive decision making by 
unit and group commanders.
Planning and Doctrine
Assuming the force under discussion initially engaged under the construct of 
structured battle—regardless of how dispersed it may have become since then—
the logical course is to try to maintain some semblance of that structure even 
as the network suffers degradations. However, planning and doctrine should 
consider the prospects for doing so. If the initial plan requires little in the way 
of contingent C2 loops once in execution, then the plan, while inflexible, is rela-
tively impervious to network outages, and a form of structured battle is likely to 
ensue and continue.
However, inflexible plans usually are not desirable, so the next best thing is 
to have a plan, or perhaps a doctrine, that can accommodate initiative by unit 
commanders as they see local conditions develop. The classic paradigm for this 
is the battle of Trafalgar, at which Admiral Horatio Nelson’s captains had such a 
clear understanding of his ideas about tactics under a wide range of conditions 
that once the battle was joined he had no need to issue any further instructions.
“Once Nelson set the Victory on its final course for the allied line, his physical 
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presence was superfluous. His spirit walked with every admiral and captain who 
paced a British quarterdeck that first ‘Trafalgar Day.’”14
This is the stuff that stirs the spirit of naval officers, but it must be remembered 
that in 1805, and indeed up to the advent of carrier aviation, naval forces fought 
within sight of each other. The development of weaponry that can be launched at 
targets over the horizon is bound to have an effect on this sentiment. It was one 
thing during World War II carrier battles for airborne strike leaders to exercise 
judgment, such as Lieutenant Commander Wade McClusky displayed at the bat-
tle of Midway; it is quite another when missiles—which are relatively scarce and 
cannot be recalled—are launched at targets over the horizon, especially in a battle 
space that could contain significant numbers of merchant and neutral ships.15
Individual units may have their own OTH-T resources—probably some kind 
of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)—to provide not only the location but an iden-
tification of the target, allowing the unit to fire without violating the law of armed 
conflict. However, several problems arise. First, if a coordinated salvo is required 
to penetrate the defenses of the enemy ship or force, unless the unit has many 
offensive missiles aboard or the unit is in company with others and line-of-sight 
communications are available to coordinate firing, a single unit’s missiles could be 
countered by enemy defenses, and thus wasted. Second, a unit’s organic OTH-T 
may not be able to match the full kinetic range of its missiles. A SAG composed 
of three or four ships may be able to conduct OTH-T on its own if network con-
nectivity is lost; but, from the perspective of the joint force maritime component 
commander, if it cannot take advantage of the full range of its missiles, it may be 
wasting them against lower-priority targets.
All this is to say that in modern, dispersed-missile combat, the Nelsonian par-
adigm may not serve. If the loss of network connectivity compromises the abil-
ity to coordinate missile salvos across the entire battle space, the alternatives—
mission command / mission orders or not—will be forms of melee or sniping, 
unless doctrine requires a withdrawal. Mission orders cannot produce a struc-
tured battle in this case (i.e., across a widely dispersed force), but they might be 
able to provide for a coherent transition to whatever mode follows.
It is important in the development of doctrine and plans to understand the 
characteristics of the melee and sniping modes. In both, units are operating on 
their own recognizance; but in a melee, the force as a whole is pursuing an advan-
tage aggressively, and the prospects for inflicting decisive damage on the enemy 
may be sufficiently compelling to warrant the risks incurred, which include loss 
of mutual support, increased potential for blue-on-blue casualties, and inefficient 
use of scarce missile resources. A reversion to sniping, on the other hand, reflects 
a desire to reduce risks by adopting opportunistic tactics. Branches and sequels 
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in plans and the structure and content of mission orders must be based on these 
characteristics.
To visualize better the relationships among the modes in a missile-centric, 
network-centric war-at-sea environment, imagine that the battle-force network 
is operating optimally and is generating targeting-quality information on the 
enemy, as well as comprehensive information on blue-force units. If the network 
incorporates processing that allows dispersed units to fire in coordination, the 
network is the basis for structured battle. If, regardless of communications status, 
each firing unit selects and engages its own target set without regard to what oth-
ers are doing, then the result is either a form of melee or sniping, depending on 
the tempo and situation of the battle. The risk in either is that the fleet will use 
its collective missile inventory inefficiently. The same situation could occur if the 
network was disrupted.
Enter mission orders. If the network is not able to provide targeting-quality 
information, each unit has to generate its own. If out of contact with other units, 
the commander has to rely on whatever guidance he or she received in terms of 
what to shoot at and when. The guidance might specify an aggressive approach, 
or it might direct the unit to manage risk in one way or another. Applied across 
the force, such guidance would produce either a melee or sniping. If communi-
cations are intermittent in one way or another, it is still possible for the force as 
a whole, or parts of it, to adopt either the melee or sniping approach. The fleet 
commander must understand this when crafting mission orders.
Effects of Unmanned Vehicles and Artificial Intelligence
A future naval battle more than likely will feature the presence of unmanned 
vehicles and systems that will be characterized by their possession of artificial 
intelligence (i.e., AI). Most of these systems will have nonkinetic missions and 
capabilities, such as ISR and perhaps deception. However, some will be fitted 
with weapons and may have the capability to complete all phases of a kill chain, 
regardless of whether policy and rules of engagement (ROEs) permit them to do 
so. The three modes of naval battle apply equally to these systems.
Of course, a species of unmanned sniping has been used for over a century: 
the deployment of naval mines. While the old contact mine may be too elemental 
to fit into the sniping category, influence mines with discriminating sensors and 
ship counters and those consisting of a tethered torpedo designed to detect and 
attack submarines are sufficiently sophisticated to be regarded as sniping systems.
Unmanned systems are not immune to the logic of naval combat. “Swarming,” 
however achieved, is clearly a form of structured battle at the tactical level, the 
same being true if the systems involved execute some detailed, preprogrammed 
plan without communicating with each other. If systems are set loose to find and 
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attack targets independently, a form of melee is the result, depending on how rig-
id their programming is. Conversely, modification of such programming might 
produce a sniping operation. These dynamics hold true regardless of the degree 
of human control exerted in their operation. Understanding the characteristics of 
each mode of battle, along with the conditions in which each is appropriate, will 
inform programming and planning for their use.
Early-Phase Operations
So far, this discussion has assumed that hostilities are under way. However, the 
modes of naval battle also must be considered during Phase I deterrent opera-
tions. If, during a crisis, a U.S. fleet is arrayed in multiple independent groups or 
as single ships, the possibility of a melee occurring must be considered. Under 
the ROEs, USN ships are authorized to act in self-defense. Such action might in-
clude not only use of defensive systems to parry offensive missiles but reciprocal 
offensive actions to neutralize any further hostile actions by vessels that continue 
to present a threat.16 Depending on specific guidance at the time, a particular in-
cident might or might not precipitate a general engagement. If the network cover-
age is complete, centralized decision making likely would govern whether fight-
ing spreads to the whole force. But if, as is conceivable, the aggressor first attacks 
the network, individual group and unit commanders will have to decide what 
to do. The overall commander should decide before the fact whether to allow a 
melee to develop or instead to promulgate guidance that restrains engagement 
until networked control is reestablished. This mirrors the dilemma that Admiral 
Kurita faced—which illustrates that for future commanders an understanding of 
the three modes of naval combat is neither academic nor outdated.
What holds true for the kinetic dimension of naval warfare also can apply to 
nonkinetic operations. A fleet commander who deploys forces for deterrence 
purposes during a crisis (Phase I), especially in littoral waters or other con-
strained seas, needs to accomplish two things: preventing the development of 
tactical conditions that would entice the opponent to initiate a “battle of the first 
salvo”; and not allowing an isolated incident, perhaps the result of a mistake or a 
rogue captain, to escalate into full-scale battle. In Phase 0, tight and centralized 
command is likely to be needed to avoid these situations, but in Phase I and the 
early stages of Phase II, the opponent may initiate an information fight that could 
isolate at least some elements of a dispersed force. While such a move might be 
interpreted as a hostile act in and of itself, it is more likely that the U.S. force 
would not respond kinetically, creating at least a temporary condition in which 
mission-type orders would govern.
Such orders must be informed by an understanding of the different dynamics 
of structured battle versus a melee. The structure of mission-type orders might 
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orient around actions individual units can take to become or remain untargeted.
If centralized control is present, the overall pattern of such actions might be 
regulated, to support signaling. Without such control, again depending on the 
structure of doctrine and mission-type orders, individual group or unit actions 
could be interpreted by the opponent as a signal that higher leadership does not 
want to send—an instance of a nonkinetic version of the melee generating confu-
sion and risk.17
This suggests that an understanding of the three modes of naval war fighting 
should be considered when developing plans and mission-type orders, including 
commander’s intent, for forces that could be engaged in crisis maneuvering. The 
key is to achieve coherent transition among the modes.
Gaming and Exercises to Explore Tactical Viability
Using iterative war gaming, the Navy can gain a better understanding of the 
dynamics of a future sea fight in the context of the three modes. For instance, is 
it possible to have degrees of structure in a fight, with structure degrading incre-
mentally rather than the force moving abruptly from one mode to the next? Such 
understanding would inform not only MOC doctrine and procedures but also 
fleet design and architecture. To retain at least local structure, should the maxi-
mum dispersion be three-ship SAGs rather than independently operating units?18
Should all combatants be equipped with both OTH-T and communications-relay 
UAVs? If a general reversion to sniping is anticipated, should the design of sur-
face combatants focus on stealth? Provisions such as these are not cheap, so they 
should be decided with an understanding of how the three modes of sea fighting 
will be employed.
Certain classes of ships are better suited to certain modes of fighting than oth-
ers. Submarines, of course, always have been sniping platforms, owing to their 
stealth and tactical vulnerability if discovered. However, during the early part of 
World War II, aircraft carriers, because of the range of their aircraft, were used 
successfully in this mode, conducting raids on Japanese bases. They could do 
so because the limited ISR of the era allowed them to hide in the open ocean.
Battleships and cruisers, however, made poor sniping platforms, as the fates of 
Bismarck and Graf Spee illustrate. Destroyers and cruisers became decent melee 
platforms, especially for night battles. This brings us to ships such as the modern 
USN littoral combat ship, which, although designed for missions in scenarios in 
which the ship would be less threatened, now must be adapted for higher-end 
missile fights, perhaps requiring conversion into a frigate. Although such a ship 
no doubt would be armed with point-defense systems, its self-defense capacity 
still would be limited, meaning it would have to operate in conjunction with a 
destroyer or under air cover. It therefore would need to operate in the context of 
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a structured battle—assigning a ship of that type to independent sniping duty 
would incur too much risk. As a rough analogue, back in World War II patrol 
torpedo (i.e., PT) boats were used in that way—and there is a reason a movie 
about them was titled They Were Expendable.
In the end, it is all about command at sea. The Navy has basked in the luxury of 
access unimpeded by significant opposition for so long that, as an institution, 
it has allowed its war-at-sea posture, and indeed the instincts of its officers, to 
atrophy. It now recognizes the emerging threat and is responding.
Among the features of that response should be reconsideration of the three 
modes of naval combat and how they affect the application of mission command 
in a networked, multidomain environment. The challenge is not simply to extract 
principles and apply them; the Navy first must learn how to talk about naval 
warfare constructively. This will allow useful professional dialogue to occur, aid 
in the development of doctrine and plans, enhance education, and ultimately 
prepare the minds of future commanders so they will be able to achieve mission 
command at sea.
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Russian Maritime Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic Sea
Martin Murphy and Gary Schaub Jr.
“SEA OF PEACE” OR SEA OF WAR
Overnight on February 26–27, 2014, Russian forces invaded the Ukrainian ter-ritory of Crimea. Twenty-eight days later they had completed the first forced 
transfer of territory to take place in Europe since 1945. The transfer was effected 
by small groups of armed men (the so-called little green men) who appeared at 
strategic points all across Crimea. These men, Russian president Vladimir Putin 
assured the world at a press conference on March 4, were nothing to do with him.
They were, he said, “local self-defense forces.”1
In reality, they were Russian personnel permitted and deployed to use force 
on Ukrainian territory. They used it to confine Ukrainian forces to their bases; 
take control of all media outlets and communications channels, to ensure that the 
only news the population of Crimea saw or heard was controlled by Russia; take 
over government offices, to ensure that the only decisions taken were approved 
by them; and occupy the Crimean assembly, guaranteeing that it voted to approve 
a plebiscite, which eventually would return a near–Soviet era approval rating of 
93 percent for the (re)unification of Crimea with Mother Russia.
Putin later admitted that his earlier denial about Russian involvement was 
untrue, and that the entire operation had been planned at and conducted by the 
highest levels of the Russian government. 2  The move, in blatant contravention 
of international law, challenged the very foundations of the postwar European 
order. 3
Ironically, most observers at the time believed that what they were seeing was 
the first moves in a Russian offensive, one that amounted to a new approach to 
warfare. In fact, it was the final move in a campaign against Ukraine that had be-
gun years earlier, and the reinvigoration of a form of warfare Russia has practiced 
since the Bolshevik Revolution.
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The most absurd reaction came from Martin Schulz, then the president of the 
European Parliament, when he asked how “war could become a genuine pos-
sibility in a country which shares a border with the European Union.” 4  The most 
informed came from Latvian foreign minister Edgars Rinkēvičs, who noted that 
the “Crimea scenario resembles the occupation of the Baltic states by the USSR 
in 1940.”5
The governments and peoples of the Baltic States recognized immediately that 
they too were once again in the Kremlin’s sights.6 Since then they have remained 
very much alive to the prospect of Russian destabilization and even outright inva-
sion. This article will focus on the aspect of that possibility that has received the 
least attention: destabilization at and from the Baltic Sea itself.
If that destabilization is to occur, it will be maritime in origin. It will be, for the 
most part, nonlethal and nonnaval. The Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will have a role, 
but for the most part it will be as a threatening over-the-horizon presence tasked 
with dissuading NATO from interfering; what it will not do is engage NATO 
naval forces in pitched battle. The tools of the confrontation will be largely po-
litical, diplomatic, informational, psychological, and economic. If physical force 
becomes necessary, the units performing it will be paramilitary, such as coast and 
border guards, special operations forces (SOFs), and regular forces disguised as 
local-defense forces and civilians. Regular forces will be deployed in a regular 
manner only after any campaign, and only if absolutely necessary to consolidate 
gains and “keep order.”
We begin by asking why Russia would want to disrupt what it once termed a 
“sea of peace”; the short answer is that the Baltic Sea region (BSR) offers Russia 
a point of relatively high political leverage vis-à-vis NATO and the West. We will 
examine the concept of hybrid warfare, emphasizing its political and information-
warfare dimensions, and suggest how it could be applied in and from the Baltic 
Sea itself. We will look briefly at maritime hybrid warfare in practice and sug-
gest that Russia will see clear parallels with its own land-based approach (even as 
the leaders of China and Iran are likely to admire and even envy the speed and 
aggression with which Russia achieves its aims, compared with their own more-
cautious approaches). Finally, we will argue for measures that the BSR states can 
take to mitigate the effects of possible Russian hybrid aggression.
WHAT IS HYBRID WAR?
Most observers of Russian actions in Ukraine point, quite correctly, to the 2008 
conflict in Georgia as the precursor. It validated the use of military force and the 
employment of irregular units and proxies as a foreign policy tool, while demon-
strating that strategic gains could be achieved at little long-term cost. 7  The Che-
chen wars (1994–96 and 1999–2009), however, had a more profound impact on 
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Russian military and political thinking than the brief Georgian conflict. While the 
Chechens eventually were defeated by the application of overwhelming force, the 
Russians found their opponents’ fusion of unconventional military tactics with 
information warfare (IW) and psychological operations difficult to deal with.8
Russia was successful in Crimea because it had learned the lesson of Chechnya 
and built on its partial success in Georgia in ways that reinvigorated two long-
standing instruments of its power: its armed forces and its capacity for intensive 
IW.9 When Frank Hoffman defined hybrid warfare in 2007, he made it clear that 
it could be conducted by states as well as nonstate actors.10 He returned to this 
point in a later essay, arguing that hybrid warfare was one of a number of lenses 
through which Russian actions should be analyzed, including protracted, am-
biguous, irregular, and gray-zone warfare.11
The term gray zone best captures the orchestrated multidimensionality of 
Russian actions that are calibrated to gain specified strategic objectives without 
crossing the threshold of overt conflict—actions that appear to be aimed at ex-
ploiting a Western (and specifically U.S.) strategic culture that, unlike Russian 
military practice, conceptualizes war and peace as two distinct conditions.12
This binary divide presents enemies with a seam they can exploit. Actions that 
in Western eyes are ambiguous—such as Russia’s operations in Crimea, which it 
disguised with a substantial disinformation campaign—play well in this seam.13
Russia, however, has demonstrated vividly that it will “pulse” its actions, moving 
from nonviolence to violence when it judges the risks to be acceptable, and back 
again when they are not.14
If gray-zone conflicts fall short of violent warfare, hybrid conflicts most cer-
tainly do not: they are ones in which adversaries employ a “fused mix of conven-
tional weapons, irregular tactics, catastrophic terrorism, and criminal behavior 
in the battlespace to obtain desired political objectives.”15 In eastern Ukraine, for 
example, where nonviolent and ambiguous methods met with less success, Rus-
sia did not hesitate to deploy regular forces in support of an irregular proxy force 
that, acting in classic irregular fashion, fought to erode the Ukrainian govern-
ment’s “power, legitimacy, and will.”16
The problem, of course, is that the Russian invasions of Crimea and eastern 
Ukraine were more than purely military adventures. As the Defence and Secu-
rity Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly noted in its 2015 draft 
report on hybrid warfare, “the new arena for the strategic competition between 
Russia and NATO is actually more likely to be played out at the Article 4 level.”17
Countering such incursions by Russia in the future will require more than the 
deployment or rotation of military forces. For the West, agreeing on such re-
sponses, coordinating their implementation, and putting them in effect promptly 
will give rise to considerable intergovernmental challenges.18 Budgets will be 
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one: ensuring every NATO nation raises its defense outlays to 2 percent of gross 
domestic product will add little to the resources needed to counter the political, 
information, cyber, and subversive aspects of hybrid warfare if they are expended 
solely on big-ticket items such as fighter aircraft.19
NAVAL HYBRID WARFARE
Hybrid warfare as deployed by Russia in Crimea and subsequently in eastern 
Ukraine has received considerable analytical coverage. 2 0 By comparison, hybrid 
warfare at sea has received rather less consideration. 2 1 The geography of the 
Crimean and eastern Ukrainian theaters, combined with the circumstances of 
the incursions, has meant the naval role has been limited in both, although naval 
activity did take place in and around the port of Sevastopol, where an aged Rus-
sian cruiser was sunk at the entrance to prevent five Ukrainian warships from 
leaving. 2 2
Therefore, given that Russia, to date, has not extended its hybrid-warfare capa-
bility to the maritime domain, it is worth diverting the discussion for a moment 
to review what China and, to a much lesser extent, Iran have been able to achieve.
In the South and East China Seas, China has deployed a layered maritime 
force consisting of fishing vessels supported by a maritime militia backed by its 
recently formed China Coast Guard to conduct operations at a level of conflict 
below anything that justifies an armed response. 2 3  Chinese-language publications 
talk openly about these ambiguous agencies with their numerous cutters as being 
the tip of the spear for carrying out China’s maritime strategy. 2 4  The role of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy is to stay in the background, making its presence 
felt from over the horizon.
This combination of naval force and naval proxies is brought together with an 
IW campaign consisting of diplomatic pressure, menacing media stories, eco-
nomic incentives, boycott threats, accusations that its enemies are militarizing 
the situation, spurious claims of historical rights, and perverse and self-serving 
interpretations of international maritime law. Meanwhile, China has been chang-
ing the facts on the ground. In the South China Sea, this has involved building 
artificial islands; and in the East China Sea, declaring an air-defense identifica-
tion zone that, by overlapping with those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, is 
intentionally destabilizing. 2 5
Iran’s attempts to use hybrid-warfare techniques to remake the Middle East 
have been inhibited by U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the sanc-
tions the international community has imposed to force Iran to give up its nuclear 
program. 2 6 The same impediments also have limited the country’s naval actions 
in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
Navy has been operationally and tactically innovative despite severely restricted 
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technology, like the Russian armed forces before 2008. It has planned and exer-
cised to fight guerrilla warfare at sea, using “hit and run attacks with sea[-] and 
land-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, mines, mini-subs and suicide boats.” 2 7
Both China and Iran have engaged in extensive harassing behavior aimed at 
deterring foreign warships and military aircraft from operating close to their 
coasts. This was standard Soviet practice against NATO assets until it was cur-
tailed by mutual agreement. Russia now has resumed similar operations, with 
multiple incidents taking place on and over the Baltic and Black Seas.2 8 At the 
same time, Russia has resumed Soviet-style probing missions against NATO 
countries, while the Baltic States, Sweden, and Finland all have had their territo-
rial waters and airspace compromised. 2 9
The Chinese have made extensive use of their maritime paramilitary forces 
to assert maritime claims and to deny neighboring states access to waters for 
fishing and resource-extraction purposes. The opportunities for the disruptive 
use of coast guard and border forces appear to be fewer in the BSR, as all but a 
few maritime borders are agreed; a well-established system for settling fishery, 
environmental-protection, and other issues is in place; and, for such a small 
geographic space, the diversity of coast guard and border-force organizations is 
considerable. 3 0 Yet Russian behavior—for instance, withholding ratification of 
the Narva Bay and Gulf of Finland treaty because the Estonians have “created 
tensions” by protesting against violations of their airspace—demonstrates that 
the Russians are maintaining the potential for disruption inherent in the handful 
of disputes that remain. 3 1
RUSSIA AND THE BSR
While common sense suggests that Russia should be a status quo power, given 
its economic weakness and strategic vulnerability, it clearly is not—Russia is a 
revisionist power. 3 2  It wants to revise the existing regional order unilaterally, al-
beit at the least possible political and military cost to itself. It wants to diminish 
U.S. power and replace the unipolar with a multipolar world. To achieve that, it 
needs to test U.S. strength when and where it can. The Putin regime also needs 
an enemy it can blame to divert attention from its own failures.
Geographic and Strategic Dimensions
The Baltic States lie at the point where American power is most extended and 
Russian power can be concentrated most easily. 3 3  Testing the strength of a great 
power often begins by testing the strength of its allies and the resilience of their 
mutual allegiance. America’s allies have given it many advantages over the past 
seventy-five years; but now, when America’s power is in relative decline, coercion 
of its allies on the periphery will test the limits of its strength and the support it 
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could provide those states should Russia choose to escalate. Russia is under no 
illusion that it can fight the United States directly, or a coalition of America’s core 
allies, although local or regional superiority is well within its grasp. That is not its 
intent. It will want to stay below the level of direct confrontation. 3 4
However, it is important to recognize that it “might be entirely possible that 
the Putin regime evaluates costs and benefits in a way different from what the 
West assumes.” 3 5 If Russian leaders believe that the political and military risks are 
acceptable or warranted, they may exercise military options up to and includ-
ing the nuclear level. 3 6 If Russia could engineer a situation to warrant military 
action against a NATO member, so that it was responding to a situation rather 
than provoking a crisis, the reward of weakening NATO and calling into ques-
tion America’s value as an ally would be extraordinary, as it would revise current 
European and global power balances and perhaps merit the costs to be paid.
If the overarching reason for a Russian attack is to revise the regional order, the 
potential triggers for such action in the BSR are plentiful, and not just in the Baltic 
States. Keir Giles offers a wise reminder that a “distinctly Russian concept of what 
constitutes national security, and a view of international relations which is at odds 
with that held in the rest of Europe, mean that—as was the case with Ukraine—
assessing actions and reactions by criteria that seem rational in Western capitals 
will be of limited use.” 3 7  He cites a Finnish government study that concludes 
bluntly, “Russia’s sore points are almost invariably psychological and tactical.” 3 8
The most obvious point of leverage is the Russian minorities (Russia refers to 
them as “compatriots”) who reside in the Baltic States. Others have addressed this 
subject at length. 3 9 It will not be revisited here except to note that there are con-
centrations of ethnic Russians in key maritime areas of each Baltic state. 4 0 In Es-
tonia, ethnic Russians constitute over 70 percent of the population in the county 
of Ida-Virumaa in the northeasternmost part of the country. 4 1 It contains most 
of Estonia’s energy resources, primarily oil shale, and is bounded to the north by 
the Gulf of Finland, to the south by Lake Peipus (shared with Russia), and to the 
east by Russia itself. Russians also make up over 30 percent of the population in 
the area in and around the capital and port city of Tallinn. In Latvia, ethnic Rus-
sians make up over 40 percent of the population in the capital and port city of 
Riga, 20–30 percent in its suburbs, 30–40 percent in the port city of Liepaja, and 
20–30 percent in the port city of Ventspils, with larger concentrations inland on 
the border with Russia. 4 2  Finally, there are no significant concentrations of eth-
nic Russians in port or shore areas in Lithuania, although they constitute 10–20 
percent of the populace of the capital, Vilnius. 4 3
Nor are the Baltics removed from Russia’s deeply ingrained sense of insecurity 
arising from its loss of strategic depth. Advancing the Russian right flank to the 
Baltic Sea would offer only a marginal increase in its own security, but would 
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right a perceived wrong, prevent the encirclement of Kaliningrad—the main base 
of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet—and provide a platform from which Russia could 
threaten the entire Baltic Sea littoral. From a NATO perspective, the Baltic States 
are vulnerable geographically: they are flat, offer few natural defensive features, 
and lack strategic depth of their own—it is only 150 miles from the Russian bor-
der to Riga. Greater depth could come only from either operations from a sea 
base steaming in the Baltic Sea—an exceptionally hazardous proposition against 
Russian land-based airpower and quiet submarines—or NATO operation from 
bases in Sweden and Finland.
Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO; they are unlikely to join in the 
immediate future; and if they did join, they would do so in tandem. Nonetheless, 
the Finnish government has stated it may apply at any time, while Swedish public 
opinion has displayed some volatility, with a positive showing in 2015 falling back 
again in 2016. 4 4  One of the factors influencing opinion in both places has been 
increasingly aggressive incursions into the airspace of both countries, including 
what appeared to be a simulated nuclear attack on Sweden’s capital, Stockholm. 4 5
More recently Sweden, which had withdrawn its army garrison from the strategi-
cally important island of Gotland after the Cold War, brought forward its return, 
in a move some observers attributed to a specific intelligence warning. 4 6 At the 
same time, towns and cities across Sweden were told to make preparations against 
a possible military attack. 4 7  Conscription also has been reintroduced. 4 8 How-
ever, any move by either state to join NATO—thereby meaningfully increasing 
NATO’s strategic depth—could “provoke Russia to launch a pre-emptive provo-
cation in order to demonstrate the alliance’s weakness” and deter either country 
from proceeding with its application. 4 9
Finally, it is not even clear that a prolonged campaign against the West, includ-
ing the BSR, is not under way already.50 Russian statements in nuclear matters 
exceed even the rhetoric of the Cold War, while in domestic matters accusations 
that the United States is attempting to overthrow the Russian government and 
widespread reports of Russian interference in Western elections suggest that 
President Putin and his inner circle believe conflict with the West has begun.51 
If that is the case, the various measures taken in Georgia, Ukraine, and, most 
recently, Syria signal their willingness to use every means at their disposal to 
counter what they perceive as subversive Western actions.
Political and IW Dimensions
The BSR is a peripheral region, and only three things matter when it comes to its 
security: (1) how much the core NATO powers, especially the United States, are 
prepared to commit to the region’s defense, (2) whether Russia’s determination 
to restore its sphere of influence in the region exceeds NATO’s commitment to 
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prevent it, and (3) how important it is to Russia to probe Western weakness and 
undermine its archenemy.
For some twenty years, the United States has viewed central and eastern Eu-
rope (CEE) as stable, secure, and steadily more prosperous. This is not a view 
the Baltic States share. They remember the Soviet Union’s messy exit from their 
territory and are conscious of the ties that still bind them to their former impe-
rial ruler. Their Nordic neighbors, having observed Russian actions in Ukraine 
and Russia’s increasingly aggressive stance in the BSR, have come to share many 
of their fears.
The invasion of Crimea instilled a belief in Russia’s leadership that it is pos-
sible to take bold military action without prompting a Western military response.
NATO may possess the capability to blunt and most likely defeat a thrust against 
it, but Russia just does not believe that Europe’s will to use force in any way 
matches its own.52  Moreover, the intervention in eastern Ukraine may have re-
inforced the belief that to succeed in a probing action Russia cannot allow itself 
to be bogged down, but instead needs to act swiftly and decisively if and when a 
political opportunity presents itself. The new National Defense Control Center in 
Moscow is intended to facilitate such swift and coordinated action.53
It may well be true, as Keir Giles notes, that “Russia’s borders are, for its leader-
ship, provisional—determined by accidents of history—and to be adjusted when 
necessary.”54  But NATO is falling into the trap of concentrating on military mea-
sures to defend the Baltic States, when in fact the challenge it will face is the de-
ployment of all arms of Russian power to identify and exploit political, economic, 
and military vulnerabilities in Russia’s target states and the Western alliance. “[I]n 
the Baltic context, Russia’s strategy aims to weaken NATO’s willingness to follow 
through on its own deterrent threats. Military solutions overlook this dimension 
of Russian hybrid warfare because they focus disproportionately on modifying or 
restructuring military capabilities.”55
The political dimension has been underplayed in NATO’s thinking, a ten-
dency reinforced by the military nature of the organization’s charter and institu-
tional culture. “A year ago, NATO’s discussion of Baltic defense was couched in 
terms of hybrid warfare and ‘little green men.’ Today it is much more focused on 
conventional military issues and the danger of nuclear escalation.”56 The point is 
that the organization needs to concern itself with both. Questions remain regard-
ing whether NATO’s own legal framework, and the instruments with which it 
traditionally has worked, are sufficient to deal with these nonmilitary challenges, 
and certainly whether they are able to respond to a fast-changing situation.57
Recalling NATO preparations for Soviet coercion and limited aggression during 
the Cold War is a useful reminder of what can be achieved militarily but is largely 
irrelevant in the current circumstances.58 Yes, the means Russia is prepared to use 
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now to deceive and confuse NATO and the West are based on the same tools it 
used then, but it has adapted them to the mores of a social-media environment 
that lacks the experience to judge the import of Russian messaging and actions.59
Edward Lucas writes that Russia “exploits Western perceptions of abnormality 
and normality . . . such as when it convinced a large portion of world opinion 
that Russian-speakers in Ukraine were being persecuted by the new leadership 
in Kiev [and] by claiming that NATO also engages in intimidatory military avia-
tion exercises.”60 In a BSR scenario, the Kremlin’s deceptive messaging would be 
filtered through Western media that culturally are attuned to look for moral 
equivalence, and therefore are predisposed to find failings in the West’s response.
This would confuse Western publics and complicate matters for Western decision 
makers, possibly slowing down any response until it was too late. “Russia could 
then declare air and sea exclusion zones in the region on the pretext that this pre-
vents military escalation.”61 Giles and his colleagues express this more succinctly. 
Russian information campaigns, they write, “need not even remotely resemble 
the truth to be successful.”62
If Russian aggression were allowed to reach this point, NATO would be faced 
with an unenviable dilemma: attempt to recapture NATO territory occupied 
directly or indirectly by Russia, or negotiate. Russia almost certainly would be 
open to negotiations: effect matters more than territory, and the demands it could 
impose would be humiliating. If NATO attempted to dislodge Russian forces 
militarily, Moscow immediately would brand it a coaggressor against the Rus-
sian minority. NATO also would have to decide how it would respond to Russian 
occupation of an island in the Baltic Sea such as Bornholm, or to nuclear threats 
and, possibly, a “de-escalatory” Russian nuclear strike.
MARITIME HYBRID OPPORTUNITIES IN THE BSR
However, Russia’s high-end forces—including the Baltic Sea Fleet—would not 
constitute the first movers in a hybrid conflict. They should be regarded as deter-
rents to local resistance and intervention by NATO and other Nordic states. Rus-
sia would rather practice more-ambiguous methods. Aside from Moscow’s ability 
to manipulate the loyalty of Russian expatriate communities in the Baltic States, 
many of the points where it can apply pressure lie on or under the Baltic Sea itself.
Geographically Isolated Islands and Disputed Borders
The obverse of the geographic advantage of concentration that Russia enjoys 
is the geographic separation of Danish, Swedish, and Finnish islands that have 
considerable strategic significance: whoever holds them could influence the out-
come of any conflict. Many are ideal as bases, supply points, staging areas, and 
jumping-off points for SOF operations and ambushes, while bays, fjords, and 
peninsulas provide hiding places and launch points for fast raiders.
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The Danish island of Bornholm is positioned ideally to serve as a Russian 
advanced base; it is worth recalling that Soviet forces occupied it in 1945.63  The 
Swedish island of Gotland offers whichever power controls it dominance over 
all sea routes and much of the airspace over the Baltic Sea and its littorals, which 
explains why Sweden has moved to regarrison the island.64  The Åland Islands, lo-
cated at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, are Finnish territory, but were demili-
tarized in 1856, a status that has been confirmed twice since then. They overlook 
the narrow entrance to the Gulf of Finland. During World War II, German forces 
blocked this passage with mines and nets, successfully confining the Soviet Baltic 
Sea Fleet to its bases. Finland is known to have plans to remilitarize the waters 
around these islands in the event of conflict, as their location dominates all sea 
movement in the northern part of the Baltic Sea.65 Russia has practiced invading 
all three locations.66
Undersea Cables
Modern economies depend on an information and communications–technology 
infrastructure that is remarkably vulnerable. “Today, roughly 95 percent of inter-
continental communications traffic—e-mails, phone calls, money transfers, and 
so on—travels not by air or through space but underwater,” through fiber-optic 
cables, most no thicker than a garden hose.67
When it comes to the Baltic Sea particularly, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia 
have only a few nodes that need be severed, while Estonia, the Nordic countries, 
and Germany have much more redundancy available in their connections. Still, 
the disruption of communications by severing these undersea cables would cause 
severe economic distress in the region for a considerable period and would be 
difficult to mitigate, even for those countries with multiple nodes. These cables 
therefore would be a prime target in a hybrid-warfare campaign. As a former 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), has 
written, “The tactical reasons for doing so are plain: in the case of heightened 
tensions, access to the underwater cable system represents a rich trove of intel-
ligence, a potential major disruption to an enemy’s economy and a symbolic chest 
thump for the Russian Navy.”68 While cutting cables would remove an important 
conduit for disinformation, tapping into them and ultimately cutting them would 
contribute significantly to a campaign designed to create instability in the tar-
geted states and societies, making state authorities look weak as they pressured 
cable owners to restore services.
Energy Supplies
There long has been a recognition that states’ dependence on Russian energy 
supplies, particularly among former Eastern Bloc countries—in this case, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—exposes them to the possibility of economic 
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coercion.69 These states have pursued policies to reduce their dependence on 
Russian supplies of oil, natural gas, coal, and electricity, but the advantage that 
accrues to Russia—given the infrastructure investments necessary to diversify 
supplies—has been difficult to overcome. Nonetheless, reliance on Russian en-
ergy supplies is not uniform across the Baltic States.
Owing to ample domestic energy supplies—shale oil and coal, respectively—
Estonia and Poland are among the least dependent on energy imports in the 
European Union. 7 0 However, they remain heavily dependent on Russia for other 
energy supplies: in 2010 it provided 100 percent of Estonia’s gas and 54 percent 
of Poland’s, in addition to 92 percent of Poland’s oil needs. Yet these portions of 
their overall energy mix were 15 percent for Estonia and 39 percent for Poland—
a far cry from the total dependence that often is suggested. Lithuania and Latvia, 
on the other hand, were almost entirely dependent on Russian gas, oil, coal, 
and electricity in 2010. 7 1 As the European Commission put it, excessive reliance 
“on one single foreign supplier for oil and gas, the absence of any domestic en-
ergy source, and the lack of interconnections with other EU [European Union] 
countries has further worsened the exposure of Lithuania to potential security 
of supply risks and price shocks. . . . Excessive reliance on Russia is an issue that 
Lithuania is trying to resolve.” 7 2  Similar passages mark the section of the report 
discussing Latvia. Overall, the ability of Russia to use the supply of different 
forms of energy as part of a hybrid-warfare campaign varies across the vulnerable 
parts of the region.
Port and Supply Chain
Ports and ships could be subject to sabotage and strikes using SOFs as part of 
a hybrid offensive. Indeed, it is easy to imagine “little green men” or irregular 
forces conducting operations against port facilities to disrupt operations and 
trade, and hence the local economy. Yet conceivably the most serious threat could 
come from cyber attacks, a concern that already animates much of the landward-
resilience debate. Modern ports could not operate absent sophisticated computer 
systems, while modern ships are increasingly automated to cut crew costs. As 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security pointed out in a 2016 report, a cyber 
attack “on networks at a port or aboard a ship could result in lost cargo, port 
disruptions, and physical and environmental damage depending on the systems 
affected. The impact to operations at a port, which could last for days or weeks, 
depends on the damage done to port networks and facilities.” 7 3  Any prolonged 
interference with the region’s maritime trade could impact industrial-production 
flows and economic security severely.
The attacks that are known to have taken place against ports so far were 
committed by hackers and other cyber criminals. Russia, however, deploys a 
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sophisticated cyber-warfare capability that mounted a distributed-denial-of-
service (DDoS) attack against Estonia in 2007, effectively forcing it to decouple 
itself from the Internet. 7 4  Stockholm has accused Moscow of being behind the 
cyber attack that closed down Sweden’s air traffic–control system for more than 
five days in November 2015, forcing the cancelation of hundreds of domestic 
and international flights, allegedly owing to Russia testing its electronic warfare 
capabilities. 7 5
Although most international attention has been directed at China’s cyber ex-
pertise, former U.S. director of national intelligence James Clapper believed that 
Russia’s cyber threat exceeded the Chinese threat because it employed stealthier 
and more-advanced methods of attack. 7 6 Port operations present a vulnerable 
target. Handling large numbers of different cargoes at once would be impossible 
without sophisticated information-management systems. 7 7  Disrupting their 
complex and time-sensitive operations would have consequences nationally 
and regionally. Blunt cyber instruments such as DDoS attacks have their uses, 
but more-targeted tools, such as worms and viruses designed to take down port 
operations selectively and even randomly, could result in billions of euros in lost 
economic activity and generate social unrest as a consequence of the unavail-
ability of food, medicine, and energy. This would serve the Kremlin’s aims ably, 
constituting hybrid warfare with more deniability. 7 8
Individual ships are also potentially at risk. The Baltic Sea is a major waterway, 
with between two and four thousand commercial vessels in transit every day of 
the year. 7 9 The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) recently is-
sued guidelines on maritime cyber security, in partnership with related maritime 
trade bodies (Cruise Lines International Association, International Chamber 
of Shipping, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners [known 
as INTERTANKO], and its equivalent for dry cargoes [INTERCARGO]). The 
guidelines make the point that, as “technology continues to develop, information 
technology and operational technology onboard ships are increasingly being 
networked together—and more frequently connected to the worldwide web,” and 
attacks mounted against these systems could undermine the “safety and commer-
cial operability” of ships.80 The list of onboard systems that could be manipulated 
remotely to place ships at risk is long and growing.81
Thus, instead of disabling ships with gunfire or mines, anonymous cyber at-
tacks could leave ships unable to navigate or maneuver, putting them at risk of 
grounding and presenting a hazard to other shipping. Multiple such incidents 
in the crowded waters of the Baltic Sea could result in ship operators and crews 
refusing to serve Baltic Sea ports or marine insurers raising rates to prohibitive 
levels in the face of an unsustainable aggregated risk.82
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OPERATIONALIZING MARITIME HYBRID WARFARE IN THE BSR
Broadly speaking, two scenarios for a Russian campaign in the BSR appear 
possible:
• A low-key, possibly opportunistic campaign that, by exploiting real or 
manufactured discontent among Russian compatriots to destabilize one or 
more of the Baltic States, creates a “frozen conflict” that undermines NATO’s 
credibility.
• A more structured, high-tempo campaign to achieve the same objectives 
against NATO power in the BSR and also render Nordic defense cooperation 
redundant.
It is reasonable to assume that the Baltic Sea Fleet and other organs of Rus-
sian maritime power would play supporting rather than leading roles in any such 
conflict.
Russian Considerations
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Baltic Sea has become a vital con-
duit for Russian trade—one, moreover, that is close to important Western mar-
kets and (to date) untroubled by the risk of conflict. Prolonged interruptions in 
flows of energy and goods would inflict considerable damage on Russia’s poorly 
diversified economy. Russia recognizes that its lack of control over access to the 
North Atlantic through the Danish straits renders it vulnerable in the event of 
serious conflict. It does have an alternative—the White Sea Canal, which runs 
from Saint Petersburg via Lake Ladoga—but this suffers from limited capacity, is 
vulnerable to sabotage and air attack, and is icebound in winter.83
An additional complication—one that affects Russian naval as well as com-
mercial shipping—is that the Soviet Union invested around 50 percent of its ship-
building capacity in the Saint Petersburg area. A second vital facility, the Yantar 
Shipyard, specializing in the construction of large surface ships, is located in the 
Kaliningrad Oblast. Russia has made no attempt to dilute this concentration of 
shipbuilding assets by moving them elsewhere.84
In 2015, the two containerports within what is known as “big port Saint Pe-
tersburg” handled 52 percent of Russian container traffic. This amounted to 1.9 
times the throughput of Russia’s Far Eastern ports and more than three times 
the volume passing through its Black Sea terminals. Further container traffic is 
transshipped via Baltic State ports such as Riga in Latvia and Tallinn in Estonia.85
Europe remains, to date, a major customer for Russian crude oil. The bulk of 
this traffic is shipped by tanker from the ports of Primorsk and Ust’-Luga near 
Saint Petersburg via the Baltic to northwest Europe. However, volumes are de-
clining, apparently because shipments to China are increasing.86 On the seabed 
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is the Nord Stream gas pipeline. This consists of two parallel pipes that run from 
Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in Germany. The first came on stream in No-
vember 2011, the second almost a year later. It is currently the longest undersea 
pipeline in the world. Despite EU sanctions following Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine that limited the volume of gas that could 
be transmitted, volumes increased by 10 percent in 2015.87  Furthermore, negotia-
tions continue for the laying of two further parallel pipelines in a project named 
Nord Stream 2. The plan is controversial.88 If it overcomes opposition, it would 
double the capacity of the system, meaning up to 110 billion cubic meters of gas 
could be transmitted annually to the European market by 2019.89
This volume may be additive, but this is unlikely, given that its main purpose 
appears to be to give Russia the option of shutting down its current pipeline net-
work through Ukraine and other states for political reasons. Nord Stream and 
other pipelines like it, such as the Turkish Stream, are strategically important to 
Russia—and strategically perilous to the states in Russia’s near abroad—because 
they would allow the Kremlin to cut off supplies to the border states it wished 
to intimidate, while maintaining an uninterrupted supply to its key Western Eu-
ropean markets.90 It is noteworthy that even when confronted by EU sanctions 
imposed after the invasions of Ukraine, the Kremlin never suggested it would 
retaliate against its prime Western European energy markets, while conversely 
it has shown no compunction in wielding the energy weapon against Kiev, and 
before that the Baltic States.91 Russia expresses this differently: it argues that by 
linking Russia and Western Europe directly, EU states are no longer vulnerable to 
supply disruptions caused by political difficulties in transit countries. This con-
nection reinforces the dependency and mutual interest that already exist between 
the EU and Russia and, in the absence of plans to balance European purchasing 
power against Russian supplier demands, risks compromising Western European 
responses to possible Russian aggression in CEE.
Mitigation Measures
Given the essentially political nature of hybrid war, many of the mitigation mea-
sures will focus on political, economic, and information outcomes. The sugges-
tions advanced here draw on and add to two recently published policy proposals
—one from the EU entitled Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats: A 
European Union Response, the second from NATO entitled “Resilience: A Core 
Element of Collective Defence”—that contain suggestions adaptable to the mari-
time situation confronting the BSR states.92
Demonstrable Resolve
Russia needs to be convinced that all BSR states are committed to challenging 
Russian aggression at sea. NATO has gone some way toward addressing this. The 
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maritime component of the Readiness Action Plan on which NATO agreed at its 
2014 summit includes intensified naval patrols in the Baltic (as well as the Black 
and Mediterranean Seas), built around the Standing NATO Maritime and Mine 
Countermeasures Groups; increased sorties by maritime patrol aircraft; and an 
expansion of the annual BALTOPS naval and amphibious exercise, from thir-
teen nations in 2014 to seventeen in 2015 and 2016, including Sweden and Fin-
land.93  However, BALTOPS still reflects the alliance’s focus on high-end military 
operations.
Prior to Russia’s demonstration of its hybrid-warfare capabilities in Crimea 
and Ukraine, the Baltic States perceived the possibility of a Russian ground 
invasion as their most significant military threat. Consequently, the naval and 
maritime-security forces of all three states have had to work with even more lim-
ited resources than the other military and security arms. Each state has chosen 
to concentrate its naval capabilities on mine countermeasures, seeing this as an 
affordable way to make a realistic contribution to NATO, while directing other 
funds toward more constabulary-focused homeland- and maritime-security mis-
sions such as countersmuggling and fisheries and border protection.94
Hybrid Fusion Cell
The EU report recommends the establishment of a hybrid fusion cell to furnish 
a single focus for the analysis of hybrid threats, established within the EU Intel-
ligence and Situation Centre (known as the EU INTCEN) of the European Ex-
ternal Action Service.95
Given the position of the BSR on the front line of potential Russian aggres-
sion, it would be prudent to set up a BSR hybrid threats fusion cell at a secure 
location within the region. The center could liaise with the EU hybrid fusion 
cell and NATO, but also develop a specific understanding of potential threats 
throughout the region and coordinate closely with regional states on relevant 
early-warning indicators. The cell undoubtedly would find it useful to rebuild a 
regional analytical capability focused on Russian priorities, motivation, capabili-
ties, and planning.
The EU and NATO appear to have taken a first step in this direction by agree-
ing to establish a hybrid threats research center, based in Helsinki, Finland.96
Strategic Communications
As the EU report comments, perpetrators of hybrid threats “can systemati-
cally spread disinformation, including through targeted social media campaigns, 
thereby seeking to radicalize individuals, destabilize society, and control the 
political narrative. The ability to respond to hybrid threats by employing a sound 
strategic communication strategy is essential. Providing swift factual responses 
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and raising public awareness about hybrid threats are major factors for building 
societal resilience.”97
Although each state will wish to conduct its own strategic communications 
strategy, a regionally based center of excellence could act as a focal point for 
exchange of best practice, audience research, and messaging, including how and 
why Russian acts in the maritime domain can cause widespread instability.
Critical Infrastructure
It is widely recognized that the ability to maintain supplies of energy, food, po-
table water, and medical supplies as well as telecommunications links will be 
critical to maintaining civilian morale and trust in government. In the Baltic 
States, diversification of energy supplies away from exclusively Russian sources 
is already under way.
A new facility for the import and regasification of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
has been built at Klaipeda in Lithuania; ensuring its security is vital. Further 
diversification could be achieved if additional terminals were built in Estonia 
and Latvia, with reversible-flow pipelines linking all three. Ideally, a trans-Baltic 
pipeline should be built to link the Baltic States with the Swedish system (known 
as Swedegas), which could transmit gas from its new terminal in Göteborg on 
Sweden’s west coast in the event that LNG carriers were unable to pass through 
the Danish straits.98 These pipelines would supplement the NordBalt power cable 
laid between Sweden and Lithuania. Notably, Russian warships interfered with 
this link on three occasions during its construction. In each case, Russia claimed 
the area would be used for military exercises.99 Additional links should be laid 
among Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. The Baltic States also need to sepa-
rate themselves from the Russian-dominated electricity grid known as BRELL 
(for Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). The financial cost of doing so, 
however, will be high, and it would incur further Russian displeasure, as the grid 
currently carries Russian power to Kaliningrad.100
Protecting this largely maritime infrastructure would place a premium on ef-
fective Baltic Sea maritime domain awareness (MDA). Maritime patrol aircraft 
(MPA) fleets have declined since the Cold War and need to be rebuilt. At the same 
time, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have begun to share the intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance burden previously carried by MPA aircraft alone.
BSR states currently lack experience with large, long-endurance UAVs, a capa-
bility gap they might fill by using the NATO-developed “lead nation” concept 
to work alongside Poland, which wishes to acquire a fleet of medium-altitude, 
long-endurance unmanned aircraft (known as MALEs).101
On the other hand, BSR states have three existing MDA frameworks: Surveil-
lance Cooperation Finland-Sweden (SUCFIS), Sea Surveillance Co-operation 
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Baltic Sea (SUCBAS), and the European Defence Agency’s Maritime Surveillance 
(MARSUR). SUCFIS involves the automated exchange of daily reports and clas-
sified information between the military commands of Finland and Sweden.102
SUCBAS does not supplant this structure, but augments it by facilitating the 
exchange of MDA data in unclassified form among all member states.103  It went 
“live” in 2010. Russia was invited to join but declined.104  MARSUR enables the 
“exchange of operational maritime information and services” so as to improve 
maritime situational awareness, interoperability, and cooperation between EU 
military and civilian maritime authorities and other international maritime 
actors.105
However, the degree to which these multinational organizations and their 
participating national MDA agencies are attuned to hybrid threats in the mari-
time domain and consequently the strength and efficiency with which they can 
bridge the civil-maritime divide in their respective countries are areas where 
further work may be needed. For instance, Russia could use normal commercial 
ship movements to seed mines from nontraditional platforms. The Libyan navy 
demonstrated that this was perfectly feasible when in 1984 it seeded the Red Sea 
from the civilian ship Ghat, resulting in damage to twenty ships making their way 
to or from the Suez Canal.106
Port and Supply Chain
In line with the steps laid out in the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan, 
BSR states need to place a strong emphasis on port and supply-chain security.
This must include defenses against cyber attacks. Although the maritime indus-
try is taking steps to address the issue of cyber attacks on ports and shipping, 
there currently is no focal point that brings government and industry together to 
address the problem.
Russia considers itself to be a maritime power. It always has sought to control the 
seas that give it access to the world ocean. The Baltic Sea is vital in this regard.
During the Cold War, the Soviet concept of “Baltic Sea: Sea of Peace” translated 
into an assertion of Pax Sovietica that beguiled no one but fellow travelers as 
Soviet submarines pursued it and NATO and Sweden contested it.
But Russian power, when compared with its Soviet predecessor, is sadly dimin-
ished. It is therefore understandable that Russia should continue to augment its 
remaining military power with the measures of influence, deception, and covert 
action that were so characteristic of the Soviet approach to interstate relations.
Russia’s methods in Crimea and Ukraine took NATO by surprise for a number 
of reasons. The most serious was historical amnesia, because it led the alliance to 
mischaracterize what was taking place as new. Even though NATO, and indeed 
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almost all of Russia’s opponents since 1917, had experienced before the mix of 
disguised SOF actions, deception, and misinformation to which the Russians 
refer as reflexive control, NATO chose to refer to it by a new name: hybrid war-
fare. The alliance, Western governments, and the EU also have tended to focus 
primarily on Russian military action when, in fact, conventional military forces 
played a relatively insignificant role in what took place.107
Most of the troops involved—the “little green men” who appeared on the 
streets of Sevastopol and elsewhere—were as much a part of the GRU (the Rus-
sian army foreign military intelligence agency) as they were the Russian army per 
se. Certainly, the presence of Russian conventional forces was advertised widely 
and was used as an escalatory threat, but the small number of conventional-force 
units that were deployed operationally consisted largely of indirect-artillery-fire, 
electronic-warfare, communications, logistical, and aerial-surveillance troops.
Any repetition of the Crimean model is likely to make similar use of conventional 
forces. It will be a whole-of-government effort of political subversion and desta-
bilization in which the conventional military—in contrast to SOFs and proxy 
militia—will play a largely passive role until the last minute, unless the political 
campaign fails and can be redeemed only by using conventional military force.
Whole-of-government aggression demands a whole-of-government response.
In this sense, there is no such thing as maritime hybrid warfare, certainly in 
Russian political or military doctrine or practice. What states in the BSR may be 
confronting even now, however, is a long-term campaign of politically motivated 
societal disruption, aspects of which may occur in or from the maritime domain.
The seaborne aspects of the campaign will be maritime rather than exclusively 
naval, in that what takes place could involve any of the ways people use the sea, 
the seabed, and the airspace over them. Warships, submarines, and military air-
craft will be involved, but so will fishing vessels, other ships, and ports, drawing 
in coast guards and border forces along the way. Any disruptive campaign at sea 
in the Baltic is likely to use conventional naval forces in ways that are analogous 
to the background role that ground forces played during the Crimea invasion and 
the eastern Ukraine intervention.
BSR states are already alert for signs of disruption instigated and sustained 
by any aspect of Russian state power anywhere on their territories, but they 
must ensure that their vigilance does not stop at the coast. Russia has a powerful 
vested interest in the safe movement of its goods and raw materials through the 
Baltic Sea; but then, so does China in the safe movement of its goods, especially 
its energy imports, through the South China Sea, yet this has not stopped it 
from conducting a campaign of political and territorial disruption that has an-
tagonized its regional neighbors, its trading partners, and the United States. The 
transition from a sea of peace to a sea of war could be slow and subtle or quick 
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and merciless; either way, both NATO and the states surrounding the Baltic Sea 
need to be prepared.
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COMMENTARY
THE BALTIC, POLAND, AND PRESIDENT TRUMP’S  
WARSAW DECLARATION
Don Thieme
There may be no greater potential flash point in Europe today than the Baltic Sea 
region (BSR). The convergence of the Kaliningrad outpost; the riparian powers, 
neutrals, NATO allies, and Russia; and economics and military force in general 
makes for an explosive brew that may merely simmer—or may boil over and 
ignite a larger conflict. While much of the debate focuses on the Baltic littorals 
and hinterlands, it is the Baltic Sea itself that sits, physically and strategically, at 
the center of the issue. It is critical for naval policy makers and scholars today to 
understand the history of the BSR.
Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, and 
Denmark all touch the Baltic Sea. Commercial and military ships ply its waters, 
their access controlled by Gotland Island and the Skagerrak, the strait between 
Norway and Denmark—one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. The wa-
ters are icy cold in winter and chilly even in summer—but climate change means 
that even in winter they are not as frozen and challenging as they were previously.
This enables greater commercial flow—as well as 
greater access for the Russian Baltic Fleet to warm 
seas, albeit through easily contested waters. Fin-
land and Sweden, while not members of NATO 
(although members of the European Union), 
nonetheless have integrated themselves intimately 
into many of the activities of the NATO member 
states within the BSR.
Several points impact how northern Europeans 
perceive Baltic history. After they returned from 
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the Crusades, the Teutonic Knights built an empire along Baltic shores. The new 
power in the region, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1386–1795), de-
feated the knights in 1410. The commonwealth defeated the expansionist Ivan IV, 
“the Terrible,” and occupied Moscow during the “Time of Troubles” in the early 
seventeenth century. While the Swedes wreaked havoc and mortally wounded the 
commonwealth during the “Swedish deluge” of the late seventeenth century, the 
commonwealth still mustered enough power to defeat the Ottomans at Vienna 
in 1683.
Economically, the reach of the Hanseatic League of the thirteenth to fifteenth 
centuries extended from London and Flanders through the Baltic to Novgorod.
Built around the lucrative grain and fur trades, the league provided a European 
common market with shared, enduring cultural and economic ties. This combi-
nation generated political power, drawing Peter I, “the Great,” to move his capital 
in 1703 from Moscow to a swampy piece of ground that today is Saint Petersburg.
The work was performed primarily by Swedish prisoners from the Great North-
ern War, especially after the tsar’s resounding defeat of Swedish forces at Poltava 
in 1709. Peter moved to the Baltic at least in part because of the economic power 
concentrated there.
After the dissolution of the commonwealth and Poland—completed by the 
Third Partition, in 1797—Prussia, Russia, and Austria changed the power rela-
tions in the region. However, this did not alter the importance of the BSR, or 
that of the North European Plain that extends from Novgorod to Amsterdam. It 
was no accident that the thirteenth of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points specifi-
cally addressed the re-creation of an independent Polish state—which served as 
an excuse for the Hitler/Stalin invasions of Poland in 1939. From Grunwald in 
1410 and Potsdam in 1945 to Solidarność in 1980 and the fall of the wall in 1989, 
the BSR and its peoples have been a centerpiece of power struggles in Europe.
Nothing in the last twenty-six years, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 
Christmas Day 1991, has changed this essential set of historical facts.
Today, tensions are high, primarily because of naval maneuvers conducted 
to ensure access to the Baltic, reinforced by operations and activities in the lit-
torals and hinterlands that control the approaches to the sea. While ZAPAD 17 
drew much interest, it was only one part of the strategic-to-tactical maneuver-
ing going on throughout the BSR—maneuvering that is increasing tensions and 
opportunities for actions and messages to be misunderstood. Northern Europe 
offers a complex mixture of naval and land forces; while geography and history 
might indicate that land-based power is the more important of the two, there is 
a reason the Baltic Sea remains the most heavily mined waterway in the world.
It is worth remembering that the Soviets and Nazis fought over it bitterly during 
World War II.
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In the maritime domain, even as ports such as Gdańsk/Gdynia and Szczecin 
(Stettin in German) develop their commercial intermodal transportation capa-
bilities, military operations continue. NATO, along with Finland and Sweden, 
conducted BALTOPS this year. Russia used to participate in BALTOPS, but in 
recent years has reoriented its focus. In July 2017, it conducted RUSSO-SINO 
BALTIC MARITIME COOPERATION 2017 (also called Exercise JOINT SEA 2017). 
The Chinese sent a destroyer, a frigate, and a supply ship, with helicopters and 
naval infantry, to exercise with the Russian navy’s frigate, fixed-wing aircraft, he-
licopters, and naval infantry, especially in the waters off Kaliningrad. Next winter 
Norway will be the site of NATO’s COLD RESPONSE exercise, which will involve 
thousands of troops from more than a dozen nations. Add to this a Baltic com-
ponent of the regional missile-defense system, and one sees many operations and 
activities taking place in what was thought previously to be a strategic backwater, 
now turned regional pivot point.
Thus, when President Trump stopped in Warsaw en route to the economic 
summit in Germany in July 2017, he underscored the strategic importance of the 
BSR. Within Poland, the spot where President Trump made his speech was im-
portant at the micro level: plac Krasińskich, in front of the monument to the War-
saw Uprising. The monument serves as a symbol of Polish resistance to any exter-
nal power. The symbolism Trump conveyed at Krasiński Square was even more 
important. Although the president drew criticism over his Warsaw stop, those 
criticisms missed the underscoring of the strategic importance of Poland and 
the centrality of the BSR to overall European security. The North European Plain 
links Russia and Germany geographically, yet culturally Moscow and Berlin are 
further apart than the thousand miles of road between the two capitals would in-
dicate. Although there are many issues on which the Germans and Russians may 
agree (e.g., Nord Stream), there are at least as many about which they disagree
—with millions of war dead and millions more displaced ethnic minorities un-
derscoring the point.
There is a saying in Poland that Poland represents the walls of Christianity. 
John III Sobieski embodied this concept in 1683 when he defeated the Turkish 
armies outside the gates of Vienna. President Trump could have flown directly 
to Germany, but he chose to stop in Poland before flying to the G20 summit in 
Hamburg, where he would mingle with Merkel and Putin. By stopping in War-
saw he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to NATO expansion and evoked the 
Solidarność era amid a new era of Mitteleuropa contention. It was no coincidence 
that the signing of a deal with Raytheon for Patriot missiles was announced 
nearly simultaneously.
By traveling to Warsaw, President Trump underscored U.S. involvement in the 
complex Polish-German-Russian relationship. By speaking at Krasiński Square, 
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he figuratively placed himself in the middle of one of the most contentious his-
torical issues touching on that relationship: the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944.
At that time, with Soviet armies advancing from the east, the Polish underground 
Home Army saw an opportunity to reassert native control of Poland for the post-
Nazi era, before the Soviets could install a puppet government in Warsaw. But 
the Nazis counterattacked in a vicious urban battle that destroyed more than 80 
percent of the city and killed roughly two hundred thousand Poles. Meanwhile, 
the Soviets declared an “operational pause”—and merrily watched the Germans 
and Poles kill each other. They calculated that this would make it easier to defeat 
Nazi forces and install their puppet government atop the ruins of the city, the 
country, and—most importantly—the resistance. As Stalin once quipped, trying 
to put Communism into Poland is like trying to saddle a cow; but brute force has 
a compelling political logic all its own. Furthermore, the Soviets knew that the 
inclusion of Polish ports within the future Warsaw Pact would constitute a critical 
component of their cordon sanitaire.
President Trump’s speech channeled four important historical messages to-
ward the BSR and the rest of Europe. First, ninety-nine years ago, President Wil-
son’s thirteenth point had called for an “independent Polish state . . . [with] free 
and secure access to the sea . . . guaranteed by international covenant.” President 
Trump’s words echoed that call with the phrase “a Poland that is safe, strong, and 
free.” Second, he reasserted the U.S. commitment to NATO and the maintenance 
of peace by standing in front of a monument to the Polish underground that 
fought both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Third, he reminded his audience 
of the importance of keeping modern Germany as a powerful, peaceful player 
within the realpolitik arena of central Europe, as well as greater Europe. Last, 
he reminded Russia that the United States is not ignorant of history (“As long as 
we know our history, we will know how to build our future”), and while the two 
countries may have been Allies during World War II, that does not mean we were 
friends then or during the ensuing Cold War. He also reminded his audience of 
Poland’s defeat of the Soviets in 1920 outside Warsaw—a battle witnessed by a 
young leader, Joseph Stalin. His message was not lost on observers in Warsaw, 
Berlin, Moscow, and the rest of Europe.
Finally, the Warsaw Uprising remains a hotly debated issue in Poland even 
today. I have friends and members of my extended family who fought both the 
Nazis and the Soviets from 1939 forward, and many dinners have been spent 
engaged in lively discourse over the costs and merits of the uprising. It destroyed 
the ability of the Polish Home Army to resist effectively, ensuring that the na-
scent Polish Communist party was able to assume control by 1948. The human 
cost—coming at the end of five years that saw both the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany invade Poland in 1939, as Britain and France reneged on their security 
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guarantees to Poland, Nazi Germany invade the Soviet Union through eastern 
Poland in June 1941, and the Soviets invade Poland in 1944–45—was stagger-
ing. Yet despite the human and physical destruction, the uprising gave emergent 
Poland the moral high ground. It represented Poles’ assertion that they never 
would be compliant with Soviet rule and always would fight, by whatever means 
available, the occupation and oppression of Poland.
President Trump reaffirmed to Poland the U.S. “commitment to your security 
and your place in a safe, strong, and democratic Europe.” He supported the Three 
Seas Initiative, and called the Polish people the “soul of Europe.” And when he 
mentioned the “courage and will to defend our civilization,” he was speaking 
directly to that Polish concept of defensive walls, operative from the Middle Ages 
to the battle along Jerusalem Avenue during the uprising. And, most importantly, 
he seized the diplomatic initiative before traveling to Hamburg to meet with 
Chancellor Merkel and President Putin: he laid down a marker. While pundits 
may debate whether he made the best possible declaration, there is no debating 
that it sent an unequivocal message to Germany, Russia, Poland, and the rest of 
Europe. It is difficult in a single message to recall history, reassure partners and 
allies, and caution rivals, but in less than an hour, in front of a monument on 
Krasiński Square, President Trump did just that.
The populations of the countries touching the Baltic total 292 million, and 
those countries include two of the world’s largest economies. While many histo-
rians focus on the land battles that raged back and forth across Poland in 1939 
and 1944–45, it should be recalled that the first rounds of the fighting were fired 
by ships into the cities lining the Gulf of Gdańsk, and that the largest mari-
time disaster ever, with an estimated 9,400 dead, was the Soviet sinking of MV
Wilhelm Gustloff in January 1945. The maritime domain—and the land ap-
proaches, rivers, and other riparian components of the “Sea of Amber”—remains 
a critical factor, not only in naval strategy and operational concepts, but with 
regard to the broader security interests and points of potential conflict in north-
ern Europe as well. While access from the high seas is a challenge in the BSR, the 
navigational restraints do not limit the influence of naval strategy. To challenge 
Mackinder: whoever controls the Baltic controls the granary of Europe—a truism 
at least since the time of Gustavus Adolphus. The impact of sea power and the 
fate of Europe—whether in terms of transiting warships or gas pipelines—are tied 
directly to the Baltic Sea. Strategists would do well to brush up on their history 
and follow the facts.
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REVIEW ESSAY
DESPERATELY SEEKING A NEW DR. STRANGELOVE
Sam J. Tangredi
The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, 
America’s Top Secret Military Research Agency, by Annie  
Jacobsen. New York: Little, Brown, 2015. 552 pages. $30.
As with many histories written by journalists, The Pentagon’s Brain promises 
more than it delivers. The hype begins with the subtitle’s promise of “an uncen-
sored history”—as if there is any real means by which the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), an overt government agency that makes no 
effort to hide its existence, could censor a report that is based on interviews and 
open sources. The fact that the Internet and the Global Positioning System origi-
nally were created with funding provided by ARPA (DARPA’s original name—the 
“Defense” was added later to identify to whom the agency belonged)—is com-
mon and repeated knowledge, and something in which DARPA takes pride. 
The author’s claim (p. 5) that it is “one of the most 
secretive and, until this book, the least investi-
gated” military science agencies is true only in 
that DARPA has received media attention only 
infrequently. Nothing particularly nefarious goes 
on in the agency itself, which (as the book admits) 
consists of about 120 program managers with aca-
demic backgrounds who fund classified research 
projects conducted by universities, think tanks, 
and defense industries. DARPA itself does no re-
search, and the ideas for the research it does fund 
usually are prompted and sponsored by other de-
fense agencies. DARPA is, in fact, boring—which 
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is probably why there have been few nongovernment books about its history. It is 
just hard to find a new Dr. Strangelove at DARPA.
The research DARPA does fund is indeed interesting and certainly worthy of 
examination. However, the book approaches this examination as if conducting 
an exposé and tries to suggest that some of these projects—whose particulars are 
classified, but whose general subject matter is apparent—constitute threats to 
humanity. It does this by linking the development of hydrogen weapons—with 
which DARPA had no involvement—with the agency’s current focus on artificial 
intelligence, to which the author refers as developing “killer robots.” The initial 
link is the fact that Herbert F. York, one of the scientists involved in developing 
the hydrogen bomb, became the first full director of ARPA/DARPA in 1958. Like 
many atomic scientists, York later regretted his involvement in nuclear weapons 
development and was a strong proponent of arms control; in contrast, York’s 
autobiography makes his time at ARPA seem quite fun. However, the author of 
this book spends much of the opening chapters discussing pre-1958 nuclear tests 
and the threat the resulting radiation represented. It takes some time for her to 
sort out which projects ARPA/DARPA actually initiated and which were under 
the control of other agencies of the Defense Department.
Jacobsen does identify the start of ARPA/DARPA efforts with the 1958 ARPA 
Study No. 1, which gathered together a group of defense scientists “‘to identify 
problems not now receiving adequate attention’ [York’s words] in the national 
security domain” (p. 65). For reasons unexplained, the group gave itself the 
mysterious title of “Project 137.” Thus, ARPA/DARPA began with a logical effort 
to determine whether scientific developments of the time constituted threats 
to American security. In the era of Sputnik, such developments were certainly 
apparent.
However, ARPA/DARPA did not always back the right horse. One of York’s 
first hires was Nicholas C. Christofilos, an elevator-repair technician and erst-
while self-taught scientist who claimed that high-energy electrons trapped in the 
earth’s magnetic field above the atmosphere could act as an antiballistic missile 
defense. Christofilos’s reputation rested on the fact that in 1948 he sent a letter to 
the University of California Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley describing the idea 
of a nuclear particle–accelerating synchrocyclotron, something that had been in-
vented only a few years previously. The letter apparently contained no engineer-
ing details, and was put aside. But in 1950 he sent a letter describing a different 
type of accelerator, similar to one that would only be built several years later. With 
a little self-promotion, Christofilos became viewed as a “strange kind of genius,” 
one whose ideas should not be ignored. To generate the high-energy electrons, 
a small nuclear warhead was launched from the test ship USS Norton Sound in 
the South Atlantic, but the “Christofilos effect” did not occur. The author tries to 
7130_ReviewEssay copy.indd   156 2/23/18   2:53 PM
162
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/1
R E V I E W  E S S AY 1 5 7
portray this as “the world’s first test of an electromagnetic pulse bomb (EMP)” 
(p. 71), but the EMP effect was already known, though not fully understood, and 
there is no evidence that EMP was examined during that particular test.
Evidence, or rather the lack of it, is what makes the book weak. Despite an 
extensive bibliography, Jacobsen bases her work primarily on over seventy in-
terviews she conducted with former ARPA/DARPA members—as well as others 
having no direct connection to DARPA. Many of the subjects were in their seven-
ties, eighties, or nineties—and ready to tell a good story. This biases her toward 
human-interest tales that often characterize people as heroes or villains. In a 
section on social-science research the RAND Corporation conducted in Vietnam 
in 1963, funded by ARPA, she finds her second “militarists not listening to the 
qualms of scientists” story (hydrogen weapons being the first). The RAND study 
averred that the Strategic Hamlet Program then being pursued inevitably would 
fail. In Jacobsen’s version, higher Pentagon officials pressured Harold Brown, 
the then ARPA director and future Secretary of Defense, to suppress the study 
and rebuke RAND’s leadership. But this interpretation is that of the scientists in-
volved, who were dismayed that while they briefed Brown on their findings “[he] 
turned his heavy chair around and looked out the window[,] leaving us to talk to 
the back of his chair.” Jacobsen does note (p. 141) that “perhaps Brown was simply 
contemplating the severity of the situation,” but the urge to turn this into a good-
versus-bad confrontation is too much for her to resist. This tendency continues 
through an extensive discussion of other Vietnam projects, such as “Jason,” the 
failed attempt to create an “electronic fence” of sensors to detect North Vietnam-
ese infiltration through the jungles. She finds quite a number of Vietnam veterans 
to interview about such improbable schemes and inevitable failures; however, 
she does interview them with considerable respect for their service and bravery.
There is an additional problem with Jacobsen’s reliance on interviews. Some 
of the statements made by those involved are not drawn from direct interviews 
but culled from autobiographies, oral histories, and other articles. However, it is 
difficult to determine which actually were conducted by the author and which 
were not, leaving the reader to wonder about the context of these statements. For 
example, the book contains many remarks by Herbert York, who died in 2009. 
It is likely that many of them come from his autobiography or other previous 
sources, but the author does not identify them in that fashion.
If one were to conclude that The Pentagon’s Brain is less a history and more 
a collection of human-interest stories strung together, he or she would be right. 
Some of the stories are indeed interesting; others are quite absurd. In addition 
to that of Christofilos, some other DARPA hires seem inexplicable. DARPA 
contracted retired admiral John M. Poindexter (after the Iran-Contra scandal) to 
serve as director of its Information Awareness Office, supervising a data-mining 
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effort called the Total Information Awareness project that critics saw as threaten-
ing civil liberties, and actually let him testify about it in front of the Senate. The 
testimony turned into a shouting match with Senate staffers; it was neither a wise 
nor a happy day for DARPA.
But a string of human-interest stories does not make a history. In fact, several 
of the human-interest stories seem to have no obvious connection to DARPA, 
particularly a lengthy section about a catastrophic brain injury suffered by Allen 
M. Dulles (son of CIA director Allen W. Dulles) in the Korean War that resulted 
in permanent short-term memory loss. Although the author spends considerable 
time interviewing Dulles and his family, the only possible linkage provided—
much later in the book (p. 421)—is DARPA’s funding of research “around trying 
to restore mind and memories of brain-wounded warriors.” No such research 
ever was conducted on Dulles himself.
The book concludes with a portrayal of current DARPA funding for drones, 
robots, artificial intelligence, and autonomous vehicles that is intended to cause 
alarm. As Jacobsen juxtaposes, “This book begins with scientists testing a weapon 
that at least some of them thought was an ‘evil thing’ [hydrogen bomb]. . . . This 
book ends with scientists inside the Pentagon working to create autonomous 
weapons systems, and scientists outside the Pentagon working to spread the 
idea that these weapons systems are inherently evil things, that artificially in-
telligent hunter-killer robots can and will outsmart their human creators, and 
against which there will be no defense” (p. 452). This is indeed a serious debate 
to examine, but Jacobsen interviews only three opposed scientists and relies on 
a single report. She does not develop the debate fully, and it certainly transcends 
a discussion of DARPA.
Perhaps the disconnections in the book simply point to the fact that its initial 
premise is wrong. A brain decides how to direct action, then other organs carry 
out the tasks. The Office of the Secretary of Defense—carrying out the will of the 
president and the funding of Congress—decides and directs the action; DARPA 
fills out the paperwork and moves the money. DARPA is not the Pentagon’s 
brain; that resides elsewhere. As for this book, an actual history of DARPA also 
lies elsewhere.
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BOOK REVIEWS
READERS: HERE ARE THE CHOSEN FEW—INCLUDING THE CHOSEN FEW
The Chosen Few: A Company of Paratroopers and Its Heroic Struggle to Survive in the Mountains of 
Afghanistan, by Gregg Zoroya. Boston: Da Capo, 2017. 370 pages. $27.
Gregg Zoroya chronicles the journey 
of the paratroopers of C Company, 
2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd 
Airborne Brigade—known as “the 
Chosen Few”—as they deployed to 
combat in Afghanistan and fought in 
some of the most violent and bloody 
battles during 2007 and 2008. In his 
foreword, Admiral William McRaven, 
USN (Ret.), highlights that during the 
fifteen-month deployment, nearly two-
thirds of the soldiers among the Chosen 
Few were injured and awarded the 
Purple Heart. Eventually, two of them, 
Specialist Kyle J. White and Sergeant 
Ryan M. Pitts, would receive the Medal 
of Honor for their heroism and bravery 
in close combat with the enemy.
Initially, Zoroya describes the soldiers’ 
backgrounds and how they came 
together at Fort Benning, Georgia, and 
later in Vicenza, Italy. The soldiers of 
the Chosen Few were a reflection of 
contemporary working-class America. 
They joined the Army in search of a 
better life and better opportunities for 
the future. The Army provided them 
with structure, a full-time job, and much 
more. “A large number of ‘the Chosen 
Few’ came from broken homes and 
arrived in the Army without a father 
figure, or at least none who had been 
around full-time. Some were like lost 
boys searching without realizing it for 
a surrogate family after a childhood of 
abuse or neglect.” Joining the Army was 
about being a part of something bigger 
than themselves—a first for many of 
them—with their buddies eventually 
becoming their second family.
Zoroya does a superb job highlighting 
the nuances of the soldiers’ personalities, 
their relationships with one another, 
and how they came to meld together. 
He traces the lighthearted moments 
as well as the gruesome details these 
soldiers faced as they fought against 
overwhelming odds at the Ranch House 
command post, on the cliffs of the 
Waigal valley, and again at the battle 
of Wanat. Zoroya conducted count-
less interviews with soldiers, family 
members, and others to bring the details 
of each fight to life so that readers feel 
as if they were actually there. But this is 
more than just an account of one unit’s 
combat actions; the reader also feels 
the camaraderie, love, and respect these 
soldiers shared—they were willing to 
fight and even die for one another.
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The resiliency, dedication, and mental 
toughness that the Chosen Few soldiers 
displayed, even though medevac assets 
and air support were lacking, are 
commendable. At Wanat, they were 
on their own in enemy territory and 
outnumbered by enemy insurgents just 
meters outside their fighting positions. 
Yet they continued to fight, looking 
out for one another in a way that only 
those in close combat can understand. 
In combat, soldiers fight for one another 
more than anything else—they do not 
want to let their buddies down.
The book raises the question: How 
can the world’s most powerful military 
put soldiers in harm’s way with only 
limited resources and support? Lieuten-
ant Colonel Bill Ostlund, battalion 
commander of the 2/503 Infantry, 
noted that the entire “brigade had 
six Apache attack helicopters, and at 
times as many as four were down for 
maintenance. It was taking way too long 
to get the wounded off the battlefield.” 
Wanat was a travesty, not just another 
bureaucratic oversight; the U.S. military 
establishment clearly was surprised 
and could not react quickly enough.
The July 2008 battle of Wanat itself was 
horrific, and the fallout devastating for 
all. Those who survived were tormented 
by guilt, wondering what more they 
could have done. The Army, for its 
part, conducted several investigations, 
released the findings, and then amended 
the findings. Careers were ruined, and 
some leaders left the Army. Even more 
tragic, families lost faith in the chain 
of command and the Army leadership, 
because it seemed that no one was 
held accountable for the circumstances 
surrounding and the casualties result-
ing from the battle of Wanat.
There are important lessons to be 
learned from reading about these brave 
soldiers of the Chosen Few. Zoroya 
makes the following point: “Just as 
military teachers for decades strolled 
with students across the battlefields at 
Gettysburg, Shiloh, and other famous 
engagements to learn the art of war, 
they [should] also virtually tour Wanat 
in the years ahead.” These are lessons 
that should not have to be relearned 
each time U.S. forces engage in combat 
operations, and that is why the battle of 
Wanat will be studied by young men and 
women at the U.S. Military Academy 
and in college Reserve Officers’ Training 
Corps (i.e., ROTC) detachments across 
the United States for years to come. 
Zoroya has done a masterful job of 
highlighting the brave soldiers of the 
Chosen Few. This book is a must-read 
for military leaders at any level.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS
No Room for Mistakes: British and Allied Sub-
marine Warfare 1939–1940, by Geirr H. Haarr. 
Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2015. 450 pages. $49.95.
No Room for Mistakes is a meticulously 
researched and well-written history of 
the British and Allied submarine ser-
vices from 1939 to 1940. The relatively 
short time span the book covers allows 
the author, Geirr Haarr, to delve into 
granular detail, often giving week-
by-week, even day-by-day, accounts 
of particular submarines and their 
travails fighting the German navy in the 
eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.
The book’s first chapter follows the 
tragic story of HMS Thetis during the 
first half of 1939. Shortly after it left 
the Cammell Laird shipyards near 
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Liverpool, England, a series of mistakes 
coupled with some very bad luck left 
the ship lying on the floor of the Irish 
Sea. Only a few survivors made it to 
the surface to be rescued. Eventually, 
Thetis was salvaged, repaired, and sent 
back into service. At first, this particular 
story might seem out of place; after 
all, the German military was nowhere 
near Thetis when it sank. Yet after a few 
chapters it is clear that Thetis’s story 
artfully sets the tone for the entire book.
In 1939, there really was no room for 
mistakes. Everything about submarine 
warfare in the early years of World 
War II was experimental, and the 
margin for human error was paper-thin. 
Hull designs, weapon systems, and 
navigational equipment had undergone 
evolutionary leaps since the early 
U-boats of World War I—and crews had 
to learn how to operate them on the fly. 
Although crews learned quickly and 
often achieved remarkable results, the 
cost of not learning quickly enough, as 
with Thetis, was high. Questions such as 
the optimal depth and spread for firing 
torpedoes, equipment configurations, 
and maneuvering tactics remained 
unresolved throughout this period.
Even bigger unknowns surrounded 
operational employment. Some in 
the British Admiralty argued that 
submarines should be used primar-
ily for surveillance; others argued for 
minelaying or direct engagement of 
surface vessels. After some early success 
seemed to settle the debate in favor of 
surface engagements, the German navy 
became increasingly adept at thwarting 
submarine attacks through the use 
of convoys and air cover. Increasing 
British losses from these improved 
German tactics restarted the debate 
on how submarines should be used.
Difficulties for the submarine service 
multiplied after the successful German 
invasions of Norway and France in 
1940. British submarines now found 
themselves under threat of air attack 
from the moment they left home, and 
there were few neutral or allied ports 
outside the home islands where a captain 
could seek refuge if his boat suffered 
battle damage. As the summer of 1940 
advanced and nights became shorter, it 
was also increasingly difficult for boats 
to charge their batteries on the surface 
without being detected and driven 
underwater. These circumstances frayed 
the nerves of even the most experienced 
sailors—a point Haarr drives home with 
his excellent narration and extensive use 
of ships’ deck logs and crew diaries.
No Room for Mistakes is appropriate 
for both junior and senior personnel 
in the military as well as enthusiasts of 
military history. Although submariners 
will have the easiest time relating to 
the material, individuals from every 
branch and service will be inspired by 
the bravery of British submarine sailors. 
Additionally, the level of detail in No 
Room for Mistakes makes it an invalu-
able resource for anyone researching a 
particular aspect of military operations 
or naval tactical developments during 
the early World War II period.
My favorite aspect of No Room for Mis-
takes is Haarr’s extensive use of primary 
sources, including diaries, logs, journals, 
and photographs. These materials help 
make the historical account of this 
period much more poignant and remind 
the reader of the high human cost of 
war at sea. No Room for Mistakes is an 
excellent addition to a personal library 
and is recommended particularly to 
anyone with an interest in naval history.
CHARLES T. LEWIS
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Great Strategic Rivalries: From the Classical World 
to the Cold War, ed. James G. Lacey. New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2016. 680 pages. $47.95.
Edited by James Lacey of the Marine 
Corps War College, this collection’s 
sixteen essays explore prolonged 
strategic rivalries, beginning with 
Athens, Sparta, and the Peloponnesian 
War, and ending with the Cold War 
rivalry between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. Each essay explores 
a rivalry’s nature and causes, the 
reasons it endured, how it ended, and 
its legacy. While some revisit well-
trodden ground, such as Paul A. Rahe’s 
discussion of the Peloponnesian War, 
others offer interesting new insights.
Sally Paine’s analysis of the three-sided 
struggle among China, Japan, and Russia 
for regional dominance highlights the 
importance of developing civic and eco-
nomic institutions to support military 
power, conducting long-term planning, 
securing allies, and focusing on the right 
enemies. Nineteenth-century China 
failed to do any of these, and reaped the 
consequences in a succession of military 
defeats and “unequal treaties.” Chinese 
leaders went to war with Britain and 
France—distant powers that posed little 
threat to China—instead of focusing on 
nearby and more dangerous Russia.
Kathleen M. Burk’s impressive essay 
on Great Britain and the United States 
illuminates a multifaceted rivalry 
that involved both cooperation and 
competition and was often more 
commercial than military. Its slow, 
peaceful end in the twentieth century 
made it particularly unusual, as British 
leaders urged the United States to 
assume primary responsibility for 
regions critical to British security.
In contrast, Christine Shaw’s analysis 
of Genoa and Venice demonstrates 
that commercial rivalries can be quite 
bloody, involving not only conventional 
military operations but raids on trade 
quarters in foreign ports and piracy. 
Despite their bitter rivalry, Genoa 
and Venice too sometimes fought the 
same enemies, as when both joined the 
Holy League to fight the Ottomans.
Kenneth W. Harl’s analysis of the long 
rivalry between Rome and the Parthians 
and Persians underlines geography’s 
enduring influence. Defeat of one 
enemy can pave the way for a new, 
more powerful one, such as Sassanid 
Persia. The Ottoman Turks, in turn, 
inherited Byzantium and Rome’s 
rivalry with Persia, and faced the same 
strategic problem of securing borders 
and waging war in an arid region.
Kelly R. DeVries explores the role of 
secondary powers in these rivalries 
by examining Anglo-French rivalry 
during the Middle Ages. Maintaining 
the wool trade required English rulers 
to support rebellions and wars by the 
Low Countries against France, the Holy 
Roman Empire, and Spain. Similarly, 
English campaigning focused on secur-
ing and defending the port of Calais so 
England could control both ends of the 
wool trade. Hoping to weaken England, 
Scotland and Wales aided France.
Matt Schumann and Michael V. 
Leggiere cover the later stages of the 
Anglo-French rivalry, in which Britain 
prevailed owing to superior economic 
and maritime power, though not without 
committing substantial troops to 
fight on the European continent. Like 
DeVries, both authors adroitly blend 
discussions of military and economic 
factors. Leggiere’s cost-benefit analysis 
of Napoleon’s Continental System 
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and its effect on global trade is par-
ticularly thorough and well argued.
Troubled by distance, information 
overload, and numerous local rivals 
to their scattered holdings, the Haps-
burgs, Geoffrey Parker notes, were 
almost always at war, often in different 
places against different enemies. Their 
empire’s status as the leading Catholic 
power further complicated the strategic 
situation and influenced important 
strategic decisions. Despite the logistical 
and operational problems the Spanish 
Armada faced, Philip II believed that 
divine favor would bring it victory 
against England. Religion often proved 
less an obstacle to the Hapsburgs’ rivals, 
as demonstrated by France’s alliance 
with the Ottoman Empire, which 
Andrew Wheatcroft’s essay details.
Geoffrey Wawro, Williamson Murray, 
William M. Morgan, Robert M. Citino, 
and James H. Anderson, respectively, ex-
plore more-recent rivalries: France ver-
sus Germany, Britain versus Germany, 
the United States versus Japan, Germany 
versus Russia, and the United States 
versus the Soviet Union. Citino places 
the Nazi-Soviet pact in the historical 
context of earlier partitions of Poland 
and argues that “German-Russian 
strategic rivalry was the real and proxi-
mate cause of World War I” (p. 465).
Lacey’s introduction ties the essays 
together and highlights their com-
monalities, such as the economic and 
financial systems needed to support 
protracted rivalries. Rivalries often begin 
and end with shocks to the international 
system, such as the rise of new powers 
or the collapse of old ones; examples 
include the Athenian-Spartan rivalry 
that arose after the Persian threat to 
Greece receded and the long-standing 
Anglo-French rivalry that ended when 
Germany arose as a new threat to both 
nations. Fear, honor, and interest—
categories introduced by Thucydides 
in his history of the Peloponnesian 
War—cause rivalries to endure.
Strategic rivalry is a topic worthy of 
more research, particularly since, as 
Lacey notes, disputes between enduring 
rivals are twice as likely to lead to war 
as disputes between nations without 
a history of rivalry. The breadth and 
depth of this book’s essays make it an 
excellent choice for a course text.
STEPHEN K. STEIN
Churchill & Orwell: The Fight for Freedom, by 
Thomas E. Ricks. New York: Penguin, 2017. 352 
pages. $28.
George Orwell and Winston S. Churchill 
do not strike us as two men whose 
surnames would share a dust jacket. 
One only has to look at David Levine’s 
clever caricatures in the New York 
Review of Books for two entirely different 
men to appear: Orwell the rustic, in 
tweeds, chewing on a piece of hay; and 
Churchill, clad in coronation robes, 
the king of his own dominion. Yet 
Thomas Ricks, a journalist formerly 
at the Washington Post, has written 
an interesting book, a dual biography 
of sorts that claims that the men had 
much in common as they fought 
fascism and Communism, two of the 
greatest evils of the twentieth century.
Ricks focuses on the “fulcrum” years 
of Orwell’s and Churchill’s lives—the 
1930s and 1940s. And this is just as 
well, because if they had died before 
1940 they would be remembered little 
today, if at all. A sniper’s bullet almost 
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took Orwell’s life during the Spanish 
Civil War, and if it had he would be 
remembered today as a talented essayist 
and mediocre novelist; while Churchill, 
almost killed by a car in New York City 
in 1931, would be remembered as the 
man who lost Gallipoli and deserted 
one political party for another.
Ricks tells the tale of these two men, 
who, in their own ways—through their 
writing, speech, and actions—fought 
to “preserve the liberty of the indi-
vidual during an age when the state 
was becoming powerfully intrusive 
into private life.” He begins by touching 
briefly on their early years: Churchill’s 
journey as a soldier, journalist, writer, 
and eventually politician; and Orwell’s 
time as a police officer in Burma, 
which would alter his life and lead 
him to write some of the best essays 
in the English language—namely, “A 
Hanging” and “Shooting an Elephant.” 
From there we are ushered quickly to 
the historical events that would make 
them the men we remember today.
Orwell’s defining moment was the 
Spanish Civil War and his participa-
tion in a leftist (Trotskyist) political 
organization known as POUM. It fought 
against Franco’s Nationalists, but owing 
to its anti-Stalinist platform the same 
Republican forces that supposedly were 
Orwell’s allies placed a death sentence 
on his head. He barely escaped Spain 
alive, with the Soviet secret police in 
close pursuit. His experience in the 
war would provide the grist for his 
famous novels Animal Farm and 1984.
Churchill’s moment came a few years 
later, in 1940–41. During these two 
precarious years, Churchill was thrust 
into the fray as prime minister, staved 
off Nazi appeasers, and rallied England 
to endure and prevail during the 
Battle of Britain, eventually securing 
much-needed support from the United 
States. The rest, as they say, is history.
Ricks’s book is a work of appreciation; 
he admits he has admired both men for 
some time. However, he does not appre-
ciate them so much that he glosses over 
their less admirable traits. A quick flip 
through the (thorough) index reveals 
references to Orwell’s anti-Semitism and 
Churchill’s drinking. Ricks even man-
ages to fit a sentence into the book refer-
ring to the unfortunate praise Churchill 
lavished on the fascist Italian dictator 
Benito Mussolini in the 1920s. Thus it is 
a credit to Ricks’s pacing and power of 
distillation that he squeezed both men 
into a book that numbers around three 
hundred pages. This is no easy task; 
Orwell wrote over two million words 
in his lifetime, and reading Churchill’s 
autobiographical six-volume series The 
Second World War alone requires one 
to scour over four thousand pages.
Placing Orwell and Churchill together 
in a single book does invite contrast, 
however. The late writer and journalist 
Christopher Hitchens once said that 
Orwell was right about the three big sub-
jects of the twentieth century: Commu-
nism, fascism, and imperialism. On the 
latter, while Ricks’s two subjects never 
met, we can speculate safely that they 
would have disagreed vehemently. Ricks 
does not delve into this contrast deeply, 
yet it was a defining issue for both men. 
Churchill would remain a staunch 
imperialist his entire life, and is callously 
quotable on the issue (on Gandhi: “[He] 
ought to be lain bound hand and foot at 
the gates of Delhi, and then trampled on 
by an enormous elephant with the new 
Viceroy seated on its back”). Orwell, 
on the other hand, saw imperialism 
up close during his posting in Burma, 
and would rail against power in all its 
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forms throughout the rest of his life. But 
readers be warned: do not invite a moral 
equivalency test between these two 
men. Orwell was a frustrated moralist, 
while Churchill, for all his success, was 
a politician—a man who, for most of 
his life, sought power and its trappings.
There are many great books on Orwell 
and Churchill. If you already have read 
D. J. Taylor’s fine biography of Orwell 
and cracked William Manchester’s 
biography of Churchill, then Ricks’s 
work may seem like tilled soil. Consider, 
then, reading Christopher Hitchens’s 
Why Orwell Matters or perhaps David 
Reynolds’s In Command of History, a 
fascinating story of Churchill’s produc-
tion of his memoir The Second World 
War and a sure testament to the 
fact that those who win wars get to 
write the history. Regardless, this is 
a fine book for anyone interested in 
reacquainting themselves with either 
luminary, or for those curious to see 
both in a complementary light.
CHRISTOPHER NELSON
The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought, 
by Lukas Milevski. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2016. 175 pages. $80.
At first glance, telling the story of the 
evolution of grand strategy would seem 
to be a straightforward project. The term 
grand strategy is encountered often in a 
variety of disciplines, each of which at-
taches importance to the idea. However, 
as Lukas Milevski demonstrates, the task 
is far more challenging than it appears.
The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic 
Thought is essentially Milveski’s doctoral 
dissertation. It is not a book especially 
suited to the lay reader. Milevski is 
thorough in this effort—he does not 
appear to have overlooked anyone of 
importance. Milevski explains that 
one of the major difficulties associ-
ated with grand strategic thought is a 
notable lack of a commonly agreed-upon 
definition of the term. He identifies six 
interpretations of the term in current 
use, of which five are associated with 
particular scholars and each of which 
presumably has passionate adherents. 
It is easy to imagine how Milevski 
must have felt as, in his own words, he 
began his doctoral research “believing 
I knew what a grand strategy was and 
how I would use the concept,” only to 
discover that “there were simply too 
many distinct and even contradictory 
definitions of grand strategy” (p. 1).
The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic 
Thought takes a chronological approach 
to the subject, and explains how the con-
text of the times affected contemporary 
thinking on grand strategy. Divided into 
eight chapters, the work starts during 
the Napoleonic Wars, anchoring grand 
strategy’s origin as a military concept, 
as “interpreted” by Carl von Clausewitz 
and Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini.
Those privileged to work within the halls 
of the Naval War College and its Royal 
Navy counterpart will not be surprised 
to find that great maritime strategists, 
notably Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian 
Corbett, deserve places of prominence 
as theorists of grand strategy. Milevski 
reminds the reader that Stephen B. 
Luce brought Mahan to the Naval War 
College to teach strategy; however, as the 
College initially lacked students, Mahan 
had almost three years to refine this 
thinking before giving his first lecture. 
In comparing these two great naval strat-
egists, Milevski identifies Mahan as the 
more influential, but considers Corbett 
superior as a thinker on grand strategy.
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The period bookended between the first 
days of World War I and the last days of 
World War II was productive for grand 
strategists. Milevski details the rise of 
J. F. C. Fuller and Basil H. Liddell Hart, 
rightly described as “giants of British 
strategic thought.” Also discussed are the 
works of other strategists, notably Henry 
Antony Sargeaunt and Geoffrey West. 
The shadow of the First World War 
looms heavily over this portion of the 
book, and Milevski does an admirable 
job of showing how the war influenced 
the thinking of these strategists. Each 
was determined to avoid the horrors 
of the trenches and the near-fatal 
blows dealt winners and losers alike.
Milevski explains how postwar thinking 
about grand strategy took a different 
direction in the United States. Edward 
Mead Earle was a rising strategist, as 
was Captain George Meyers, USN, who 
lectured on strategy at the Naval War 
College. Not since Mahan had U.S. 
strategists engaged in “such serious, 
in depth development” of the grand 
strategic concept. Central to their work 
was a perceived need to link military 
ends to political results. Ironically, much 
of this thinking would be discarded after 
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki ushered in the age of nuclear 
strategy. Milevski argues that scholars 
forgot the “notion” of grand strategy as 
their attention focused on nuclear strate-
gy and limited-war theory. During these 
discussions, more names joined the list 
of scholars dealing with grand strategy, 
including John Gaddis, Bernard Brodie, 
Henry Kissinger, and Herman Kahn.
Milevski states that during this period 
limited-war theory came into existence; 
prior to this, national power was used 
to prevent or win wars. During this 
time, Milevski credits the Naval War 
College with serving as the center of 
what little study on grand strategy was 
undertaken. Milevski explains this 
phenomenon by noting that nuclear 
strategy protected and preserved the 
Air Force, while limited-war strategy 
served a similar function for the Army. 
Lacking such intellectual cover, the 
Navy stayed focused on grand strategy.
Grand strategic thought reemerged in 
the 1970s in the wake of the Vietnam 
War. New academics took up the study 
of grand strategy; Milevski identifies 
John M. Collins, Edward N. Luttwak, 
and Barry R. Posen. Paul M. Kennedy 
gets credit for building on Liddell Hart’s 
work, and Luttwak’s work is noted as 
being similar to Earle’s, in that Luttwak’s 
ideas of grand strategy are “effectively 
synonymous with military statecraft.” In 
contrast, Posen’s view of grand strategy, 
according to Milevski, focuses on “relat-
ing military ends to political means.”
In addition to discussing the major 
definitions of grand strategy, Milevski 
also has included unique applications. 
Here too the Naval War College 
contributed to the field. Historian 
John B. Hattendorf broke ground in 
using grand strategy as an analytical 
tool. The late William C. Martel, who 
taught at both the Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy and the Naval War 
College, turned the strategy-policy 
relationship—“one of the core concerns 
of strategic studies”—on its head.
In the end, Milevski concludes, “Grand 
strategy remains a standardless, incoher-
ent concept” (p. 141). Its interpretations 
and explanations have been author-
centric, and instances of scholars such 
as Collins and Kennedy being willing to 
refer to earlier definitions of the term 
are rare. Despite the decades of study, 
there is still no common definition of 
the term, and new definitions continue 
to multiply. At present, according to 
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Milevski, the state of grand strategic 
thinking is “unhelpful” and requires 
“rehabilitation” before that state can 
change. To say that this conclusion is 
surprising is something of an under-
statement, and it will be interesting to 
see how many scholars of grand strategy 
agree with Milevski in this regard.
RICHARD J. NORTON
A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace, by Har-
lan K. Ullman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 2014. 214 pages. $34.95.
The legacies of the First World War 
are many, and Harlan K. Ullman, a 
respected national security practitioner 
and academic, offers a thought-
provoking snapshot of some of the 
current challenges facing the United 
States that can be linked back to the 
war. The book focuses on current policy 
debates, but simultaneously attempts 
to relate back to historical events. 
Ullman argues that the current threat 
environment began revealing itself 
when Gavrilo Princip assassinated the 
archduke of Austria, thus launching the 
First World War with only a handful of 
bullets. Today, Ullman contends that 
there are all kinds of Gavrilo Princips in 
the world who can throw international 
order into a tailspin. More significantly, 
the author argues that the means and 
methods of doing so have multiplied.
Ullman’s foundational argument is that 
individuals and groups now can have 
increased impact vis-à-vis the state. This 
change occurred because of the gradual 
unraveling of the Westphalian system 
and the erosion of state sovereignty 
over the last decades. Power is now 
diffused among so many people and 
devices that they cannot be quantified. 
The consequence is a world with “four 
new horsemen of the apocalypse”: 
failed governments; economic despair, 
disparity, and dislocation; radical 
ideologies; and environmental calam-
ity. These represent the main threats 
on which the United States should 
focus, but unfortunately our policy is 
grounded in the past, and our present 
strategies address the symptoms instead 
of the causes of these threats. This new 
environment is difficult for governments 
to manage; the United States in particu-
lar does not have a system in place that 
enables it to cope. Ullman argues that 
our political-military system merely 
hops back and forth from one crisis 
to the next without any real strategy.
The author argues that the United States 
desperately needs sounder strategic 
thinking. The extent of the national 
debt means that resources for project-
ing military power will be more and 
more limited. When a state’s chief 
enemies possess no organized military 
or economic base, traditional military 
power exerts less influence. The United 
States must become smarter in spending 
for national defense and must formulate 
strategies that take into account not 
just Iran, China, and Al Qaeda but all 
the overarching challenges it faces, as 
well as the wild card scenarios that 
can emanate from them. However, the 
author keenly observes that this strategic 
change is unlikely to occur, given the 
dysfunction and vitriol in our political 
system. Our elected leaders have a 
short-term obsession with winning 
elections and with the continuous 
pursuit of dollars for campaign financ-
ing. As many others surely would agree, 
Ullman worries that only major crises 
can create the impetus for real change.
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Ullman’s main points are sound, even 
difficult to disagree with. But most of 
the points are not new. Furthermore, the 
book at times reads like a laundry list of 
things and people with which the author 
does not agree; he often voices this 
disagreement but provides little depth 
or analysis. He bounces around among 
multiple topics somewhat chaotically, 
from Vladimir Putin to presidential in-
experience to Iran’s nuclear ambitions to 
universal voting, and so forth. He wades 
into cyber. Climate change gets its own 
chapter. Infrastructure investment holds 
critical importance to him. And then the 
author tries to relate most of this back 
to the First World War. Sometimes the 
historical comparison has coherence, but 
at other times it does not work as well.
Nevertheless, the book structures itself 
in a unique way and provides a powerful 
argument for critical reform in the 
national security arena—even as the 
author himself notes it is unlikely his 
reforms will be implemented. Particu-
larly penetrating are the reasons given 
for why the current national security ap-
paratus is unsuitable to the task. The rate 
of government development has not kept 
up with the pace at which challenges are 
arising and the complexity of the world 
is increasing. Ullman argues that this 
has been demonstrated by the derelict 
mismanagement of the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the haphazard drone 
policy, and the government’s present vul-
nerability to cyber attacks. To meet these 
challenges, our government’s new course 
of strategic thinking must effectuate 
a restructuring on par with the 1947 
National Security Act. We must reform 
NATO into a multilateral institution 
capable of countering modern threats. 
Ullman argues for creating new metrics 
for measuring and understanding state 
power. The author also offers a variety 
of other, less controversial, unsystematic 
proposals. Depending on one’s perspec-
tive, the reader may find the book’s argu-
ments to be somber and discouraging, 
to constitute a passionate call for action, 
or perhaps simply to represent a realistic 
paradigm for the present day. Whichever 
way, Ullman’s book is a worthwhile read, 
and national security experts should 
consider his conceptual arguments.
JEREMY SNELLEN
Hannibal, by Patrick N. Hunt. New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 2017. 362 pages. $28.
The ancient historian Polybius cautioned 
against writing about a place to which 
one had not been, and Hannibal 
biographer and author Patrick N. Hunt 
has heeded this warning. An archaeolo-
gist and historian who has taught at 
Stanford University since 1993, Hunt 
has walked and studied every major 
Hannibal battlefield and tracked the 
military leader’s routes from Carthage 
through Spain, France, Italy, and Turkey. 
The National Geographic Society’s 
Expedition Council sponsored Hunt’s 
2007 and 2008 Hannibal expeditions. 
His archaeological fieldwork has 
concentrated on Hannibal for decades, 
and from 1994 to 2012 he was director 
of the Stanford Alpine Archaeology 
Project, leading expeditions in the Alps 
to explore routes Hannibal might have 
taken on his march on Rome. Hunt 
thus comes to the topic with decades 
of research, and this new biography 
is a welcome addition to the study of 
Hannibal and his methods of warfare. 
The result is a well-written study 
delivered via an engaging narrative.
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Hunt provides a balanced and informa-
tive biography of a leader whom many 
regard as a military genius, analyzing 
Hannibal’s weaknesses as well as 
his strengths. When people think of 
Hannibal, it is usually in reference to his 
use of elephants in the Alps in 218 BCE, 
but there is much more to the famous 
leader than this daunting mountain 
trek. Hannibal was born about 247 
BCE and was raised in the aftermath 
of the bitter defeat of Carthage by 
Rome in the First Punic War. He was 
reared by his father, Hamilcar Barca, a 
Carthaginian general and statesman, 
to make and carry through on a vow 
to defeat Rome. Hunt’s first chapter is 
dedicated to that vow to take revenge 
against the Romans, which was taken 
in the Temple of Baal in Carthage. At 
other places throughout the work Hunt 
reminds readers of the importance of 
religion in Roman and Punic cultures, 
and recounts its use by Hannibal and 
Roman civic and military leaders 
throughout the Second Punic War.
Hannibal’s father died when Hannibal 
was in his teens, but the young man had 
learned well from him and rose quickly 
as a military leader. Determined and 
growing in power, Hannibal began a 
nearly two-decade war against Rome. 
Hunt contends that Hannibal had 
“an ability to understand and exploit 
weaknesses” (p. 24) and that he used 
that skill throughout his career. Coupled 
with his ability to make accurate military 
observations and assessments, this made 
him into a formidable foe against Rome.
In his account Hunt balances quite 
well the many classical sources, such as 
Polybius and Livy, with contemporary 
scholarship. His biography flows at 
a good pace and provides readers a 
well-documented work. His endnotes 
are thorough and interesting (note 
particularly his comments on Hannibal’s 
eye disorder in the Arno marshes in 
the spring of 217 BCE and the military 
technology of Archimedes at Syracuse 
in 214–212 BCE), providing ample 
information and explanatory details 
for those who want to go deeper into 
specific topics. He does this without 
meanderings in the body of the text. The 
result is a delightful book to read and 
study. For this reviewer, the chapters on 
Hannibal in the Alps (chapter 9), the 
battle of Cannae (15), and the march on 
Rome (17) were the most captivating. 
Chapters on the campaign for southern 
Italy (16), the battle of Zama (22), and 
Hannibal’s exile (23) may be the most 
instructive for current military leaders, 
as Hunt describes Hannibal’s inability to 
reach a satisfying conclusion swiftly. He 
was a pragmatic leader and victorious 
in battle, but he could not win the war. 
Hunt understands the battle of Cannae 
(216 BCE) as Hannibal’s pinnacle, but 
points out that it was also, ultimately, his 
undoing—the beginning of a ten-year 
occupation of southern Italy that 
gradually wore him down. Afterward he 
would be recalled to Carthage to fight 
the battle of Zama (202 BCE), a victory 
for Rome and Scipio Africanus that 
brought an end to the Second Punic War.
Hunt is at his best in showing how 
Hannibal skillfully used nature, 
geography, and weather to enhance his 
military strategies and planning. Of 
special interest to naval historians is 
Hunt’s analysis of how, during the long 
campaign in southern Italy, Roman na-
val superiority prevented Hannibal from 
securing the support of allies through 
diplomacy. Despite Hannibal’s success 
in building coalitions, his skillful use of 
intelligence, and his ability to adapt new 
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weapons technologies, he lacked the 
diplomatic skills to sustain his resources 
and thereby defeat his lifelong foe.
Hunt’s Hannibal has excellent maps 
as well as an extensive bibliography. 
A brief chronology would have been 
helpful for a quick overview, but the 
chapter subsections and use of dates 
throughout the narrative help keep 
the reader on track. The volume 
is tremendous and highly recom-
mended for the library of any military 
professional or military historian.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Timothy J. Demy is a professor of military ethics at the Naval War College. He is a retired Navy 
chaplain and graduate of the Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare. Among other graduate 
degrees, he received the ThM and ThD from Dallas Theological Seminary and the MA and PhD 
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Thomas J. Gibbons has worked for the associate provost at the Naval War College since 2008. 
He is a retired Army colonel and has a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, an MS from George 
Washington University, an MA from the Naval War College, and an EdD from Johnson & Wales 
University. 
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
Surveys have shown that truly successful people, from whatever walk of life, are driven by a desire for self-improvement and personal growth. They are never 
content to go into a holding pattern after achieving some milestone; they always 
are setting new goals and working diligently to accomplish them. This is particu-
larly true within the U.S. Navy, since the organization selects and promotes its 
leaders on the basis of merit, demonstrated past performance, and indicators for 
probable future success. In January 2017, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
released his Navy Leader Development Framework, which can be found on the 
CNO Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) website and at www.navy.mil/
cno/docs/NLDF_Final.pdf. The framework states as follows:
When we imagine truly world class leaders—those who are consistently at the top 
of the pack; victorious in the most challenging contests—they embody one essential 
quality: 
Top leaders inspire their teams to perform at or near their theoretical limits. By 
making their teams stronger, they relentlessly chase “best ever” performance. They 
study every text, try every method, seize every moment, and expend every effort to 
outfox their competition. They ceaselessly communicate, train, test, and challenge 
their teams. They are toughest on themselves; they routinely seek out feedback, and 
are ready to be shown their errors in the interest of learning and getting better. When 
they win, they are grateful, humble, and spent from their effort. By doing all these 
things, great leaders bring their teams to a deeply shared commitment to each other 
in the pursuit of victory.
The framework details two parallel lanes that sailors should follow on their 
personal paths of leader development. Lane 1 develops operational and war-
fighting competence, and lane 2 develops character. There are three methods to 
move down the path: education and certification obtained from a network of 
schools; on-the-job training and qualification; and “[s]elf-guided learning through 
reading and other forms of research and self-study.” Of particular interest to the 
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managers of the CNO-PRP is the role that a career-long commitment to profes-
sional reading can play in building the leaders the Navy and the nation will need 
in the future. The framework further states as follows:
• “Self-study is . . . important in character development, and the opportunities 
have never been better. The CNO’s suggested reading list provides a jumping-
off point to build knowledge about both competence and character.”
• “The intensity of one’s self-guided learning effort is perhaps the most direct 
reflection of the drive to be the best leader possible.”
• “Leaders with the passion to make themselves and their teams the best do not 
wait for schools . . . they get to it on their own.”
Reading can serve as a form of “connective tissue” between people, and can 
provide concepts that help facilitate the very personal connections between lead-
ers and subordinates. Some books are great for giving us ideas, methods, and 
tools; other books are instructional about how to use these things; and others 
paint a vibrant portrait of leadership as a process through which we recognize 
the value of every person with whom we connect. Each of these is fundamental 
to organizational leadership, and reading can help us learn about ourselves and 
what the framework of leadership looks like.
All sailors are encouraged to spend some time investigating the wealth of 
information available on the CNO-PRP website. It lists the titles of over 150 
books of interest and direct relevance to all segments of the Navy—all warfare 
and staff communities, officers and enlisted personnel, and Department of the 
Navy civilians. It provides links that enable registered users of the Navy Morale, 
Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) digital library to download digital versions of 
many books. The site even recommends movies and videos that illustrate aspects 
of the Navy’s history and heritage. Admiral Richardson has said: “If you find just 
one book on this list that challenges you as a leader, then it has been a success.”
The CNO-PRP management team challenges every sailor to read at least one 
book from the program each month during 2018. We guarantee this effort will 
make you better able to contribute to maintaining maritime superiority for the 
nation.
JOHN E. JACKSON
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   172 2/23/18   10:51 AM
178
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/1
